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6. 
In order to prevent a husband from co-ercing his wife into 
transferring her separate estate to him, in the late eighteenth 
century 22 Lord Thurlow created an exception to the general rule 
that equity declares void any attempt to impose a direct restraint 
upon a disponee's powers of alienation. 23 Henceforth a practice 
developed whereby property transferred for the separate use of a 
married woman was given "without power of anticipation", although 
a similarly worded limitation would suffice. 24 The married woman 
was thereby disabled during coverture from alienating the property 
or anticipating its future income. Just as the restraint protected 
the wife against a predatory husband, it also operated against her 
creditors. While she could devise or bequeath the property in 
question, she could neither sell nor mortgage it, not could her 
creditors claim it in satisfaction of any debts she might have owed 
them. 25 Courts of equity had no jurisdiction to override or modify 
a particular restraint on alienation in the interests of the married 
woman who was subject to it. 
Because of the basic economic changes caused by the Industrial 
Revolution with its attendant specialisation of the labour and 
concentration of production in factories, society also changed. 
It became more mobile and more urbanized and many wives gained 
employment in the new factories. 26 Very little production was now 
carried out in the home and the husband, away - at work for long 
periods, found that his power position in the family was weakened. 27 
Since changes in the family had economic causes, these were most 
likely to be reflected in that field of the law most closely tied 
-  to the economy, that is, property. 28  As the wife began to receive 
income (and in some cases, accumulate property), reform of the 
common law doctrine of coverture was imperative. Well-to-do women 
could enjoy the benefits of property drafted marriage settlements 
incorporating the equitable notions of separate estate and restraints 
on anticipation, but poorer women lacked these advantages and, to 
the extent that they had assets, they suffered the full rigours 
of the common law. 29 i As Glendon puts t: 30  
"While ... protective devices kept the daughters 
of the wealthy secure in their gilded cages, the 
husband had complete control over most of the wife's 
property among the great mass of married couples". 
This control enabled him to use that property as he wished. 
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PART B  
THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY LEGISLATION 
(a) Reform of the common law's view of matrimonial property: 
It has been suggested that the impetus for reform of the 
property system came from the press agitation of nineteenth century 
authoresses and actresses in receipt of substantial incomes from their 
personal labours. 31 Certainly, the libertarian John Stuart Mill 
exerted an influence. In his essay, "The Subjection of Women", 32 
he wrote: 
"(T)he inequality of rights between men and women 
has no other source than the law of the strongest. 
Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. 
There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of 
every house ...". 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, one of the leading American feminists 
of last century, believed that the motive behind the reform should 
be expressed as follows: 
"Fathers who had estates to bequeath to their daughters 
could see the advantage of securing to women certain 
property rights that might limit the legal powers of 
profligate husbands. 
Husbands in extensive business operations could see 
the advantage of allowing the wife the right to hold 
separate property, settled on her in time of prosperity, 
that might not be seized for his debts,, 33 
Whatever the reasons behind the legislation, the Married Women's 
Property Acts 34 had the effect of ending coverture and extending the 
protection of equity to all women. Subject to the imposition of 
restraints upon the powers of alienation and anticipation, married 
women were now permitted to assert full rights of ownership over, 
and to exercise full powers in respect of, their property. 35 
Corresponding legislation, based on the English Act of 1882, and 
introducing the concept of married women's separate property to 
Australia, was enacted in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania 
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in 1884, in Queens land in 1891, in Western Australia in 1892 and 
in New South Wales in 1893. 36 It was also enacted in New Zealand, 
the United States and Canada. 37 Each Australian State (with the 
exception of New South Wales and Western Australia) now has legis-
lation declaring a married woman's property to be her own rather 
than her separate estate; in all States, except New South Wales, 
legislation forbids restraints upon a married woman's powers of 
anticipation and alienation, since protective and discretionary 
trusts may now be used to save married women from their economic 
irresponsibility; and each State has introduced a scheme of inte-
state succession to pre-empt the husband's common law right to 
succeed to so much of his wife's estate as consists of personalty. 38 
The legal regime of separation of property had the advantages 39 
of simplicity. 40 The concept was familiar to the middle and upper 
classes, who for generations had made use of the marriage settlement 
to protect their daughters' property. It lacked the alien conno-
tations of the European community of property system and it accorded 
well with "... the currently fashionable notions of philosophical 
individualism under which the legal subordination of one sex to the 
other should (it was.said) be replaced by 'a principle of perfect 
equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor 
If 41 disability on the other '  
(b) Disadvantages of the system of separate property: 
Paradoxically, less than a century after its establishment, 
the system which was created to further married women's rights and 
at the time of its introduction had received great acclaim was being 
condemned as having given rise to injustice. 42 
The concept of separate property is incompatible with the 
notion of marriage as a partnership43 that emerged during the social 
upheaval of the Second World War. 44 While one might expect a partner- 
ship to give rise to partnership property, the system of separate 
property regards spouses, not as equals, but as strangers at arm's 
45 length. It does not take into account: 46 
... the fundamental difference between the economic 
relationship of persons doing business as strangers 
and the economic relationship of spouses. As a result 
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it reinforces and magnifies the economic inequality 
arising out of the fact that there is no economic value 
accorded the role of homemaker, no economic reward 
given to the spouse who works in the home, keeping 
house and raising children, performing the 'normal 
woman's role'. It fosters economic dependency when the 
marriage breaks down". 
The separate property system provides no safeguards against 
a spouse who may dissipate family assets or deliberately divest title 
to them, nor is there answerability where secret trusts and dispos-
itions for inadequate consideration are concerned. 47 One of the most 
serious defects of the separate property system before legislative 
safeguards were introduced was that the spouse who held the legal 
title to the matrimonial home could sell it to a third party without 
the knowledge of the other spouse, with the result that the latter 
could be rendered homeless. In National Provincial Bank v. 
Ainsworth, 48 the House of Lords held that while a wife had a personal 
right against her husband to provide a roof over her head, this 
"mere equity" could not affect a bona fide purchaser for value who 
took without notice of the equity. 
There are disadvantages of the separate property system even 
after the death of one party for it does not give a spouse property 
rights in the other's estate. Intestacy law awards a share to the 
surviving spouse, but this is not because the survivor is regarded 
as being entitled to a share of the estate but rather because it 
is assumed that this is what most couples would wish at their 
death. 49 A spouse is able to completely disinherit his partner, 
subject only to the discretion of a court under the Testator's 
Family Maintenance legislation50 to provide for the maintenance 
of the survivor: 
"Consistently with the concept of separate ownership 
the law has a very individualistic attitude to 
property matters between spouses at death. Moreover, 
the Family Provision legislation can be frustrated by 
the parties giving away property before they die. The 
legislation only operates on what is left behind and 
there are no provisions 51 enabling a survivor to reach 
inter vivos dispositions n . 52 
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Further, if a testator leaves his property by will to anyone other 
than a dependant, the legatees will have great difficulty in 
ascertaining what property passes under the bequest in the face 
of an adverse claim by a spouse. 
Intrinsic in the separate property system is the need for a 
non-titled spouse to apply to a court as a place of first resort for 
a declaration of property entitlement. 53 As Kovacs points out, 54 
11 ... rights are uncertain and expensive to ascertain, and the 
parties' assets may be substantially dissipated in the legal costs 
of ascertaining them anyhow". 
PART C 
THE INTERVENTION OF EQUITY 
Just as equitable principles which had been developed to 
protect the property of the well-to-do from the harsh consequences 
of the common law were the foundation of the Married Women's 
Property legislation which extended the system of separation of 
property to all women, so the Courts of Equity set about modifying 
its unfair aspects in the true Aristotelean tradition 55 of 
modification of the law where it is defective owing to its 
universality. 56 
No attempt will be made in this study to give a detailed 
analysis of the case law nor to canvass the academic comment, but 
rather a simple exposition of the principles of equity as they can 
affect the ownership of property as between the parties to a 
marriage will be made. 
A woman owns only what is hers, that is, what she has purchased 
or acquired by way of gifts or inheritance. At common law, a binding 
gift can be effected by express language in a deed or by a donor's• 
present intention to pass property to a donee together with actual 
or constructive delivery of the property into the possession of 
the donee. 57 Unless the husband takes action clearly indicating 
that he intends the items to be hers absolutely, "gifts" do not 
belong to the wife. 58 A husband can even stipulate that his wife's 
clothes, purchased with his money, are to remain his property. 59 
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Where intention to give is expressed in the future rather 
than the present tense, then prima facie the donor can break his or 
her promise and revoke the gift at any time. A promise alone is 
therefore legally ineffective but such future intention to give may 
be legally binding where the donee acts in reliance upon the donor's 
statement under such doctrines as unilateral contract (when equity 
, will order specific performance), 60 proprietary estoppel 61  and 
constructive trust 62 (in both of which cases equity will imply 
a proprietary interest). 
Equity presumes a bargain, not a gift, 63 and equity will not 
perfect an imperfect gift, 64 so if an apparent donee fails to prove 
that a gift has been made, equity will imply a resulting trust to 
the donor. 
Where a husband provides the purchase price for property such 
as land or shares and conveys it to his wife, or he deposits money 
in a bank account in her name, equity presumes that he intended to 
make a gift unless evidence in rebuttal of this "presumption of 
advancement" is tendered, 65 but "... to rebut a presumption of 
advancement the evidence must be cogent". 66 
The High Court observed in Charles Marshall Pty. Ltd. v. 
Grimsley 67 that: 
"Apart from admissions, the only evidence that is 
relevant and admissible comprises the acts and 
declarations of the parties before or at the time 
of the purchase ... or so immediately thereafter as 
to constitute a part of the transaction. If that 
evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption, 
the beneficial gift, absolute or subject only to 
qualifications imposed upon it at the time, is 
complete and no subsequent changes of mind or 
dealings with the property inconsistent with the 
trust by the donor can as between himself and the 
donor alter the beneficial interest". 
No presumption of advancement is implied where a wife conveys 
property into the name of her husband. In that case, a resulting 
trust is presumed in favour of the donor. 68 Where there is a 
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voluntary transfer of personalty. into the joint names 69 of the 
transferer and the transferee, it is presumed that the transferee 
holds his interest as a resulting trust for the benefit of the 
transferer 70 except where the transfer is made by a husband to his 
wife, in which case the wife will hold her interest beneficially. 
A voluntary payment from one person to another does not give rise 
to the presumption of resulting trust as a gift is presumed, 71 or 
the presumption of advancement applies because the payment is made 
by a husband to his wife. 
There are dicta from Lord Reid,Lord Morris, Lord Hodson and 
Lord Diplock in Pettitt v. Pettitt 72  to the effect that the 
presumption of advancement is no longer of importance but, in 
Tinker v. Tinker, 73 it was held that it still operates between 
husband and wife, despite what had been said Pettitt. Freeman 74 
is of the opinion that, with the exception of improvements to the 
matrimonial home or to personal property, the presumption applied 
in contemporary cases works an injustice. 75 It still applies in 
Australia. 76 As recently as 1981, in Woolley (No. 2) 77 Nygh J. 
applied the presumption to decide the fate of a $3000 gemstone, 
and in Calverley v. Green, 78 the nature and basis of the presumption 
was discussed by Gibbs CJ., Mason and Brennan JJ. Gibbs CJ. stated 
that he would be prepared to apply the presumption in cases of 
de facto marriages of some permanence, although on the facts of the 
case before him the presumption was rebutted. 79 
As far as the presumption of resulting trust is concerned, 
when two or more purchases contribute to the purchase of the 
property and the property is conveyed to them as joint tenants, 
the equitable presumption is that they hold the legal estate on 
trust for themselves as tenants in common in shares proportionate 
to their contributions. That basic presumption may be displaced 
by a counter-presumption or rebutted or qualified by evidence of 
the common intention of the parties who contributed to the price 
at the time the purchase was made. 80 Where a married couple have 
contributed to the acquisition of the property, it may be inferred 
that they intend to be joint beneficial owners. 81 In Calverley v. 
Green, 82 Deane J. expressed the view that the presumption of 
resulting trust may be found to be of practical importance only 
where the evidence does not enable the court to make a positive 
finding of intent, while 	 83 le Murphy J. 	went so far as to say that 
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presumptions of resulting trusts are inapplicable except where 
the dispute falls within the terms of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.). 
In certain situations, equity requires the person in whom the 
legal title to property is vested to hold it as trustee for the 
benefit of another. Where a party has gained an interest in 
property for a considerable undervalue84 or has perpetrated a 
fraud, equity will impose a trust. 85 "Fraud" is a term which is 
used in many senses, but in equity it generally refers to no more 
than the unconscionability of asserting particular legal rights. 86 
The Statute of Frauds of 1677 was passed in order to discourage 
unscrupulous litigants from pursuing false or goundless claims 
with the help of manufactured evidence; legislation based on it 
has been part of English law ever since. Cardozo J. once described 
the statute as the result of "... the peril of perjury and error 
(which) is latent in the spoken word n . 87 
Without fulfilment of the requirements of the Statute of Frauds  
with respect to land that contracts for its disposition or the 
disposition of any interest therein must be in writing; that the 
legal interest in land can only be conveyed by deed; that an interest 
in land, albeit equitable, can be created or disposed of only in 
writing; and that the creation of a trust respecting any interest 
in land must be provable by writing, 88 a purported conveyance of 
land or the purported creation of a trust or disposition of an 
equitable interest in land will fail. However, the legislation 
expressly excepts the creation or operation of resulting, implied 
or constructive trusts. 
Equity will not allow a statute to be used as an instrument of 
fraud. Where it would be unconscionable for the legal owner to rely 
on the statute to defeat the claim of the other party contrary to 
the terms of the oral agreement between them, the court will 
enforce the trust. 89 
A party may also enforce an oral contract relating to land if 
he, the plaintiff, has partly performed his side of the bargain. 
The justification which has most frequently been given for dis-
regarding the requirement of writing is that, where the plaintiff 
has partly performed the agreement, the defendant "... is really 
charged upon the equities resulting from the acts done in reliance 
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on the contract, and not (within the meaning of the statute) upon 
the contract itself" . 9°  Lord Selborne in Maddison v. Alderson 91 
was of the opinion that, to be sufficient, "... the acts relied 
upon as part performance must be unequivocally referrable to some 
such agreement as that alleged". Australian courts accept this 
approach92 but the position in England is still not settled. 93 
Cases concerning matrimonial property may present particular 
problems. As Lord Hodson indicated in Pettitt v. Pettitt, 94 
"(t)he conception of a normal married couple 
spending the long winter evenings hammering out 
agreements about their possessions appears grotesque". 
Indeed, there may be a feeling in such a situation that "... to 
talk of property matters at all indicates a distrust, or at least 
an attitude inconsistent with that which is appropriate amongst 
persons newly living together? . 95 In circumstances where there 
are nevertheless likely to be arrangements or understandings with 
respect to land and those arrangements are unlikely to be documented, 
the principles preventing the use of the statutory requirements as 
an instrument of fraud play an important role. 96 In cases coming 
within its jurisdiction, the Family Court of Australia may, under 
s.79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.), alter existing property 
rights where it is just and equitable so to do, 97 but where the 
parties are not able to invoke its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction 
which arises under either s.161 of the Marriage Act 1958 (Vic) or 
s.30 of the Family Court Act 1976 (W.A.), " the ordinary rules of 
property law and equity law must be applied. 
The principles relating to implied or resulting trusts and 
the presumption of advancement (supra.) have proved to be inadequate 
to resolve problems relating to the ownership of property as between 
husband and wife where the parties intend that their respective 
beneficial interests will be other than a precise reflection of 
their contributions to the purchase price or where the contributions 
of the party in whom the legal title is not vested are indirect. 99 
In response to the problem, Lord Denning and the English Court 
of Appeal in a line of decisions ' developed the doctrine of "family 
2 assets", which held basically that where both parties were 
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contributing to the general expenses of the family, this was 
evidence from which the court could infer an implied pooling 
arrangement or joint venture and, accordingly, the parties should 
share the beneficial interest in the "family assets" acquired from 
the pool irrespective of where the legal interest lay. 3 Not 
surprisingly, some of the decisions were greatly at odds with 
established property law principles, and, in Pettitt v. Pettitt 4 
and Gissing v. Gissing, 5 the House of Lords put an end to the 
doctrine of "family assets", supplanting it in the latter case with 
a "trusts approach". 6 The courts, it seems, were not to be concerned 
with dispensing "justice" but with the consideration of "... the 
cold legal question" of property rights. 7 
Unfortunately, the Law Lords differed in their expositions 
of the relevant principles, but there does appear to have been 
a consensus ineach case in relation to the general proposition that 
the court will, by the imposition of a trust, give effect to the 
agreement or common intention of the parties as to the manner in 
which the beneficial interests are to be held. Opinions varied 
as to the nature of the necessary intention. It has been suggested 
that since the trust.described by Viscount Dilhorne 8 and Lord 
Diplock9 arises out of, or implements, the expressed or implied 
intention of the parties, it clearly falls within the realm of 
resulting trusts. 10 This view was accepted by Bagnall J. in 
Cowcher v. Cowcher. 11  He concluded that there must be between the 
parties an arrangement or consensus as to the extent to which 
each party was to be treated as having contributed to the 
purchase price of the matrimonial home. 
Bagnall J's analysis was rejected in Re Densham 12 by Goff J., 
who took the view that "... in the vast majority of cases, parties 
do not direct their minds to treating the money payments as 
notionally other than they are. What they think about, if they 
think at all, is ownership" .13 The relevant trust in his view was 
an express trust. However, such a trust would not be unenforceable 
by reason of the statutory writing requirements because it would be 
fraudulent for the defendant to seek to rely upon non-compliance 
with these requirements in the circumstances of the case before 
the court. 
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The conclusion thus reached by Goff J. accords with that 
reached by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Allen v. Snyder, 14 
where it was held that the court cannot impute to the parties a 
common intention which they did not have. 
On the other view of what was decided in Gissing v. Gissing, 15 
it has been contended that, for Lord Reid, Viscount Dilhorne and 
Lord Diplock, the trust arises out of equity's long established 
jurisdiction to impose constructive trusts in order to prevent 
one party enjoying the fruits of unconscionable behaviour towards 
the other. 16 
Subsequent decisions of the English Court of Appeal have 
favoured this second interpretation and have carried it to the 
point of imposing a trust, even in the absence of agreement, 
wherever necessary to do justice between the parties, thereby, 
in effect, reviving the "family assets" doctrine. In these 
decisions, therefore, the concept of "unconscionable behaviour" is 
used not merely as a reason for imposing a trust once the respective 
rights of the parties have been established on the basis of an 
agreement expressed or implied from the surrounding circumstances: 
it is used as a criterion for determining what the interests of 
the parties actually are. 17  
The "trust by imputationu18  was rejected by the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Allen v. Snyder. 19  The judgment in that case of 
Glass J.A., with whom Samuels J.A. agreed, contains a valuable 
analysis of the relevant principles. His Honour referred to the 
fact that the courts will give effect to the parties' common 
intention as to the manner in which the beneficial interest in 
land is to be held, notwithstanding the fact that the common 
intention is not evidenced in writing and - therefore does not comply 
with the statutory writing requirements. His Honour rejected the 
view that, where the respective intended shares of the parties did 
not co-incide with their respective contributions to the purchase 
price, the relevant trust could still properly be described as a 
resulting trust. Rather, it was an express trust which lacked 
writing. As it was founded on the actual subjective intentions of 
the parties, it could not be described as a constructive trust, 
these being imposed without reference to the intentions of the 
parties. The occasional descriptions of the trust as a "constructive 
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trust", his Honour said, could be explained by reference to the 
fact that the trust would be enforced, even in the absence of 
writing, because reliance by the trustee on the statutory writing 
requirements would constitute an equitable fraud. 
His Honour considered that the proposition that a trust could 
be imposed otherwise than to accord with the actual intentions of 
the parties was wholly inconsistent with the line of reasoning in 
a series of High Court decisions culminating in Hepworth v. 
Hepworth. 20 
Australian courts have accepted the view that the basis for 
the imposition of the constructive trust is equity's general 
jurisdiction to prevent the party with legal title from behaving 
unconscionably. 21 
The fraud often present in the matrimonial property dispute 
is the fraud inherent in a party seeking to rely upon a statutory 
requirement of writing to defeat the beneficial interest created 
by an agreement or common intention to which he was a party. 
Similarly, it may well be regarded as fraudulent for a legal 
owner to deny a beneficial interest vested in another person by 
reason of that other person's contributions, direct or indirect, 
to the purchase price of the property. It is, however, quite 
another matter to hold that the conduct of a legal owner is 
fraudulent if he has not been a party to any agreement or common 
intention whereunder the beneficial interest is to be vested in a 
person other than himself and he has not received from that other 
person any benefits which they may have agreed to treat as 
contributions to the purchase price of the property. 
What is needed to establish a common intention is a matter 
of contention, as a comparison of Lord Diplock'S approach in 
. 	22 	. Gissing v. Gissing with that of O'Bryan J. i 	23 n Hohol v. Hohol 
illustrates. 
According to Lord Diplock, it would be necessary to show 
that the parties made an agreement akin to a bargain, although they 
may not have had any intention to enter into legal relations, but 
O'Bryan J. was of the opinion that it may be sufficient to show 
••• 	! 
that after the formation of the parties' common intention, the 
claimant acted to his or her detriment. On this view, which is 
close to that underlying the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, 
it will be unnecessary to go so far as to show that the activities 
of the claimant were specifically contemplated by the parties at 
the time the common intention was formed. 
Hardingham and Neave24 support the latter view because of its 
flexibility. It is submitted by the present writer that there 
seems to be no logic in drawing a distinction between acts required 
to be done or otherwise expressly agreed to by the parties and 
other acts done in reliance upon the promise that a beneficial 
interest has been or will be conferred upon the non-titled party. 
No clear principles have yet emerged as to the size of the 
contribution which must be made by the claimant before the court 
will regard it as unconscionable for the legal owner to resile 
from the parties' common intention. 25 Hardingham and Neave26 are 
of the view that it is arguable that, even where a common intention 
is clearly manifested, it will not be unconscionable for the legal 
owner to resile from that intention unless the claimant's 
contributions have been reasonably considerable. 
It appears, on the other hand, that in trusts arising from 
the principle of proprietary estoppel (variously called "equitable 
estoppel" and "equity of acquiescence"), the contribution made by 
the claimant can be quite minimal. 27 The crucial factor is that 
the claimant has changed his or her position, either in the active 
or the passive sense, on the faith of the inducement. 28 
In view of the number of decisions in which the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel has featured, it appears to be the "growth 
area" in matrimonial disputes where one party's contributions to 
property in the name of another are concerned. In some decisions 
in which it has been used, the court in its deliberations has come 
close to accepting the doctrine of unjust enrichment which is used 
in Canada in determining these questions. 29 This was certainly the 
case in McLelland J.'s judgment in Morris v. Morris. 30 Simply 
because the woman changed her position in reliance on the promise 
that she would have an interest in the property, his Honour held 
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that the defendant was estopped from denying her claim, even though 
there was no agreement within the guidelines laid down in Allen v. 
Synder. 31 As Evans 32 points out, this comes close to saying that 
an equity can arise from receipt of a benefit unless the circum-
stances do not otherwise provide some juristic reason why the 
benefit should be retained free from any obligation to pass a 
proprietary interest. 
For Kirby P. of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the 
recent decision in Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 33 the principle in 
Allen  v. Snyder 34 fails to reflect societal change. First, his 
Honour drew attention to the statement of Mason and Brennan JJ. in 
Calverley v. Green35 to the effect that it is arguable that a 
constructive trust ought to arise where property, beneficially 
owned in certain proportions, was maintained or enhanced by work 
done or contributions made in different proportions. Also, the New 
South Wales legislature, in enacting ss.20 and 38 of the De Facto 
Relationships Act 1984, has enabled the court to take into account 
"... a wide range of contributions, by either party, to the 
acquisition, conservation or improvement of assets and to the 
welfare of the other.partner or the family generally". 36 Further, 
in a number of decisions, 37 judges have applied the principle in 
Allen v. Snyder 38 "with the greatest reluctance09 because of what 
they saw as the manner in.which it drove them to results which 
appeared unjust. For these reasons, Kirby P. indicated that the 
decision may need to be reviewed in order to reflect community 
attitudes. 
On the other hand, Mahoney JA. delivered a conflicting 
judgment, expressing the view that the proprietary rights of 
parties involved in a dispute about the ownership of property ought 
not to depend on the view taken by a judge as to what is fair 
between them. 
Mahoney JA.'s view was that taken by the High Court in 
Muschinski v. Dodds, 40 a case which was decided after Baumgartner. 41 
All of the Justices, either expressly or impliedly, stated that 
fairness is not a basis on which to support a declaration of a 
constructive trust. Particularly cogent is a statement made by 
42 Deane J.: 
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"The fact that the constructive trust remains 
remedial does not mean that it represents a medium 
for the indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of 
fairness and justice. As an equitable remedy, it is 
available only when warranted by established 
equitable principles or by the legitimate processes 
of legal reasoning, by analogy, induction and 
deduction, from the starting point of a proper 
understanding of the conceptual foundations of 
such principles". 
For Australian courts, then, the re-introduction of "palm-tree 
justice" has been refused and the principles of Pettitt v. Pettitt, 43 
Gissing v. Gissing44 and Allen v. Snyder 45 remain the law. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF THE SEPARATE PROPERTY SYSTEM  
PART A  
THE JURISTIC BASES FOR REFORM  
(a) The need for reform: 
Equity had proved unequal to the task of modifying the 
severity of the Married Women's Property legislation. Nor was 
judicial discretion to provide the answer: in 1956, the High Court 
of Australia in Wirth v. Wirth' held that "... the title to 
property and proprietary rights in the case of married persons no 
less than in that of unmarried persons rests upon the law and not 
upon judicial discretion". 2 In England, Lord Denning's attempts 
to distribute "palm-tree justice 113  on the basis of a purported 
discretion conferred by s.17 of the Married Women's Property Act 
1882, which in his view "... transcends all rights, legal or 
equitable, and enables the court to make such order as it thinks 
. fit", 4  were brought to an abrupt end by the House of Lords' 
decisions in Pettit V. Pettit 5 and Gissing v. Gissing. 6  
According to the ordinary principles of law and equity which 
the courts were bound to apply as a result of these decisions, 7 the 
8 "solid tug of money" usually ensured the entitlement of a financial 
contributor. 9 An indirect contribution had a similar result only 
if the contribution was substantial and it could be inferred that 
the expenditure in question was referable to the acquisition of 
the property concerned. 10 Not only did the homemaker's unquantifiable 
contribution go unrecognised (and lie vulnerable to denial by the 
other spouse, usually the husband) but also a wife who had contributed 
to the general running expenses of the home or had failed to keep 
a strict account of all acquisitions and had not ensured that her 
moneys were ear-marked and applied towards the purchase of defined 
articles would have acquaired few tangible assets. 11 
The judiciary was conscious of the need for reform, 12 but 
"... lawyer's law" 13 was not capable of deciding issues directly 
affecting the lives or large sections of the community. It was 
up to the legislature to provide the solution. 14 
(b) The heterogeneous nature of early reform: 
Because there were no clear ideas about the juristic basis 
on which the transmutation of the system of separation of property 
should proceed, early attempts at reform, though numerous, were 
piecemeal. They were largely concerned with individual items 
of property, such as the matrimonial home, or specific situations 
of the spouses, but not with property as a whole. 15  
A major reason for this heterogeneous approach was the fact 
Chat, until the 1950's, the English lawyer thought of, and sought, 
the rules that have now amalgamated into "family law"16 under the 
disparate disciplines of "divorce", "law or persons", "domestic 
relations", "parent and child", "husband and wife", "married 
women's property" and so on. 17  Until these constituents were fused 
into the new and discrete subject of "family law" 18  , the legal 
principles and doctrines of each part, having been developed 
separately, could not be fully worked out and rationalised, unlike 
the established disciplines such as land law, contract and tort. 19 
That there was no term "matrimonial property regime" in English 
legal language before this time is ample illustration of the lack 
of attention that the law of property as between husband and wife 
had been given, nor is the fact of omission surprising, since one 
of the fundamental principles of English law was that a spouse 
owned his or her property just like anyone else. 20 
It was not until 1965 that permanent Law Commissions were 
set up in England and Scotland. 21 However, in its inaugural 
programme, the English Law Commission included a review of the whole 
of family law. Pursuant to this, it convened a seminar at All Souls 
College, Oxford, in 1966, and at this both divorce reform and 
matrimonial property were for the first time subjected to 
comprehensive study. 22 
The science of sociology was in its infancy when the 
Married Women's Property legislation was first enacted; comparative 
jurisprudence was a barely developed discipline; and the behavioural 
sciences were a thing of the future. Little thought was given to 
• how the principle of equality, with its emphasis on the husband 
and wife as individuals, was to be reconciled with the essential 
unity of the family. 23 Moreover, the concept of the family's 
economic status has changed considerably in the century or so 
since separation of property was introduced. As Sir Otto 
Kahn-Freund has observed, the idea that a "... husband and wife 
should share the benefit of any increase in their wealth produced 
during the marriage by their work or thrift is a postulate which 
arises from the present stage of development of Western societyu . 24 
Unfortunately, such statements as this, more often than not, 
have been based on subjective judgment because empirical research 
into matrimonial matters is a recent development. Its importance 
was first recognised in the United States. In England, sampling 
on a comprehensive scale has been practiced only since the 
establishment of the Law Commission as a permanent institution. 
Major studies were conducted there in 1972 and 1977 25 and the Law 
Commission has made specific recommendations relating to matrimonial 
property, 26 but, in Australia, the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.) was 
passed without the benefit of any local studies. 27 Currently, 
• however, the Australian Law Reform 
28 the Matrimonial Property Inquiry, 
Hambly, has obtained data from two 
Commission, which is conducting 
chaired by Professor David 
comprehensive projects. 29 One 
was a survey of property proceedings in all registries of the Family 
Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia. 30 
The other project, which was planned as a co-operative arrangement 
between the Commission, the Family Court of Australia and the 
Australian Institute of Family Studies, studied the experience and 
attitudes of a structured sample of about 900 divorced men and 
women. 31 The people in the sample group, who accepted an invitation 
from the Chief Judge of Ithe Family Court to participate, 32 were 
interviewed about their financial and property arrangements 
during the former marriage; the arrangements made immediately after 
separation; their current economic circumstances; their negotiations 
on property and financial matters and their experiences of the 
legal process; and, finally, their attitudes to some policy issues 
which underlie the Commissions's inquiry. 33 
24. 
(c) The concept of marriage as a partnership: 
That marriage is a partnership of equals is a concept that 
appears to have emerged as a result of the social upheaval of the 
war of 1939 to 1945. This was made clear by the Report of the  
Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (England) - the Morton 
Commission Report - in 1956: 34 
"Marriage should be regarded as a partnership 
in which husband and wife work together as equals, 
and the wife's contribution to the joint under-
taking, in running the home and looking after the 
children, as just as valuable as that of the husband 
in providing the home and supporting the family". 35 
The war-time practice of wives going out to work has continued in 
time of peace 36 and the doctrine of equal pay for equal work now 
holds sway. 37 Women tend to continue working after marriage, or to 
resume paid employment at a later stage of married life when 
children have been reared. The family budget is commonly fed by 
the earned income of both husband and wife, but in most households 
there is no strict accounting of how the combined income is applied 
to expenditures. In some marriages the pooling of separately-
earned income has enabled the accumulation of capital assets above 
and beyond the matrimonial home and its furnishings, while a 
previously-married spouse may bring significant assets into the 
marriage. 38 For most married persons, marriage is seen as 
"... a practical union of both lives and propertyn . 39 Friedmann, 40 
however, has drawn attention to the fact that matrimonial property 
law must not fail to "... take account of the quantitatively small 
but qualitatively important number of cases where the husband and 
wife have separate property of some magnitude or own 'separate' 
businesses of their own". In such instances, separation of property 41  
provides the only just solution. 
By deliberately adopting a system of common ownership of 
"matrimonial joint stock" 42 for such assets as the matrimonial 
home, 43 the furnishings of the home, their bank accounts and their 
small savings, many couples have departed from the principle of 
separation. Some items of property can fairly be seen as "... truly 
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representing the fruits of a totality of efforts of wage-earning, 
homemaking and mutual support". 44 Other items are acquired by each 
spouse separately and simply used in common. For a family in 
harmony, this creates no legal difficulty, and at this stage the 
parties "... would regard any attempt to apportion ownership as 
pointless or even as exhibiting an undesirable lack of trust", 45 
but, when a marriage breaks down, an almost impossible task may 
fall on the court to determine the ownership of such assets used 
in common for the purposes of the family. 46 As Llewellyn so 
picturesquely puts it: 47  
"Between the spouses when split impends ... (t)he 
quondam partners may agree on the division (of 
property), but if they do not, their disagreement 
will be peculiarly embittered, peculiarly troublesome 
to solve. Some believe her, others him. The air is 
alive with assetions, accusations, 'promises', 
'agreements', denials. It takes an official to 
determine what is what, and what to do". 
The concept of partnership between husband and wife is not 
that of a commercial partnership: "... (i)t is instead the unique 
community of life and purpose which characterises the ideal 
relation of husband and wife". 48 There is no intention that there 
should be a strict accounting between the spouses 49 , for both are 
seen as equal partners in-co-operative labour, each making an 
essential contribution towards the economic viability of the family 
unit, and therefore towards the accumulation of matrimonial property. 50 
However, Professor Kahn-Freund 51 points out that there is a distinc-
tion between the "internal" relationship between the spouses (that 
is, "the obligations they owe one another with regard to both the 
use of the income derived from property and to the distribution 
of the substance or value") and the contrasting "external" relation-
ship between Chem (that is, "the allocation of the power of disposal 
which the spouses or either of the spouses have against outsiders 
and the position of outsiders towards the propertyu ). 52 
The developing notion of a partnership situation between 
husband and wife was foreign to the common law, which has a 
"commercialistic disposition". 53 The result was "... a quite 
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indefensible form of discrimination between ... wage-earning and 
homemaking roles„ . 54  In view of the current blurring of the spousal 
roles, it is imperative that the apportionment of matrimonial 
property on divorce should not favour one conjugal role in preference 
to_another, 55 nor should one party to the marriage be allowed to 
manipulate uncertainty over the allocation of equitable interests 
in order to disadvantage the other spouse. 
(d) The question of domestic contribution: 
The first legislative attempts to provide for recognition of 
domestic effort as a means of acquiring an interest in property were 
hampered by the inability of the judiciary to sever the bonds of 
orthodox property law. While s.86 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1959 (Cth.) and s.5(3) of the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 (N.Z.) 
gave the courts comprehensive powers to adjust the property relations 
of spouses regardless of legal and equitable interests, and there-
fore gave the woman a higher statistical probability of sharing in 
the property built up by her husband during the course of their 
marriage, she did not necessarily have a legal "right” in this 
respect. 56 Law concerns rights and duties. According to Hohfeld, 
a "right" (or claim) is a duty placed on another (or others) to 
act in a certain manner. Legal rights can therefore serve as the 
basis for jural relations. "Privileges", on the other hand, are 
correlatives of "no rights". 	spouse who wishes to have 
recognised an equitable claim to property built up during the 
marriage has to pray the indulgence of the court and the result 
of his or her application for equitable relief is by no means 
certain. He or she has no legally enforceable right but only a 
privilege to bring a claim. 
The courts were ill-equipped to grapple with the concept that 
a homemaker's contribution could serve to acquire an interest in 
property. At first, it was set aside lest there be any "pecuniary 
prejudice" to the financially contributing spouse. 58 Even when the 
fact that non-monetary contribution could serve as a means of 
purchasing an interest in property was eventually recognised, the 
courts at first required more than the performance of ordinary 
59 services. 
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A more liberal approach to the wife's contribution was 
advocated by the High Court of Australia in Sanders v. Sanders 60 
and by the Privy Council in a New Zealand case, Haldane v. Haldane. 61 
In the latter case, the Privy Council was of the view that a 
remedial approach should be adopted to the New Zealand legislation, 
whose property provisions resembled those of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1959 (Cth.), since the Act seemed to them to give 
statutory effect to the "Rule in Heydon's Case. 62 Thus they 
endeavoured "... to ascertain what was conceived to be wrong with 
the New Zealand property law before 1963". 63 They concluded that 
the law of separate property was "... inadequate to secure justice 
to the generality of married women who have neither land, invest-
ments nor professional earnings"64 and that the statute had been 
enacted because "... marriage has come to be regarded as a partner-
ship of equals, even though the equal partners performed widely 
different functions". 65 
On the question whether the foundation for equal sharing of 
property is established merely by the fact of marriage or whether 
the Act rested on the proof of an earned claim, the Privy Council 
was of the view .that. the fact of contribution limited the court's 
jurisdiction under the 1963 Act. Therefore, they explicity rejected 
the notion that the Act instituted any sort of formal regime of 
community of property. However, the contribution required to bring 
the court's discretion to alter property interests into play was 
minimal and could be supplied by "... the usual domestic contributions 
of an ordinary housewife, and not only (by) the contributions of a 
thrifty and frugal one?. 66 
Even so, there was no clear idea about the juristic basis on 
which recognition of the fact of contribution rested. According to 
one view, 67 a woman's domestic contribution should be recognised 
because she has given up paid services in the labour market in 
order to make a home and nurture children. 68 On another view, that 
of Sir Jocelyn Simon, President of the Probate and Divorce Division, 
and later Lord Simon of Glaisdale, the wife's acquisition of an 
interest in property in the name of her husband can be attributed 
to the fact that "... the cock-can feather his nest because he does 
not have to spend time sitting on it". 69 While the first approach, 
which is reminiscent of the notion of "pecuniary prejudice", 70 
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ultimately leads to the result of re-adjustment of property 
interests, .the perspective is not an accurate reflection of the 
matrimonial partnership, during which both spouses normally make 
a positive contribution to the accumulation of property. It is 
difficult to conceive of a negative contribution serving as a means 
of acquiring property. 71 As for Lord Simon's approach, it is 
submitted that the man would still have engaged in economic 
pursuits had he not married, and he would in that case not have had 
the burden of providing a home and sustenance for a wife and 
children. 72 However, Lord Simon 's view has been accepted by English 
courts and by the Family Court of Australia. 73 t was also adopted 
by the High Court of Australia in Mallett v. Mallet, 74 especially 
by Mason and Dawson JJ.. 75 
The Victorian Parliament in 1962 responded to the problem of 
recognising domestic contribution by legislating for a presumption 
of equal ownership of the matrimonial home. The Marriage (Property) 
Act amended s.161 of the Marriage Act 1958 (Vic.), the equivalent 
of s.17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 (Eng.), in a 
deliberate attempt to give effect to the changing status of 
marriage as more of a partnership than formerly 76 and "to negative 
the restrictive judgment of the High Court in Wirth v. Wirth". 77 
Gray78 is of the opinion that the legislation represented "... a 
remarkable fusion of the common law and community property 
traditions". The economically disadvantaged spouse's contributions 
were implicitly recognised by s.161(4)(b), whereby,equality of 
ownership of the matrimonial home was presumed. However, the 
presumption operated only when a dispute arose between the spouses 
and proceedings were brought under the Act. 79 
What the reform amounted to 80 was nothing more than the 
substitution of a presumption of joint ownership for the rebuttable 
presumption of advancement, or other presumptions of law and equity, 
such as resulting trusts. The presumption of joint ownership was 
itself rebuttable, for it was subject to sufficient evidence to 
the contrary on the part of the spouses, or to the special 
circumstances rendering it unjust to make the substitution. As 
Finlay puts it , 81 H ... while the Victorian expedient (went) as far 
as possible within the limitations of palm tree justice to mitigate 
the rigours of the traditional approach to married women's property, 
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it was subject to its own limitations ... (I)t had the inflexibility 
of a statutory rule and the limitations that flow from such 
inflexibility". 82 
Sackville83 urges the repeal of the "common intention 
restriction" upon the court's discretion and its replacement by 
an amendment ensuring that the rebuttal of the statutory presumption 
of joint tenancy does not deprive the court of its residual 
jurisdiction to re-organise the parties' proprietary rights. More-
over, 84 s.161(4)(a) directs the court to disregard "any conduct of 
the husband or of the wife which is not directly related to the 
acquisition of the property or to its extent or value". The word 
"conduct" has been taken not to be "... confined to conduct of a 
moral connotation" 85 and, accordingly, a wife's domestic services 
are not to be regarded as a contribution as they are only indirectly 
related to the acquisition, extent or value of the matrimonial 
property. This result flows from the drafting of the legislation, 
for it was not intended by the legislature. 86 
As a result of the enactment of the Family Law Amendment Act 
1983 (Cth.), it is possible that the application of s.161 of the 
Marriage Act 1958 (Vic.) may be very limited, provided that the 
purported extension of the jurisdiction of the Family Court by 
the insertion of paragraph (ca)(i) in the definition of "matrimonial 
Cause" in s.4(1) is held by the High Court to be constitutional. 87  
The English Law Reform Commission in the Third Report on 
Family Property: The Matrimonial Home (Co-ownership and Occupation 
Rights) and Household Goods (1978) 88 recommended the introduction 
of what Baxter referred to as "... a community regime reduced to the 
matrimonial home". 89 It was proposed that, subject to a contrary 
agreement, all matrimonial homes by operation of law would be 
jointly owned on a matrimonial home trust. 90 The recommendation had 
a mixed reception and it has not been implemented, 91 but it was the 
basis of legislation establishing deferred community of property in 
New Zealand, Ontario and Saskatchewan. 
That the legislatures and the courts were fumbling with the 
notion that domestic services warranted recognition is perhaps not 
surprising when one considers that their quantification in monetary 
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terms is notoriously difficult. 92 Sociologically, the matter also 
presents difficulties. For example, Nygh J. has pointed out 93 that 
"... a childless wife who sits at home in relative idleness may be 
said to have made little or no effort". At the other end of the 
scale, a woman may be in full-time employment yet also carry out 
domestic services: should she be seen as making a greater 
contribution? 94 Should the extent of property acquisition be scaled 
down because the wife merely stays at home since she considers 
herself entitled to be supported or since, on early breakdown of 
marriage, she could be said to have left the job unfinished? 95 
What of the benefits the wife has received during the marriage in 
the form of gifts, the sharing of prosperity or overseas triips, or 
should these be balanced against the fact that she has, say, kept 
the books and acted as an unpaid telephonist in the husband's 
business and entertained his business associates? 96  
The legislatures in England and Australia solved the problem 
of making a precise analysis of the value of domestic contribution 
by enacting legislation 97 which provided for a discretionary 
adjustment of property interests at the time of divorce. 98 However, 
while the performance of "ordinary" domestic services is ranked as 
a contribution towards the acquisition of property, conferring upon 
the wife a "moral claim" or "accrued" beneficial right to share in 
that property after divorce, 99 as an equitable interest it stands 
to be postponed to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
(actual, implied or constructive)' of the prior equity. 2 In the 
case of personal property, however, the purchaser will not normally 
be required to investigate title or be fixed with notice of an 
outstanding equitable interest if he or she fails to do so. 3 Thus, 
in the absence of actual notice, a spouse who has acquired an 
equitable interest in goods or other personalty will usually be 
unable to enforce it against a third party purchaser or mortgagee, 
except where statutory provisions affect priority conflicts in 
respect of goods or other personalty. 
(e) The uncertain nature of equitable interests: 
Under the Torrens system of land registration practiced in 
Australia, a caveat may be lodged to protect an equitable interest. 
To be caveatable, such an interest must specify the quantum of the 
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estate claimed and the facts on which it is founded. 4 A wife who 
is unaware that she has an equitable claim cannot lodge a caveat to 
protect it, and even if she is aware that her contribution may give 
rise to some kind of claim, her legal adviser may have difficulty in 
drafting a caveat with a sufficient degree of precision. Joske J. 
strongly attacked the unfairness of this in Gasiunas v. Meinhold. 5 
Hardingham and Neave 6  stress that even though difficulties may well 
arise in characterising and quantifying an interest to be protected 
with sufficient precision, the task should be attempted. 7 
Since it is only by going to court that parties can have their 
property interest clarified, rights are uncertain and expensive to 
ascertain. Further, during the currency of the marriage, creditors 
find it difficult to determine in advance what assets will be 
available for the satisfaction of their claims. 8 Lord Wiberforce's 
statement in National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth 9 is apposite: 
"Before a right or an interest can be admitted into 
the category of property, or of a right affecting 
property, it must be definable, identifiable by third 
parties and have some degree of permanency or stability." 
The fact is that the law fails to create present rights to 
property in the spouse who lacks legal title but may nevertheless 
have an equitable interest in it. Instead of having a certain and 
vested share, that person has only the right to apply to a court 
for the declaration of his or her equitable interest. Consequently, 
the separate property , system provides no immediate safeguards against 
a spouse who may dissipate assets or deliberately divest the family 
of them through outright gift or transfer for inadequate consider-
ation. Subject only to the discretion of the court under the 
Testator's Family Maintenance legislation 10  to provide for the 
survivor, 11 except in New South Wales-,'where sections 21 to 29 
of the Family Provision Act 1982 empower the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales to deal with certain "prescribed transactions", a 
testator has complete freedom to bequeath his property as he wishes. 
It appears that, despite the amendment of the Family Law Act 1975 
(Cth.) by the Family Law Amendment Act 1983 (Cth.) which by s.79(8) 12 
allows the continuation of s.79 proceedings after the death of a 
13 party, 	provided that they are on foot, the surviving party may 
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resort to State Maintenance legislation if he or she desires. 
The High Court in Smith v. Smith (No.3) 14 has held that there is no 
inconsistency between the Family Law Act and State Testator's 
Family Maintenance legislation so the State legislation's operation 
has not been curtailed by the operation of s.79(8) 15 . If s.79 
proceedings have not already been set on foot, a divorced spouse 
in all States except for New South Wales, South Australia and the 
Territories must be in receipt of, or be entitled to receive, 
maintenance before she is an eligible applicant 16 under State 
Maintenance legislation. 17 
Unless the legal estate in the matrimonial home is vested in 
the spouses jointly, the consent of both to the disposition of the 
matrimonial home is not normally required. 18 The English Law 
Commission's proposal that the husband and wife should become 
statutory co-owners of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial 
home would still allow the party who owned the legal as well as 
the beneficial interest to dispose of the property without the 
other party's consent. 19  In order to protect the non-titled 
spouse, the Law Commission put up a proposal, hitherto not acted 
upon by the legislature, for a system of registration of the 
equitable interest. 20 Temkin21 claims that the choice of 
registration as the lynch pin of the system is highly questionable, 
particularly since it has already proved in the context of the 
Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 to be a less than ideal method of safe-
guarding equitable interests. Since registration would not be 
mandatory, sale or mortgage of the legal interest in the home 
might well still take place without the other spouse's knowledge. 22 
The essential question seems to be upon whom the burden of 
self-protection should lie. The Law Commission would place it on 
the untitled spouse because of the conveyancing problems which 
would otherwise arise. However, the House of Lords in Williams 
and Glyn 's Bank v. Boland 23 took a different view. As a result of 
the decision, in the case of registered land (the position with 
unregistered land is unclear), banks lending on second mortgage 
will henceforth have to secure their position by obtaining the 
consent of occupants with beneficial interests in the property. 
The House of Lords thus placed the burden of self-protection on 
those best equipped to bear it. As Lord Scarman put it: 24 
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"Nor must the courts flinch when assailed by 
arguments to the effect that the protection of 
(the wife's) interest will create difficulties in 
banking and conveyancing practice. The difficulties 
are, I believe, exaggerated: but bankers, and 
solicitors exist to provide the service which the 
public needs. They can - as they have successfully 
done in the past - adjust their practice, if it be 
socially required". 
It appears that Australian Courts are also prepared to place 
the burden of self-protection on those best equipped to bear it. 
In Heath and Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation, 25 Nygh J. 
postponed the interest of the bank in the matrimonial home 
although it had been a purchaser for good consideration because 
it had not acted bona fide; it had notice of the wife's property 
claim and a search of title would have revealed her caveat. However, 
there are dicta to the effect that, in the absence of being put on 
notice and having made due search, a bank is not obliged to enquire 
into the marital status of customers before making loans. The 
importance of placing a caveat on the title to property to protect 
equitable interests is apparent, therefore. 
The Ontario Law Reform Commission in its co-ownership proposal 
also recommended that third parties should bear the burden of self-
protection since 
"(i)t would be most unrealistic to require registration 
as a condition precedent to (equitable interests). 
... It is extremely unlikely that very many spouses 
living in harmony would pursue this course". 26 
Instead, it recommended that the beneficial interest of the non-
titled spouse in the matrimonial home, without registration, should 
prevail over the claims of purchasers, mortgagees and creditors who 
transact solely with the spouse holding the title. Accordingly, it 
took the view that 
"(T)hird parties seeking to acquire or secure a 
beneficial interest in residential premises should be 
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obliged to satisfy themselves that the subject 
property is not a matrimonial home or to require the 
consent of the non-titled spouse in the prescribed 
form 
The position regarding the ownership of household chattels is 
also complex. 28 They may be held under the ordinary principles of 
law and equity (as under the laws of the Australian States), subject 
to the adjustment jurisdiction of the courts at the time of divorce, 
or they may be regarded as equally owned (as in New Zealand and 
Ontario, where the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 (N.Z.) and the 
Family Law Reform Act 1975 (Ont.) respectively established a 
deferred community of property system providing a jurisdiction on 
divorce to divide equally the aggregate of the matrimonial property 
acquired during marriage, other than by gift or inheritance), or 
their use and enjoyment may be considered to be an incident of the 
occupation of the matrimonial home (as in Saskatchewan and as 
recommended by the Law Commission in England). 29 
Under the first alternative, recourse must be had to the courts 
for the grant of an injunction to restrain dealings in the goods or 
for a declaration of property interests. Kovacs is of the view that 
the injunctive and declaratory powers are rarely invoked with 
respect to household chattels because of the uncertainty of outcome 
inherent in the separate property system. The expense of litigation 
is also a limiting factor, so that self-help is a more attractive 
alternative. 30 
In jurisdictions which consider family chattels to be equally 
owned, little advantage accrues, since the equalisation claim is 
not heard until dissolution. Provision is made for the granting , 
of an injunction to restrain a disposition which is meant to 
defeat the claim or rights of another, or for the setting aside of 
such a disposition provided that it has not involved a bona fide 
purchaser for value. 31 However, recourse must still to be had to 
the court: apart from bringing proceedings for equalisation, there 
appears to be little that can be achieved to protect the non-titled 
holder against dissipation of the property. 
The third alternative, that is of viewing the right to use and 
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enjoy household goods as an incident of the occupation of the 
matrimonial home, also has its limitations. The English Law 
Commission envisaged that the right would not arise as a matter 
of law in the person in occupation of the home but only on the 
granting of an application by the court. While the Saskatchewan 
scheme is similar, it contemplates that the right to possession 
of the goods is primarily to give effect to the right to occupy 
the home. Accordingly, there is a freeze on dealings with household 
goods until a court order can be obtained. 32 While this approach 
inhibits the de facto disposition of goods by stealth, it is 
submitted that there is no connection between the right to occupy 
the house and the right to use and enjoy household goods. 33 
It appears that the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 
(Cth.), if judiciously invoked, can be used to achieve the best 
features of each of the schemes involved. The injunctive power 
under s.114 is available to order a party to leave household 
chattels in the home or, alternatively, to hand them over for the 
use and enjoyment of the other party. A provision forbidding the 
seizure of goods without a court order, unless in the case of 
hardship, 34 would prevent, or at least inhibit, the use of self-help. 
Further, the slackening of constitutional constraints on property 
proceedings predating proceedings for principal relief by the 
Family Law Amendment Act 1983, if found to be intra vires by the 
High Court of Australia, 35 has provided for a speedy distribution 
of assets to be made by the Family Court. 36 
(0 The scope of the property to be divided: 
It is obvious that the scope of the property to be divided at 
the time of divorce is an important issue, while at the same time 
it is clear that the division of some property other than according 
to strict property entitlements is antithetical to the principle of 
separation of property. What is defined as marital property, as 
distinct from personal property, is increasingly being determined 
by the stipulations of divorce decrees in the Western world. The 
old rules by which family wealth and family property have been 
transmitted on the occasions of marriage and death have been 
complicated by divorce as an additional factor. 37 
36. 
• While Lord Upjohn voiced the opinion in Pettitt v. Pettitt 38 
that .".., the expression 'family assets' is devoid of legal meaning 
and its use can define no legal rights or obligations", Lord Diplock 
recognised that spouses acquire some property, real or personal, 
... either in contemplation of their marriage or during its 
subsistence (which is) intended for the common use and enjoyment 
of both spouses or their children". 39 Eekelaar40 points out that 
if the entitlement to such property rested on economic assessment 
of contributions alone, it is unlikely that a case for equal sharing 
of assets could often be made out, yet, as we have seen, most 
married couples are committed to the ideal of marriage as a 
partnership and favour the equal distribution of "partnership" 
property. What, then, of the so-called "new property" (super-
annuation entitlements, long service benefits and the proceeds of 
life assurance policies and the like)? Is this "partnership" 
property? The concept of "new property" was popularised by a Yale 
University Professor, Charles Reich, 41 who suggested that, for most 
people, one's employment or profession, and work-related benefits 
such as pensions, are the principal forms of wealth, 42 and that, 
for many others, claims against the government are the main source 
of subsistence. As such, he argues that they should be accorded 
the protection that the legal system has accorded more traditional 
forms of wealth. To Reich's perception of "new property" may be 
added such factors as qualifications, access to employment and 
fringe benefits. 43 During .a stable marriage, benefits of all such 
human capital are shared between the spouses, either in a pecuniary 
sense or in the quality of life that the spouses experience. 
However, since human capital is personal and the earnings which 
are its returns accruie to the individual over time, the costs and 
benefits are not shared when the marriage partnership is dissolved. 44 
Other problems arise. Should the sharing of property be equal 
in every marriage45 or should business assets and property gained 
by one party through gift or inheritance be excluded from 
consideration? Property acquired before marriage logically should 
be excluded but it may have assumed the characteristics of commonly-
owned property because of mixing or because, over a long period of 
time, it has been treated as if it were jointly owned. The treatment 
of income from assets of these types also creates difficulties. 46 
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Because of the diverse aspirations of married couples, it 
may be that the parties should be allowed, prior to marriage, to 
decide what property they intend to treat as jointly owned and 
which as separate property and reduce the agreement to contract. 
The right to contract out.47  in this manner is a feature of 
jurisdictions with statutory matrimonial property regimes. 48 
It is of particular significance to individuals who marry for a 
second time or others who already own property at the time of 
marriage. 49 
Under the present system of separation of property, which 
allows cohabitation contracts, except under the De Facto Relation- 
. ships Act 1984 (N.S.W.), pre-nuptial contracts 50 are considered to 
be contrary to public policy 51  and in no way will they operate to 
oust the court's jurisdiction. 52 It is not possible for married 
persons to contract out of the system of property distribution 53  
unless the couple go to the trouble of having the agreement 
ratified by the Family Court under the terms of s.87 of the Family 
Law Act '1975. 54 It appears that the Family Court would be unlikely 
to sanction such agreements without there being principal proceedings 
imminent between the.parties 55 since further obligations might 
arise out of the marital relationship so that the Court, accordingly, 
would not be able to say that the agreement was a "proper" one for 
it to approve at any given time within the meaning of the Family 
Law Act 1975. 56 
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Seidler V. Schallhofer 57 suggests a trend away from the enforcement 
by the courts of traditional moral standards towards the extension 
of financial protection to the individual. 58 Academic writers 
support the principle of "contracting out" as a means of combatting 
the harsh effects of the system of separation of property59 and 
the Joint Select Committee which inquired into the Family Law Act 60 
stated that the law ought to facilitate negotiated settlements to 
property claims between divorced spouses. 
As mentioned above, cohabitees who live in New South Wales 
may regulate financial matters between them by means of a 
cohabitation agreement. 61  Section 47 of the De Facto Relationships 
Act 1984 (N.S.W.) provides that such an agreement will be respected 
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by the court provided that it is in writing; that it is signed by the 
partner against whom it is sought to be enforced; and that it has 
been drawn up under the guidance of a solicitor so that, at the 
time that the agreement was formed, in the light of reasonably 
foreseeable circumstances, its provisions were fair and reasonable. 
Section 48 provides for judicial discretion to override the terms 
of the agreement where the circumstances of the parties have so 
changed since the agreement was entered into that it would lead 
to "serious injustice" if the provisions of the agreement were to 
be enforced. 62 
Provisions such as these would provide a suitable model for 
pre-nuptial contracts. The requirement that a contract be drawn up 
after legal consultation with the parties independently of each 
other would prevent overreaching and unfairness. Further, the 
parties would be informed as to the likely outcome if a matter of 
dispute were put before a court, 63 and the provision for overriding 
judicial discretion would overcome criticism that such contracts 
made early in a marriage, or before it, might be completely 
inappropriate later. 64 Already, under the Family Law Act, it 
has been held 65 that'there is a statutory obligation on the parties 
to a marriage to.disclose assets and income in relation to a 
separation agreement. Failure to disclose assets amounts to 
fraud, enabling the Family Court to revoke its approval to an 
agreement under s.87 of the Act. It is unlikely that the same duty 
of disclosure would be held to be inapplicable to pre-nuptial 
contracts. 66 
Even though the Australian Law Reform Commission doubts 
whether there would be a wide use made of the right to "contract 
out" of the legal matrimonial property system, unless either or 
both of the parties had been married previously, 67 it is submitted 
that once legislative provision for such contracts were provided, 
wider use would be made of them by those persons contemplating 
marriage. 
The approach of the Australian and English legislatures 
has been to define "property" in relation to the parties to a 
marriage or either of them as property "to which those parties 
are, or that party is ..., entitled, whether in possession or 
reversion". (See s.4(1) of the Family Law Act). At the time of 
divorce, all the property of the parties, howsoever acquired, is to 
be taken into account, but distribution is governed by considerations 
of past contribution and future need. 68 In New Zealand, 69 equal 
sharing of family assets (which are strictly defined in the 
legislation) becomes an incident of divorce unless there are 
" extraordinary circumstances" or equal sharing would be "repugnant 
to justice". 70 Kovacs 71 expresses the view that, instead of being 
an incident of divorce, as is the case both in a system of 
discretionary adjustment of property interests and a system of 
deferred community of property, property rights would be better 
made an incident of the marital status. 72 To a certain extent, 
the problem has been recognised by the amendment to paragraph (ca) 
of the definition of "matrimonial cause" in s.4(1) of the Family 
Law Act, for this provides for the hearing of proceedings under 
s.78 and s.79 with respect to property of the parties "arising 
out of the marital relationship". However, equitable interests in 
property are still vulnerable until a ruling of the Family Court 
is obtained and the inchoate rights of one spouse to an ultimate 
share in property can be thwarted by the other spouse's disposition 
or dissipation of the property to which he or she holds legal 
title. 
The problem of defining the property to be equally shared in 
systems of deferred community of property can prove to be as 
difficult as that of quantifying contributions under discretionary 
systems containing acompensation component (as in England and 
Australia). 73 Professor Kahn-Freund, a strong proponent of the 
introduction of community of property to England, put forward a 
classification which amply illustrates the problems inherent in any 
such attempt. 74 In the Unger Memorial lecture delivered at 
Birmingham University in 1971, he suggested "... making the purpose 
rather than the origin of assets the gist of the matter". 
According to this categorisation, household assets and property 
acquired through gift and inheritance would be "family" property 
while investments acquired through work or thrift would not. 75 
For such "baffling conundrums" 76 as whether a painting is for 
aesthetic pleasure, which makes it a household asset, or for 
investment, there should be a retreat into presumptions. Freeman 77 
points out, however, that "... presumptions have a .knack of 
fossilising out-of-date social assumptions", and if they are 
statutory, they are even more difficult to remove. 78 Ennor 79 
expresses the view that legalistic presumptions force spouses to 
take a much more definitive stance as to the real ownership of 
property when it is acquired and they are consequently inimical to 
a harmonious family relationship and the interests of the family. 
Also, he argues, they may place a greater incentive on parties to 
attribute fault so far as breakdown of a marriage is concerned in 
an endeavour to achieve a more favourable economic position. 80 
The Law Commission rejected Kahn-Freund's thesis as 
impracticable 81 and Freeman82  suggests that, however sociologically 
appropriate an emphasis on purpose might be, no test can be devised 
to resolve problems "... of a penumbral nature". Kahn-Freund 
himself almost admitted this when he said that "... (r)ules and 
presumptions ... may help in practice to define the difference 
between family assets and investment property. Yet the boundary 
will remain fluid and often invisible". 83 However, if the 
distinction cannot be made, he conceded that it will be necessary 
to fall back on judicial discretion, "... the rule of no principle" . 84  
(g) The question of needs: 
A distribution of property based solely on contributions made 
during the marriage may be completely unrelated to the needs of one 
or both parties to the marriage, particularly if he or she has the 
custody of the children of the marriage. 
The "traditional" law of maintenance (or "alimony") performed 
one or more of three functions: to enforce support of the divorced 
wife who had been deprived by the divorce of the expectation of 
support inherent in the husband's marital obligations; to punish 
matrimonial fault by depriving the guilty spouse of her entitlement 
(or limiting it), 85 and to provide compensation to a wife for her 
contribution to the family. The modern approach confines 
maintenance to those in need of support by providing "transitional" 
support for those requiring time to become self-supporting after 
divorce; "custodial" support for those caring for children; and 
"support" insurance for older women who cannot reasonably be 
expected to support themselves.8 6 
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The "needs" perspective is incompatible with a simple division 
of the capital assets of the matrimonial "'partnership". It has 
been necessary for the concept of "property" to be expanded to 
allow for the fact that the division of functions between spouses 
during the marriage and the allocation of child care responsibilities 
after its breakdown may produce disparities in the spouses' 
economic prospects. Recognition of the different economic effects 
of the contributions made by the spouses during the marriage and 
their respective needs afterwards frequently demands that there be 
an unequal division of their property at the end of the marriage, 
irrespective of legal title. 
(h) The legal individuality of married persons: 
The Married Women's Property Act 1882 (Eng.), as well as 
changing the substantive law, brought about an important procedural 
innovation by introducing a summary procedure whereby husband and 
wife, no longer one person before the law, were able to go before 
a court to have any property disputes between them determined. 
Such proceedings were quite independent of any divorce proceedings 
or any other matrimonial cause. In respect of a woman's 
contractual rights and the common law view that there should be 
inter-spousal immunity from actions in tort, the legislatures 
have since re-inforced the notion that a husband and a wife have a 
separate legal personality. 
The power to contract in relation to the separate estate has 
been broadened to allow the wife to contract generally as if she 
were single. 87 The legal recognition of the economic freedom and 
legal individuality of a married woman allows her to contract with 
her husband in standard commercial transactions where the parties 
might just as well have been strangers; one spouse can convey 
property to the other; one can lend money to the other and bring 
an action to recover a debt due; one spouse can employ the other in 
his or her business and come under an obligation to pay wages; and 
the spouses can enter into business partnerships with each other. 88 
While the wording of the New South Wales and Western Australian 
enactments suggests that a married woman's property, rather than 
the married woman herself, is responsible for her contractual 
debts, 89 s.7(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.) renders this 
difference of no practical importance. In Tasmania and Western 
Australia it is provided that .a married woman is contractually 
liable only where she acts "otherwise than as an agent". 90 
State Married Women's Property legislation is fairly guarded 
in its modification of the common law view that interspousal 
immunity from tort is one of the legal incidents of the relationship 
of marriage. 91 Victoria alone allows unqualified interspousal 
immunity in tort. 92 However, s.119 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.) 
gives spouses the unqualified right to sue each other in tort, and 
through the operation of s.109 of the Constitution, which provides 
that, to the extent that it is inconsistent, State legislation is 
overridden by Commonwealth legislation, it is arguable that in any 
interspousal tort dispute the exclusive repository of jurisdiction 
is the Family Law Act. 93 However, Elliott J. in Mad'eric 94 held 
that a tortious claim could be brought in the Family Court only if 
it was a matter otherwise within the Court's jurisdiction. 
(i) The question of varied social values: 
Just as marriage itself is a matter of infinite variation, so 
too is there infinite variety in social values, 95 particularly in 
a multi-cultural society such as ours. 96 Gibbs CJ. in Mallet v. 
, Mallet 97  pointed out that it is 
" -.. difficult, if not impossible, to say that any 
one set of values or ideas is commonly accepted, or 
approved by a majority of the members of society. 
Conflicting opinions continue to be strongly held 
as to the nature of marriage, the economic con-
sequences of divorce and the effect, if any, that 
should be given to the fault or misconduct of a 
party when a court is making the financial adjust-
ments that divorce entails". 
There are sharp differences in attitudes from one cultural 
group to the next towards the position of women within marriage and 
the entitlements of spouses to property, both during marriage and 
at its end. 
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In order to deal humanely and justly with family dissolution 
i and matters that relate to it, 98  it s necessary to acknowledge the 
cultural and ethnic diversity of contemporary Australia. 99  
(j) Alternatives to .a system of separate property: 
The considerations to be taken into account when devising 
a system of matrimonial property are clearly both complex and 
numerous. 1 The system should be fair to both spouses and third 
parties who deal with them, simple in form, and flexible enought to 
allow for variation. At the same time, it must give each spouse 
equal freedom to manage his or her own affairs and provide 
protection from the other spouse's profligacy, predatoriness or 
imprudence. 
It has already been noted that the system of deferred community 
of property2 that was adopted by New Zealand, Ontario and 
Saskatchewan, 3 despite its definition of the spouses' property 
rights at the time of marriage, postpones the equalisation of 
gains until the marriage is over, therefore perpetuating many 
of the disadvantages . of the separate property regime during the 
currency of the marriage. 4 On the other hand, there are statutory 
restraints on the parties' ability to dispose of family assets 
(howsoever defined): certain transactions must be effected jointly 
and there are extensive injunctive powers in the courts to restrain 
transactions which are excessive or irresponsible, and penalties are 
imposed for fraudulent dealings which are proved to have been under-
taken to defeat the other spouse's interest in the property. 5  The 
Australian Law Reform Commission, however, has expressed the view 
that it is possible to introduce protective provisions without 
going so far as to adopt a full community of property regime, for 
such a system is both complex and inflexible. 6 
A major disadvantage of a system which provides for the 
equalisation of assets on divorce is the question of the allocation 
of the debts of one of the parties. 7 The Australian Law Reform 
Commission in the Discussion Paper it issued in June, 1985, pointed 
out8 a further disadvantage, namely that the equal division of 
assets does not lead to equality of outcome, for it fails to 
recognise what in modern society is probably the most valuable 
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asset that a person can have, namely the ability to generate 
income . 9 The statutory co-ownership scheme recommended by the 
English Law Commission represents its commitment to the principle 
of sharing major matrimonial assets throughout the marriage on a 
10 partnership basis 	yet, as we have seen, it has its own dis- 
advantages. Kovacs 11 is of the opinion that a liberalised 
traditional community 12 with co-management by both parties of all 
common property might provide the ultimate answer. In those 
jurisdictions with such a regime, 13 safeguards against dissipation 
of assets or their disposition by the spouse with title by gift or 
by will or by transfer for inadequate consideration are built 
into the system. 14 Such a system is still open to criticism on 
the grounds of complexity and inflexibility. 
While the adoption of a community of property system was 
certainly considered, 15 the legislature in England in enacting the 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 decided to retain 
the concept of separation of property. Provision was made for the 
exercise of judicial discretion within a framework of statutory 
guidelines. 16  The judge was given a discretion to solve such 
matters as provision for future need, the type of conduct which as 
a matter of principle ought to be taken into account, the scope of 
the property to be considered for division, and the emphasis to be 
placed on contributions, both direct and indirect. It may be seen, 
then, that the English legislature took the view that the complexities 
of modern life and the variability of its circumstances made it 
impossible to determine the allocation of property between the 
parties to a marriage according to strict legal rules which made 
no allowances for the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
The provision of judicial discretion made possible "individualizing 
the application of the law". 17 
The power to exercise discretion in the allocation of property 
was retained under s.24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (Eng.) 18 
because the Law Commission19  was of the opinion that 
... the justice done on divorce needs to be precise 
rather than broad and needs to take account of not 
only ... the individual spouses ... but of ... the 
children as well; and all the family assets have to 




THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 (CTH.) 
The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.) is based on the same model as 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (Eng.), developments in England and 
the recommendations of the various English Law Commissions having 
influenced the legislation ultimately adopted by the Federal 
Parliament. 21 According to the Full Court of the Family Court in 
Duff, 22 
"(T)he intention of the Act is to provide a code 
of sufficient scope and flexibility to bring, so 
far as possible, all the problems attendant upon 
family breakdown and dissolution of marriage under 
the jurisdiction of the Family Court of Australia. 23 
Gibbs J., as he then was, described the discretion conferred 
on the Family Court of Australia to make orders concerning the 
adjustment of property rights as 
. . extraordinarily wide. Such orders may of course 
disturb existing rights; few curial orders can have 
a greater effect on ordinary citizens of modest 
„ 24 means . 
Nevertheless, the discretion of the Court is by no means 
uncontrolled, since specific statutorycguidelines are laid down in 
s.79(4), which, by operation of s.79(4)(e), incorporates s.75(2). 
The weight to be attached to each or any of the guidelines and 
factors in any case will depend on the individual fact situation 
and the judge's evaluation of it. 25 
A major criticism of a discretionary jurisdiction is the 
unpredictability of the result, for it is rarely possible to fore-
cast with any certainty what the shares in property as between the 
spouses will be on divorce. However, in the light of the analysis 
made in the previous section of this chapter, it is submitted that 
the operation of judicial discretion leads to a fairer result in 
the majority of instances since a judge is free to take into account 
46. 
the particular circumstances of the case before the Court. 26 
Support for this attitude towards the system of property 
distribution established by the Family Law Act is provided by the 
fact Chat, in the Discussion Paper it issued in June, 1985, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission expressed in principle satisfaction 
with the present system. 27 The majority of respondents in the 
Commission's survey of family property cases in Australia preferred 
the retention of a discretionary system, principally because of 
the perceived importance of the needs of the custodial parent and 
children. 28 
It will be the purpose of the remainder of this study to 
first examine the constitutional basis of the Family Law Act 1975 
and its structure in relation to property distribution. Whether 
•the Act's scope is wide enough and its provisions are flexible 
enough to provide a remedy for a spouse who has been disadvantaged 
• by the financial misconduct of the other spouse will be discussed 
in the final chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EXTENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENT'S POWER TO LEGISLATE  
WITH RESPECT TO MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY MATTERS. 
INTRODUCTION: 
The fact that the Commonwealth Parliament's powers to 
legislate with respect to matters which are compendiously called 
"family law" are limited places significant restraints on the 
Family Court of Australia's jurisdiction to determine disputes 
over property matters between the parties to a marriage. 
The Family Law Act 1975, as initially enacted, purported to 
give the Family Court jurisdiction to deal with all property 
relationships of the parties to a marriage, but the High Court in 
Russell V. Russell: Farrelly v. Farrelly 1 limited the jurisdiction 
to proceedings ancillary to principal relief. A dual jurisdiction 
between the Commonwealth and the States in matrimonial property 
law arose as a result. 
It has already been indicated that, with the exception of 
proceedings which fall under the terms of s.161 of the Marriage  
Act 1958 (Vic.) and s.30 of the Family Court Act 1975 (W.A.), 
which was enacted as a result of the decision in Russell: Farrelly, 2 
State Courts must determine property disputes according to the 
general rules of law and equity. The Family Court, on the other 
hand, has a discretionary jurisdiction to adjust property interests 
in cases which fall to be decided under s.79. 
A further attempt to extend the Family Court's jurisdiction . 
with respect to property matters was made with the enactment of the 
Family Law Amendment Act 1983 (Cth.). The constitutionality of the 
amendment to the definition of "matrimonial cause" by paragraph 
(ca)(i) of s.4(1) has not as yet been established, however. 
Moreover, no suggestions as to the limits of the paragraph have yet 
been made by the Full Court of the Family Court. 
Another complication is added by the fact that the exact 
relationship of the Family Law Act to s.109 of the Constitution, 
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which provides that all State laws inconsistent with federal laws 
shall be deemed invalid, has not yet been laid down by the High 
Court. 
That the constitutional bases and the interpretation of laws 
with respect to matrimonial property remain undecided bodes ill 
for the spouse who would prefer to take proceedings under the 
Family Law Act because of the advantages offered by its provisions. 
Moreover, Wade 3 suggests that relations between the Family Court 
and the common law jurisdictions are strained and that 
... proceedings under the Family Law Act will 
persist under the shadow that the Supreme Court 
may not agree with the Family Court's conclusion 
concerning the ownership of property as between the 
two married parties and other third persons". 
Since the principle of stare decisis does not apply as between 
the Family Court and the State Supreme Courts except to the extent 
that the Family Court has an accrued jurisdiction to decide non-
federal matters, 4 the problems presented by a dual property 
jurisdiction are formidable. 
PART A: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS. 
When the Australian Constitution 5 was enacted in 1901, it 
vested in the newly formed Australian Commonwealth power under 
s.51 to make laws with respect to thirty nine subject matters. 6 
Of these, placetum (xxi) and (xxii) respectively conferred power 
on the Commonwealth with regard to "marriage 117 and "divorce and 
matrimonial causes, and in relation thereto, parental rights, and 
the custody and guardianship of infants". 8 Placetum (xxxix) 
confers an incidental power to make legislation in "matters 
incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution 
in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government 
of the Commonwealth or in the Federal Judicature, or in any depart-
ment or officer of the Commonwealth". 9 
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At the time of the Constitution's enactment, family disputes 
were seen as posing problems essentially of a legal nature 
requiring legal remedies. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
the marital relationship is not one which by any means can be 
constituted or regulated exclusively by a bundle of legally 
enforceable rights and duties. In respect of many aspects of 
the relationship, as Atkin L.J. observed in Balfour v. Balfour, 10 
"Each house is a domain into which the King's writ 
does not seek to run, and which his officers do not 
seek to be admitted." 
That the marital relationship raises complex social and 
behavioural problems, the solutions to which lie in sociology and 
the behavioural sciences as well as in the law, was not perceived 
in 1901. A perusal of Quick and Garran's exposition on marriage 
in their Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia  
(1901) shows that "... (f)amily relationships were ... viewed 
from the perspective of rights and duties. 11 Problems, on this 
view, involved the infringement of such rights and the dereliction 
of such duties. As such they were susceptible of solution by 
legal actions". 12  
Not surprisingly, the drafters of the Constitution provided 
legislative powers far short of those required to cover the entire 
scope of subjects which are known in the 1980's to comprise "family 
law". 13  Moreover, the powers which were conferred by the 
Constitution have been interpreted in a legalistic manner, 14 the 
High Court generally seeing itself as being bound by the terms of 
the Constitution. However, the attitude of members of the High 
Court towards the extent of federal powers has varied. Different 
compositions of the High Court have interpreted s.51(xxi) and (xxii) 
with both generosity 15 and restraint. 16 Frequently in the mid-1970's, 
the period when the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.) was debated and 
enacted, the High Court insisted that its role was that of guardian 
of the Constitution. 17  As Griffith CJ. so aptly put it as early 
as 1908 in the Union Label Case: 18 
"Parliament cannot enlarge its powers by calling 
a matter with which it is not competent to deal by 
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the name of something else which is within its 
competence ... (and) it is for the (High) Court 
to determine ... whether an asserted power is or 
is not conferred by the Constitution." 
A fragmentary approach to the interpretation of the Commonwealth's 
power to legislate with respect to the family is inevitable "... in 
the absence of the conferral of a plenary power identified as such 
and capable of being delimited by reference to a full range of 
rights, duties and legal relationships answering the description 
19 of 'family law". 	That the Commonwealth has, in fact, no power 
with respect to family law was pointed out by Barwick CJ. and 
Stephen J. in Vitzdamm-Jones v. Vitzdamm-Jones; St Clair v. 
Nicholson and Others. 20  Further, the lack of Federal interest in 
the area is highlighted by the fact that the marriage and divorce 
powers conferred by the Constitution in 1901 were not used to any 
•significant extent 24 for some sixty years until the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1959 (Cth.)and the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth.) were enacted. 
On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the two matters, 
"marriage" and "matrimonial causes", on which the Commonwealth may 
legislate are not discrete and that it is not necessary that a 
given topic fall directly within one or the other, but not both, of 
the heads of power. It is well recognised that a law may be 
characterised as a law with respect to more than one subject matter. 22 
Therefore, a law may be a law with respect to both marriage and 
matrimonial causes. For example, Taylor J. and Menzies J. in the 
Marriage Act Case23. laid to rest the narrow view that if placetum 
(xxii) had not been included in s.51 of the Constitution, there 
would have been no power to make laws providing for divorce. As 
they pointed out,divorce may be regarded as being a particular 
aspect of marriage. 24 Also, through the operation of the so-called 
"implied incidental power", 25 an existing Commonwealth power may 
be used in the furtherance of a family law objective, even though 
it may not be characterised.as being .a topic of "family law" per se. 
The implied incidental power or "associated jurisdiction ”26 
is not a separate head of power, but rather a rule of construction 
whereby every grant of power is interpreted to include such ancillary 
powers (and only such powers) as are reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the main power. 27 Its operation is well-
illustrated by a trilogy of recent High Court decisions comprising 
Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions (The Philip 
Morris Case); 28 Fencott v. Muller 29 and Stack v. Gold Coast  
Securities (No.9) Pty. Ltd. 30  (the Trade Practices Cases). 
These cases considered the extent of the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Court of Australia under the Trade Practices Act 1974 and, 
in particular, under s.86 of that Act. Section 86 provides that: 
"Jurisdiction is conferred on the (Federal) Court 
to hear and determine actions, prosecutions and other 
proceedings under (Part VI of the Trade Practices Act) 
and that jurisdiction is exclusive of the jurisdiction 
of any other court, other than the jurisdiction of the 
High Court under Section 75 of the Constitution". 
The High Court held that s.86 is a law defining the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Court with respect to matters arising under a law 
made by the Parliament pursuant to the power conferred by s.76(ii) 
and s.77(i) and (ii) of the Constitution31 and that the jurisdiction 
conferred with respect to matters arising under Part VI of the 
Trade Practices Act extends to the determination of questions or ,  
issues which, though they do not arise under Part VI, are part of 
the matter which so arises. 32 This so-called "associated 
jurisdiction" was held to arise from the operation of s.32(1) of 
the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth.) which "to the extent 
the Constitution permits" confers jurisdiction on the Court "in 
respect of matters not otherwise within the jurisdiction expressed 
by this Act or any law to be conferred on the Court that are 
associated with matters ... in which the jurisdiction of the 
Court is invoked or that arise in proceedings (including proceedings 
upon an appeal before the Court)". Section 32(1) has been held to 
give the Federal Court jurisdiction only in associated matters 
which arise under other laws made by the Parliament, even though 
the Parliament has not otherwise conferred jurisdiction on the 
Court in respect of those matters. 33 
Section 33 of the Family Law Act is expressed in identical 
terms 34 and, since the High Court decision in Re Ross-Jones and 
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and Marinovich; ex parte Green, 35 it is apparent that decisions 
concerning s.32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 will 
assist in interpreting s.33 of the Family Law Act. 36 
In Philip Morris, 37 their Honours were invited to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Court to deal with common law claims 
arising under State law made in conjunction with claims arising 
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 in pursuance of s.32(1) of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, but, with the exception of 
Murphy J., they declined to do so. As pointed out by the High Court 
in Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; ex parte Green, which discussed 
the application of s.33 of the Family Law Act, 39 the associated 
jurisdiction can arise only if the Court already has jurisdiction: 
its jurisdiction may then be extended, as far as is constitutionally 
permissible, to associated matters. 40 
The majority of the Justices in Philip Morris41 held that 
"matter" and "matters" in s.76(ii) and s.77(i) respectively of the 
Constitution empowered the Commonwealth Parliament to invest 
jurisdiction in the Federal Court of Australia to determine other 
matters provided that those matters were not severable from a 
matter which was originally, and not merely derivatively, within 
s.76(ii). Mason J's test, namely that the attached claim and the 
federal claim must "... so depend on common transactions and facts 
that they arise out of a common substratum of facts" , 42  was accepted 
by the majority of the High Court, Mason, Murphy, Brennan and 
Deane JJ., in Fencott v. Muller. 43 Therefore, using the language 
of the Granall Case, 44 the inclusion of non-severable matters 
reasonably necessary for the efficacy of the jurisdiction over 
the matter originally within the constitutional provision is not 
beyond the jurisdiction of a court vested with federal jurisdiction. 
The majority of the High Court in Fencott v. Muller 45 explained 
this so-called "accrued" jurisdiction in the following terms: 
"What is and what is not part of the one controversy 
depends on what the parties have done, the relationship 
between or among them and the laws which attach rights 
or liabilities to their conduct and relationships. 
The scope of a controversy which constitutes a matter 
is not ascertained merely by reference to the proceedings 
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which a party may institute, but may be illuminated 
by the conduct of those proceedings and particularly 
by the pleadings in which the issues in controversy 
are defined and the claims for relief are set out. 
But in the end, it is a matter of practical judgment 
whether a non-federal claim and a federal claim 
joined in a proceeding are within the scope of one 
controversy and thus within the ambit of a matter". 
In Gubbay, 46 Nygh J. applied the High Court's interpretation 
of s.32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to the terms of 
s.33 of the Family Law Act 1975 and he held that it must be read as 
being confined to giving the Family Court an associated jurisdiction 
in respect of matters arising under the Federal Acts other than the 
Family Law Act, naming as examples the Bankruptcy Act 1966, the 
Copyright Act 1912 and the Trade Practices Act 1974. Since the claim 
in the case before him, namely an application for damages for breach 
of trust, arose under the general law of equity, a matter which 
arises under State law rather than under a federal Act, his 
Honour was of the view that it lay outside the scope of s.33 and 
. that the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide lt. 47  His 
Honour also outlined48 the distinction between the "associated 
jurisdiction" of the Family Court and its "accrued jurisdiction" . 49 
By the latter is meant a jurisdiction to provide a remedy for claims 
arising under State law which arise in conjunction with or are non-
severable from a claim arising under s.79 of the Family Law Act. 
An example might well be a claim for property adjustment with 
associated claims for damages arising out of a breach of contract 
or a tortious act between the parties to the marriage. 50 
Barwick C.J. in Philip Morris 51 said in respect of a claim 
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Commonwealth) that "... the 
authority to grant appropriate remedies will be included in the 
52 accrued jurisdiction." 	While there is no provision in the 
Family Law Act  1975 corresponding to s.22 of the Federal Court of 
Australia Act, which confers on the Federal Court a power to grant 
remedies to which any of the parties to a dispute appears "to be 
entitled in respect of a legal or equitable claim properly brought 
before it so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy 
between the parties may be completely and finally determined and 
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all multiplicity of proceedings concerning any of those matters 
avoided", Evatt C.J. in Smith (No.2) 53 expressed the view that the 
Family Court also has an accrued jurisdiction to grant appropriate 
remedies in a case before it should it decide to exercise it. 54 
Her Honour based her opinion on the fact that s.34(1) of the Family 
Law Act, which gives the Family Court, in relation to matters in 
which it has jurisdiction, power to make such orders and issue such 
writs as it thinks fit, is expressed in almost identical terms to 
s.23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act. While she conceded that 
the provisions of s.34 are less broad and less general in nature 
than sections 22 and 23 of the Federal Court Act, when considered 
in conjunction with s.80 and s.81 of the Family Law Act, it seems 
clear that they have a corresponding purpose when the Family Court 
is exercising its powers under Part VIII of the Family Law Act, 
which concerns proceedings with respect to property and maintenance. 
Section 80(k) of the Family Law Act empowers the Court to make 
any order which it thinks is necessary to do justice in proceedings 
under Part VIII while s.81 directs the Court in proceedings under 
that'Part, so far as practicable, to make such orders as will 
finally determine the financial relationships between the parties 
and avoid further proceedings between them. 
It appears, then, that so long as there is a common nucleus 
of facts and circumstances in the evidence raised before the 
Family Court, the Court has the discretion to assume an accrued 
jurisdiction and decide both the federal and the non-federal 
aspects of the proceedings, therefore obviating the need in such 
cases for the applicant to apply to a State Supreme Court for 
orders relating to matters of the general law. The parties, the 
remedies and the elements of the differing causes of action decided 
under the accrued jurisdiction need not be the same. 55 In an 
appropriate case, then, the Family Court may be asked to exercise 
jurisdiction under the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (N.S.W.) 
and determine a property dispute concerning a husband and wife and 
the de facto spouse of one of them. 
While the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over a 
"matrimonial cause" (s.8 of the Family Law Act), a non-federal 
action which arises "non-severably" with a matrimonial cause and 
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therefore falls within the accrued jurisdiction of the Family 
Court does not fall within its exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the non-federal claim could be brought before a State Supreme Court 
at the same time as it was being adjudicated in the Family Court 
in conjunction with property proceedings under s.79. Jurisdictional 
conflict appears to be inevitable, but in the past, Family Court 
Judges have adjourned or continued proceedings according to 
considerations of delay and/or legal costs. 
The burgeoning of the Family Court's accrued and associated 
jurisdiction through extrapolation from the decisions of the High 
Court in the "Trade Practices Cases" has widened its reach over 
property matters concerning married persons. Wade 56 claims that 
it is arguable that, in appropriate cases, the Family Court can now 
decide such actions as a claim by a relative to a share of property 
already in dispute between spouses under s.79 of the Family Law 
Act, whether that claim be under the law of trusts, gifts or 
contracts; a claim by a relative to a monetary sum under 
personal actions such as debt, quantum meruit or proprietary 
estoppel; a claim by a de facto spouse to a share of property under 
the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (N.S.W.); and a'request for the 
appointment of a receiver to wind up a partnership under State 
,Partnership legislation. In appropriate cases, the Family Court 
might also be able to decide issues concerning a deceased person's 
estate and the operation of State Testator's Family Maintenance 
legislation. 
Obviously, in future, there is potential for jurisdictional 
tension between the Family Court and State Supreme Courts which 
may not be easily decided through judicial comity. 
For the High Court, the Commonwealth Parliament's control of 
the institution of marriage extends to its regulation of the rights 
and duties between husband and wife, or more specifically, such 
inter-personal rights as consortium or, more widely, inter-spousal 
relations, whether these relations give rise to personal rights 
and duties (such as consortium) or proprietary rights and duties 
(such as maintenance or settlement of property). 57 Section 51(xxi) 
(the "marriage power") supports "any law with respect to marriage 
considered as an institution ... (such as) laws defining and 
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regulating the respective rights duties and obligations of the 
parties inter se". 58 Federal marriage legislation can "... 
extend at least to the personal relationships that are the conse-
quences of marriage - cohabitation, conjugal society, all that is 
meant by consortium, the mutual society, help and comfort that 
the one ought to have for the other. These are of the very nature 
- of marriage 59 
It will be noted that the latter view of s.51(xxi) gives it 
a further reach over inter-personal relations, namely beyond the 
area of personal relationships into the area of proprietary 
interests related to the institution of marriage. 60 According 
to Mason J. in Russell: Farrelly, 61 the marriage power "... may 
be exercised by the providing for and the enforcement of rights 
of maintenance ... and property" provided these are "... rights 
duties and obligations of the parties arising out of or in con-
sequence of marriage . . 62 Therefore, "... (e)ven if in law or 
equity the title to property is in one party to a marriage, the 
circumstances of the marital relationship may make an alteration 
of parties' interests just and equitable. In the case of the 
parties to a marriage, the marriage relationship brings (s.79) 
within the marriage power ... (but these proprietary rights must 
be) proprietary rights ... (related) to the marriage relationship . . 63 
The limiting of proprietary rights to those "... arising out 
of or in consequence of marriage" or to proprietary rights 
.64 i ... related to the marriage relationship '. ' 64 	the 
circumscribed power over property matters conferred by the "marriage 
power". It is not sufficient for a law founded on the terms of 
s.51(xxi) to deal with proprietary interests even if these happen 
to be contested between husband and wife, since the Federal 
Parliament has no power over a husband and wife, only a power over 
marriage and, in relation thereto, a husband and wife. Rather it 
is necessary for the s.51(xxi) law to deal with proprietary 
interests which are affected by the marriage relationship. Therefore, 
it would be intra vires for the Parliament to enact a law concerning 
proprietary interests in a home to which one party holds the legal 
title, but to whose acquisition and improvement the other has 
contributed, even if only indirectly in the capacity of homemaker 
or parent. In such a case, the enactment would be dealing with 
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marriage-partnership property. As Barwick C.J. briefly put it, 
the s.51(xxi) law is limited to interspousal disputes about 
... property the right or claim to which arises out of marriage " . 65 
It should also be noted that although the Family Court of 
Australia is a superior court of record, it does not have a general 
inherent injunctive jurisdiction; where there is no marriage 
interest in the property (and no matrimonial cause on foot or 
about to be set in motion) the Family Court has no jurisdiction 
over such property. This is so because the constitutional powers 
underlying the jurisdiction of the Family Court of Australia 
comprise s.77(i) with s.75(ii) and s.51(xxi) plus incidental 
powers, 66 and the Family Court's jurisdiction is circumscribed 
by these. 
As far as the term "matrimonial cause" is concerned, the 
meaning remains fixed as the term was construed in 1901, but its 
denotation or the scope of its application will change according 
to changing conditions. 67 As Menzies J. expressed it in Lansell 
v. Lansell: 68 
"It is right, in construing a grant of power, to 
ascertain as a starting point at least what the 
words used in the Constitution meant in 1901 when 
the Constitution was enacted, but it is quite another 
thing to attempt to confine the legislative power 
of the Parliament to making the kinds of laws then 
in existence". 
Therefore, one should look for the "... outside limits" rather 
than the "... minimum content" of a constitutional power. 69 
It has been said that a "cause" is a causa jurisdictionis, 
any suit, action, matter or other similar proceeding competently 
brought before and litigated in a particular court. 70 "Matter" 
has been held not to mean "legal proceeding", but rather the subject 
matter for determination in a legal proceeding. As Mason J. 
described the term in the Philip Morris case, 71  'matters" is 
"... the widest term to denote controversies which might come 
" 72 	73 before a Court of Justice , 	but he went on to say 	that there 
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can be no jurisdiction except in a "... matter of the required 
kind". Elliott J. in Madjeric 74 put the notion clearly when he 
said the "... jurisdiction identifies or limits the subject matter 
with which the Court is authorised to deal,, 75 
Under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Commonwealth), s.2, "cause" 
includes any suit, and any suit includes any "action or original 
proceeding between parties". Therefore, a "matrimonial cause" in 
this sense must refer to a legal proceeding arising out of or 
concerning a matrimonial relationship. 76 However, the same 
dispute may be seen as a "matrimonial cause" by the Family Court 
but be characterised differently in the Supreme Court. For example, 
a dispute between husband and wife in respect of assets held in 
partnership could equally well be maintained in both jurisdictions. 
If the Family Court heard the case, one party might well be awarded 
a greater share of such assets because of a greater degree of 
contribution, whereas, if the Supreme Court heard the application, 
the assets would be divided equally, since the application would 
not be regarded as a matrimonial cause. 77 
Whether or not a matrimonial cause is competently brought 
before the court will depend whether the matter concerned in the 
proceedings is justiciable, 78 that is, whether a law creating 
rights and duties can be invoked by the parties to a controversy 
and form a basis upon which the Court will adjudicate. It appears, 
then, that the Parliament is. competent to make a law involving any 
controversy arising out of or incidental to marriage that is 
capable of being litigated so long as it has as its minimum 
content the kind of subject matters which in 1901 were regarded as 
being included within the concept of "matrimonial cause", but it 
may also encompass matters which properly can be regarded as 
relevant to those subject matters as being within "... the widening 
denotation in the light of changing social conditions". 79 
The definition of "matrimonial cause" in the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1959 (Commonwealth) fell short of the possible coverage 
that was available to the Commonwealth under s.51(xxi) of the 
Constitution. 80 Therefore, matters such as maintenance of wives 
and children and custody of children (other than in connection 
with divorce or other "principal proceedings") as well as the 
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guardianship of children did not come within the terms of the 
Act. 
On the other hand, since State Supreme Courts were invested 
with Federal jurisdiction, the problem of dual court systems was 
avoided. 81 In matters with respect to property, jurisdiction was 
assumed under the federal law where the proceedings were in 
relation to proceedings for federal relief, but it remained in 
the State courts where this was not the case. Where a matrimonial 
cause for principal relief had come into existence but had not 
been disposed of prior to the litigation of a property dispute 
under s.86(1), however, there was doubt as to whether the 
Commonwealth legislation could deal with matrimonial property 
matters. 82 
Lansell v. Lansell 83 raised the issue as to whether there was 
power to order settlements of matrimonial property under the 
matrimonial causes power, and whether s.86(1) 84 of the Matrimonial  
Causes Act 1959, which purportedly conferred such a power, was 
valid, and, if so, to what extent. The parties had been married 
but their marriage had been dissolved some fourteen years before 
the proceedings in question, in which the Court considered the 
wife's application for an order directing the husband to execute 
a registrable transfer of certain land of which he was registered 
proprietor to the wife for life with the remainder to their two 
children. The High Court held that, by its terms, the Matrimonial 
Causes Act applied to such proceedings. Kitto J. pointed out that 
both property and maintenance proceedings were "relief incidental 
to, because consequential upon the dissolution of a marriage or 
the granting of one or the other forms of relief which identify a 
cause as a matrimonial cause in the ordinary English sense of 
the expression" 85 In Sanders v. Sanders, 86 the High Court took 
the view that maintenance and property are very closely inter- 
linked, overlapping rather than being mutually exclusive. Therefore, 
it was held that the property of one party could be settled upon 
the other in order to provide maintenance for that other party, 87 
thereby conferring a broad discretionary power to vary the established 
proprietary rights of husband and wife in matrimonial proceedings. 
The approach adopted opened the way for the Commonwealth to 
legislate boldly in the area of matrimonial property. 88 
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PART B  
JURISDICTION UNDER THE FAMILY LAW ACT TO MAKE ORDERS AFFECTING 
PROPERTY 
(a) BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY LAW AMENDMENT ACT 1983  
When the Family Law Act 1975 was enacted, it appeared that a 
robust approach had indeed been adopted. The Act conferred on the 
Family Court, by s.31(1) and s.39(1), jurisdiction to entertain 
matrimonial causes, subject to some qualifications. 89 According 
to the original definition in s.4(1) of the Act, "matrimonial 
cause", inter alia, meant proceedings with respect to 
the maintenance of one of the parties to a 
marriage; 
(ii) the property of the parties to a marriage or 
of either of them; or 
(iii) the custody, guardianship or maintenance of, 
or access to, a child of marriage". 
Therefore, power was assumed to deal with the property of the parties 
to the marriage, whereas under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 
proceedings for a settlement were defined as being a matrimonial 
cause only if they were in relation to concurrent, pending or 
completed proceedings for principal relief. 90 Moreover, under 
s.78, the Court was invested with power to make declarations of 
interest in the property of the parties, and under s.79, it could 
alter the parties' interest in the property where it considered it 
just to do so. While the provisions did not go so far as to create 
a regime of matrimonial property involving property rights and 
liabilities arising as an incident of marriage, the way seemed open 
for the Court to deal with the property relationships of the 
parties to a marriage even in the absence of any proceedings, ante-
cedent or concurrent, for principal relief, such as divorce or 
nullity. 
91 	. However, in Russell: Farrelly, 	which was decided in May, 1976, 
only shortly after the Family Law Act 1975 came into operation, 92 
unlimited property jurisdiction not ancillary to principal relief 
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was held by a majority of the High Court to be beyond federal 
constitutional power, 93 and Parliament was quick to amend certain 
parts of the Act to reflect their conclusions. 94 
Mason J.'s views in Russell: Farrelly 95 in fact became the 
order of the High Court. His interpretation of the scope of 
constitutional power to legislate in respect of property proceedings 
between the parties to a marriage was summarised by the Full Court 
of the Family Court of Australia in Tansell v. Tansell 96 in the 
following terms: 
"In his view proceedings with respect to the 
property of the parties to a marriage or either of 
them (para. c(ii) of the original definition of 
matrimonial cause) could not be considered as an 
independent matrimonial cause within the meaning 
of sec. 51(xxi) of the Constitution. The primary 
reason was that such proceedings were not limited 
to proceedings between the parties to the marriage 
in question. His Honour declined the read the 
provision down by reference to the marriage power 
(i.e. by limiting it to proceedings between the 
parties) because the proceedings would then be a 
separate matrimonial cause, independent of any 
application for principal relief, in which the 
Court could deal with any property of the parties 
howsoever and whensoever acquired. In the result 
his Honour held that the provision could be read 
only by reference to Sec.51(xxii) of the Constitution 
as conferring jurisdiction to grant ancillary relief 
in proceedings for annulment or dissolution of 
marriage ...". 
Accordingly, there was a division of jurisdiction between the 
Commonwealth and the States in the area of matrimonial property law. 97 
Until divorce proceedings could be commenced between the couple, 
namely after the effluxion of the twelve month separation period 
required by s.48(2) of the Act as evidence of the irretrievable 
breakdown of the marriage, disputes as between husband and wife 
concerning their property remained within the province of State 
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legislation and the jurisdiction of State Courts unless the 
parties could claim accelerated relief by making an application for 
a declaration as to validity of a marriage, divorce or annulment 
(s.113 and s.4(1)(b))orr a decree of nullity of marriage (s.51 and 
s.4(1)(a)(ii)), although such instances would be rare, 98 the grounds 
for a nullity decree being particularly restricted. 99 Where a 
marriage has been a foreign one, questions as to its validity in 
Australia raise some doubt, so that the acceleration of relief 
will be more readily available in such cases.'  
Once proceedings for principal relief are commenced, any 
property dispute between a husband and wife becomes subject to 
federal legislation in the form of the Family Law Act 1975 and, 
except in Western Australia, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Family Court of Australia. In Western Australia, according to the 
terms of s.29 and s.30 of the Family Court Act 1975-1982 (W.A.), 2 
the Family Court of Western Australia administers both federal and 
non-federal laws, and the adjustive property jurisdiction is 
available in both systems. 3 
Account could be taken of the indirect non-financial 
contribution to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of 
property made by a wife in her capacity of homemaker and mother 
once principal proceedings could be taken under the Family Law Act. 
By contrast, except such cases as fell within the terms of s.161 
of the Marriage Act 1958 (Vic.) or s.30 of the Family Court Act 
1975-1982 (W.A.), disputes as to property falling under State 
legislation had to be decided under the strict rules of law and 
equity whereby it is not possible to take into account non-financial 
contribution by a wife to the acquisition of the family assets. 
According to the terms of s.48(2) of the Family Law Act, proceedings 
for dissolution of marriage can only be taken and a decree of 
dissolution of marriage be made "if, and only if, the court is 
satisfied that the parties separated and thereafter lived separately 
and apart for a continuous period of not less than 12 months 
preceding the date of the filing of the application for dissolution 
of marriage". Therefore, in the majority of States, a husband 
could have up to twelve months after separation from his wife to 
dispose of property to which he held the legal title, 4 but to the 
acquisition of which his wife may have indirectly contributed, 
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either through indirect financial contributions 5 or through her 
activities as homemaker or parent. 6 
A majority of the Full Court in Sieling 7 stated obiter8 that 
despite precedents to the contrary, an injunction could lie to 
prevent the husband from dealing with assets prior to the 
availability of proceedings for principal relief. In granting 
such relief, the Court would be exercising jurisdiction to deal 
with a present matrimonial cause under s.4(1) and s.114(1). 
The jurisdiction to make a "freezing order" depended on the 
equities in property that the parties had built up during the 
marriage. Once a marriage had broken down, this approach enabled 
a court to grant an injunction to protect the incipient or 
inchoate rights of a spouse to seek an order altering property 
interests under s.79 of the Act, but such an injunction had to be 
"temporary and personal". 9 
The Sieling injunction to freeze dealings with property 
pending the availability of the property jurisdiction was adopted 
by a number of single judges 10 and, despite some initial reluctance 
to create jurisdicti.onal conflicts between the two court systems, 11 
it was utilized to prevent a party from disposing of property by 
applying for inconsistent Supreme Court orders. 12 The Full Court 
first employed this mode of closing the hiatus in Family Court 
jurisdiction pending the availability of principal relief in 
Stowe, 13 in which the Court set down the criteria which a party 
seeking a Sieling injunction needed to establish, and Buckeridge 
(No.2). 14  
However, the requirements set down in Stowe 15  do not extend 
jurisdiction to the Family Court where no s.79 order will ultimately 
be available, 16 as for example where the other party to the marriage 
has died, 17 unless property proceedings have already been 
instituted, 18 or where all the property of the parties is charged 
to a mortgage or a secured creditor so that there is no equity in 
the property remaining in the parties in respect to which a s.79 
order may be made. 19 Alternatively, the Court may find it has 
jurisdiction, yet choose as a matter of discretion to to grant an 
injunction on the grounds that it does not believe the property to 
20 be at risk or because the balance of convenience lies in withholding 
64. 
the injunction. 21 Technically, if the Family Court regards itself 
as having jurisdiction but for some reason declines to exercise it, 
then the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in the matter and the 
applicant has no remedy. 22 In practice, however, it is nevertheless 
regarded as proper that the Supreme Court should entertain an 
application subsequent to its refusal in the Family Court. 
In that a Sieling injunction23  must be limited in duration 
and personal and its award is a matter for the discretion of the 
Court, it does not provide complete protection for a non-titled 
spouse, who may be considerably disadvantaged by the freedom of 
the other spouse to dispose of property or dissipate assets in 
the period pending principal proceedings. 
The divided property jurisdiction has involved many spouses 
in the cost, emotional trauma and inconvenience associated with 
separate proceedings in the Family Courts of Australia and in 
State and Territory Supreme Courts or Magistrates' Courts. Prior 
to the Family Law Amendment Act 1983, the division often forced 
spouses to institute proceedings for dissolution of marriage in 
order to obtain a property settlement under the Act, or it caused 
the duplication of proceedings by making it necessary for parties 
to either approach the Family Court for interim or temporary 
relief until such, time as the ground for principal relief became 
available or to take separate proceedings in a State or Territory 
Court. This resulted in substantially increased legal costs to 
the parties (or, in the case of legally-aided parties, to the 
Government, and therefore to the community as a whole) and a 
significant disadvantage to women, as the wife is often in a 
vulnerable position in relation to property if her marriage breaks 
down. 24 Finlay25 adds a further disadvantage of the divided 
jurisdiction, namely manouevering and the use of subterfuge as 
the parties attempted to get themselves within a particular 
jurisdiction not otherwise open to them. 
The Joint Select Committee in its inquiry into the Family Law 
Act 1975 26 considered a number of solutions to the problems of the 
divided jurisdiction, 27 including the possibility of introducing 
a matrimonial property regime pursuant to the "marriage power" 
(s.51(xxi) of the Constitution). It was of the opinion that, 
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preparatory to the introduction of any such regime, there should 
•be a survey to establish community attitudes to the proposal, that 
a full study of the legal implications of introduction of such a 
scheme should be carried out by the Law Reform Commission and that 
an assessment of the experience under the New Zealand and the 
various Canadian schemes should be made. 28 In the interim the 
Committee urged that there be immediate amendments to the Family 
Law Act. 29 
In their submission to the Joint Select Committee, the Judges 
of the Family Court of Australia had expressed the view that an 
analysis of the reasons given by the majority of the High Court in 
Russell: Farrelly, and in particular the judgement of Mason J., 30 
suggested that there was a power to legislate in respect of property 
which has been acquired for or is used for the purposes of the 
marriage. 31 Mason J. 32  had explained the "marriage power" in the 
following terms: 
... Notwithstanding the existence of (the divorce 
power), the marriage power enables the Parliament to 
provide •or the enforcement of such rights, duties 
and obligations as may be created in exercise of the 
marriage power ... So understood, the power may be 
exercised by providing for the enforcement of rights 
of maintenance, custody and property by proceedings 
separate and independent of proceedings for annulment 
or dissolution of marriage". 
Applying this interpretation of the marriage power, Mason J. 
was able to uphold as intra vires the jurisdiction conferred by the 
Family Law Act to determine proceedings relating to children and 
maintenance proceedings between spouses, independently of divorce 
or other proceedings for principal relief (subject to the limitation 
that such proceedings must only be between parties to a marriage). 
However, because the Act did not limit the property that might be 
the subject of proceedings to property in some way incidental or 
related to the fact of marriage, the attempt to confer jurisdiction 
on such property proceedings could not be said, according to Mason J., 
to be an exercise of the "marriage power". Rather, it had to be 
regarded as exercise of the "divorce power". Therefore such property 
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proceedings had to be ancillary to proceedings for principal 
relief, and accordingly limited to the parties to the marriage. 
(b) AS A RESULT OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY LAW AMENDMENT 
ACT 198333 
The Joint Select Committee in its Report on the Family Law 
Act 34 recommended that the Act be amended by relating the jurisdiction 
in respect of matrimonial property disputes to the marriage power. 
It was of the view that if the property jurisdiction were limited 
to require that: 
(i) the proceedings be between the parties to 
the marriage; 
(ii) the dispute be related to the property or 
the property claims of either party; and 
(iii) the claim arise out of the fact that the 
parties are married, 
the legislation would survive testing of its validity in the High 
Court. 
By the Family Law Amendment Act, which eventually was given 
Royal Assent on 1st November, 1983, and which came into effect on 
25th November, 1983, the definition of "matrimonial cause" in 
s.4(1) was amended by revision of paragraph (ca), which originally 
had been inserted as a result of the decision in Russell: Farrelly35 
regarding the limits which should be placed on the operation of s.79. 
As amended in 1983, paragraph (ca) expanded the powers over 
matrimonial property disputes of Courts exercising jurisdiction 
under the Family Law Act 1975 in order to enable them to deal with 
proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the 
property of either or both of them, being "proceedings arising out 
of the marital relationship". 36 
The decision of the High Court in Cormick and Cormick v. Salmon 37 
on the scope of s.5(1)(f), which was inserted by the Family Law 
Amendment Act 1983, may throw some light on the interpretation of 
paragraph (ca)(i) of the definition of "matrimonial cause" in 
s.4(1) of the Family Law Act. Since the case raised a question as 
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to the limits inter se of the constitutional powers of the 
Commonwealth and the States, a lower court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the matter and the case was removed to the High Court by 
operation of s.40A of the Judiciary Act 1903-1959 (Cth.). At issue 
was a contest over the custody of a five-year-old boy, who was born 
out of wedlock, between his grandmother and her present husband 
and the grandmother's daughter, the mother of the child. According 
to s.5(1)(f), for purposes of each application of the Act, a child 
who has been treated by the husband and wife as a child of their 
family, if the child was ordinarily a member of their household, 
shall be deemed to be a child of the marriage. The daughter's 
claim that the purported extension of the Family Court's jurisdiction 
was unconstitutional as being beyond power was accepted by the 
majority of the Court. 38 
The decision of the majority was based on the fact that, 
since the provisions of s.5(1)(f) were intended to operate when no 
divorce or other form of principal relief was pending, the only 
possible source of power was the "marriage power" (s.51(xxi) •of the 
Constitution). The rights and duties of parties to a marriage with 
respect to the children of the marriage arise directly out of the 
marriage relationship and, accordingly, a law defining such 
incidents of marriage is a law with respect to marriage. 39 
On the other hand, Parliament cannot itself effectively 
declare that particular facts are sufficient to bring about the 
necessary connection with a head of power, 40 or, as Brennan J. 
pointed out, 41 the marriage power does not support a law regulating 
what "... is deemed to be, but what would not otherwise be, an 
incident of the marital relationship". Therefore, Parliament 
cannot under the power enact a law which provides for the adjud-
ication of a dispute between persons who are not married when the 
child whose custody or guardianship is in issue is not a child of 
the marriage. 
Unfortunately, property matters cannot be as easily compart-
mentalised as can issues of child custody. It is not easy to 
define the rights and duties of the parties to a marriage with 
respect to property nor are the parameters of the type of property 
ownership which may properly be considered to be an incident of 
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marriage easily drawn, yet an attempt was made when paragraph 
(ca)(i) was inserted in s.4(1). 
The words "arising out of the marital relationship" were 
included in the paragraph in order to make a conceptual connection 
with the federal "marriage power" contained in s.51(xxi) of the 
Constitution. 42 Paragraphs (ca)(ii) and (ca)(iii) of the definition 
of "matrimonial cause" are clearly related to s.51 (xxii) of the 
Constitution. Bailey43 expresses the view that it appears from 
recent decisions that the High Court as presently constituted may 
be prepared to give a wider interpretation of the "marriage power" 
than it was when Russell: Farrelly was decided, 44 although it should 
be noted that the Court's recent decision in Cormick and Cormick v. 
Salmon45 and Re Ross Jones and Maninovich; ex parte Green46  give a 
clear picture of the limits that have been set by the High Court. 
There was nothing in the judgments of the High Court in Russell:  
Farrelly to say that jurisdiction to hear property proceedings in 
the pre-divorce period could never be conferred on the Family Court. 
What was decided was that the particular wording of the Family Law 
Act at that time (especially the wording of paragraph (c)(ii) of 
the definition of "matrimonial cause") was not such as to express 
a sufficient connection with the "marriage power" in s.51(xxi). 
In Re Dovey; ex parte Ross, 47 which concerned, inter alia, the 
wording of paragraph (e) of the definition of "matrimonial cause", 
Gibbs J. (as he then was) said that while the words "circumstances 
arising out of the marital relationship" in the paragraph appeared 
to have a wide meaning, he was in agreement with what Demack J. had 
said in Mills, 48 namely that simply because something happens between 
husband and wife, it does not necessarily mean that it has involved 
such circumstances: "... the event must be one which raised issues 
of law that are within the body of law defining marital relationships". 
Mason J. agreed with this approach, 49 but Barwick CJ. was more 
specific in his views: 50 
"I find no need to attempt an exposition of the 
nature and limits of the jurisdiction which paragraph (e) 
of the definition purports to give. Its language is 
lacking in precision and its ambit is matter of some 
doubt in my mind". 
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Should a case on the issue of the scope of the phrase 
"proceedings arising out of the marital relationship" come before 
the High Court and the majority of the Court find that its limits 
are insufficiently defined, there is little doubt, in the light 
of the decision in Russell: Farrelly, 51  that paragraph (ca)(i) 
would be ruled unconstitutional. This conclusion is strengthened 
by the fact that while paragraph (ca)(i) is related to s.79, 
which empowers the court to alter property interests as between 
the parties to a marriage, paragraph (e) has been held to relate 
to s.114(1), 52 which provides for property rights to be affected 
or regulated, but not altered. 53 Obviously, then,the High Court 
will be likely to interpret the scope and operation of paragraph 
(ca)(i) with particular care. 
Assuming, however, that the new provision is constitutionally 
valid, its application is still uncertain. It is not yet clear 
when jurisdiction to decide issues coming unders its terms arises 
nor what interpretation should be placed on the words "proceedings 
arising out of the marital relationship". 
While paragraphs (ca)(i) and (e) of the definition of 
"matrimonial cause" in s.4(1) differ in that the first concerns 
"proceedings" and the latter concerns "circumstances", both contain 
the phrase "arising out of the marital relationship". That decisions 
on the application of paragraph (e) will provide enlightment as to 
the interpretation of paragraph (ca)(i) is made clear by In The  
Marriage of B. and B., 54 the first reported decision on an 
application under the latter paragraph. The Full Court55 was 
referred by counsel for the wife to the decisions in Mills 56 and 
Farr, 57 both of which concerned an application for an injunction 
in circumstances arising out of the marital relationship. In 
B. and B., 58 the Court refused to make a property order in 
relation to real estate purchased in joint names by a former husband 
and wife after their divorce because there was no nexus between the 
events surrounding cohabitation after the dissolution of the 
marriage and the original marital relationship. Just how proximate 
the nexus must be if there is to be a valid application based on 
jurisdiction arising under paragraph (ca)(i) is not made clear by 
the decision, nor by that in Raffellini v. Raffellini and Others, 59 
where the application under paragraph (ca)(i) to have partnership 
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interests adjusted was refused because the partnership concerned 
included persons other than the parties to the marriage. 60 
As far as the question of when the jurisdiction to hear 
applications under the paragraph arises is concerned, however, 
enlightenment must be sought other than in decisions concerning 
the interpretation of paragraph (e) of s.4(1). Paragraph (e) 
does not involve the declaration of property interests nor their 
alteration, merely their protection. Paragraph (ca)(i), related 
as it is to s.78 and s.79 of the Act, empowers the Court to declare 
property interests as between the parties to the marriage according 
to the common law principles of law and equity (s.78) and to alter 
them if it thinks fit to do so (s.79(1)). It is clear that 
applications made for a declaration of legal and equitable interests 
in property as at the time of the hearing will present few problems. 
However, an application to alter property rights under s.79 has 
been seen traditionally as something which arises from the break-
down of marriage and the need for the financial affairs of the 
parties to be re-arranged following that breakdown. 61 As will be 
indicated in Chapter Five of this study, s.79 involves the Court 
in the quantification of contributions made by the parties to the 
property in question ("the retrospective element") as well as an 
assessment of their future needs ("the prospective element") 
according to the principles set down in s.75(2) (incorporated by 
s.79(4)(e)). 
In light of s.81, which enjoins the Court "as far as 
practicable (to) make such orders as will finally determine the 
financial relationships between the parties to the marriage and 
avoid further proceedings under Part VIII, other than proceedings 
under s.78 or proceedings with respect to maintenance payable 
during the subsistence of the marriage, it is obvious that amendments 
to s.79 by the Family Law Amendment Act 1983 were necessary to 
allow for the fact that there might be the resumption of cohabitation 
or maybe the birth of further children after an application under 
paragraph (ca)(i) had been made. A final order, under s.79 would 
not be capable of subsequent variation should the parties resume 
cohabitation and not finally separate or should they divorce years 
later. In such situations, the final order under s.79 made years 
previously might exhaust the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with 
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further property disputes between the parties, 62 nor would a 
Supreme Court be able to provide relief, since the application for 
a property order, being a matrimonial cause, would fall outside 
its jurisdiction. 
The adjournment provisions in s.79 recognise the seriousness 
of the situation where, before proceedings for divorce are commenced, 
or before proceedings for a declaration as to the validity of a 
foreign dissolution, 63 annulment or a legal separation have been 
instituted, either of the parties to a marriage brings a property 
dispute before the Court under paragraph (ca)(i). Counselling by 
a Registrar or Deputy Registrar of the Family Court has been made 
compulsory, except in special circumstances, before a property 
dispute can be 'brought before the Court by s.79(9). Section 79(1B) 
confers a discretionary power of adjournment in property proceedings 
arising out of the marital relationship. 64 
The power of adjournment may be exercised on such terms and 
under such conditions as the Court thinks fit and for such period 
as it thinks necessary to enable the parties to the proceedings to 
consider the likely effects (if any) of a s.79 order on the parties 
to the marriage or the children of the marriage. Section 79(1C) 
reserves the right for parties to apply for a hearing of the 
adjourned proceedings where a "matrimonial cause" of the type 
defined in paragraph (ca)(ii) and (ca)(iii) arises. 
Where it is likely that there will be a significant change 
in the financial circumstances of the parties to the marriage or 
either of them, s.79(5) empowers the Court to adjourn proceedings 
with respect to prOperty if it sees fit. 65  Section 79(7)(a) 
and (b) refer specifically to benefits from a superannuation fund, 
or scheme or discretionary trusts which may accrue in the future. 
The powers of adjournment are not limited to those circumstances, 
however. Under the provisions of s.79(6), the Court may make 
partial or interim orders with respect to property the parties 
then have before adjourning proceedings under s.79(5) or s.79(7). 66 
Hardingham and Neave 67 are of the opinion that the jurisdiction 
to hear property "proceedings arising out of the marital relationship" 
is confined to claims arising because of the need to determine rights 
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and entitlements to property, whether owned by either or both of 
them, as a result of breakdown of marriage: 
"Thus proceedings to determine who owns what and 
shall thus have possession of what a breakdown of 
marriage (s.78) or to determine who, irrespective 
of title shall have what on breakdown of marriage 
(s.79) will fall within sub-paragraph (i)". 68 
This view appears to be unnecessarily restrictive. In fact, 
it may be claimed that such an interpretation is contrary to the 
underlying theme of the Family Law Act (1975), that is, that it 
strives towards reconciliation rather than marriage breakdown. 69 
As Freeman70 puts it: 
"(I)s it a way of buttressing faltering marriages 
(an avowed objective of recent divorce legislation) 
to provide adequate property solutions only on 
final breakdown? fl71 
If the only application of paragraph (ca)(i) were after break-
down, many parties would wait until proceedings for principal 
relief were available before making an application under s.79, 
since in the interim the status quo of all property can be 
preserved temporarily by restraining orders granted under s.114, 
sub-sections (1) or (3), 72 and the widest range of property possible 
could be dealt with during a single hearing in proceedings taken 
under paragraph (ca)(ii). 73  
Murray J. adopted a more robust approach to the interpretation 
of "circumstances arising out of the marital relationship" (s.(4)(1), 
paragraph (e) of the definition of "matrimonial cause") in Farr. 74 
Her Honour expressed agreement with what Demack S.J. had said in 
Mills, 75 namely that "... events which raise issues of criminal law, 
industrial law or fiscal law cannot be brought within the marital 
relationship simply because the circumstances involve a husband and 
wife and their children". However, Murray J. went on to say: 76 
... as I read the Family Law Act, its linchpin is 
marital breakdown or marital difficulties. The Act 
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is designed to provide remedies as between husband 
and wife in relation to any disputes that arise as 
a result of marital difficulties, and this in many 
cases regardless of whether or not proceedings for 
dissolution can be or, for that matter, should be, 
commenced. It appears to me that the moment that 
the marital difficulty or breakdown occurs, events 
thereafter involving disputes between husband and 
wife arising because of that difficulty or breakdown 
must be circumstances which arise out of the 
marital relationship ... . . 77 
It is submitted that this approach, which allows for 
jurisdiction to arise on either marital breakdown or on the occurrence 
of marital difficulty, if applied to the interpretation of paragraph 
(ca)(i), would have significant advantages. It would enable a spouse 
before a marriage actually broke down to make an application for a 
declaration of property interests under s.78 or a readjustment of 
property entitlements under s.79 where there is a disputed debt 
between the parties, 78 provided, of course, the conditions under 
which the debt could'be recovered were present, 79 or where the other 
spouse has wasted assets, 80  abused his powers, 81 or become bankrupt. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission, which is currently conducting 
an inquiry into insolvency, 82  has isolated problems of particular 
significance to members of the insolvent's family and their 
"interests" in matrimonial assets. For example, under current law, 
the interest of an insolvent in a home, matrimonial or otherwise, 
is not exempt from the operation of the laws relating to bankruptcy. 
If the home is matrimonial, what is the quantum of interest held by 
the insolvent? Determining the quantum of the estate claimed and 
the facts upon which it is founded so that a caveat to protect an 
equitable interest in Torrens land could be lodged would provide 
the other party's interests with protection, not only in the case 
of insolvency but in other circumstances as well. While in 
Ioppolo v. Ioppolo83 it was held that a potential claimant under 
s.79 has a caveatable interest in registered land, it has been held 
since that as such there is no such caveatable interest. 84 It is 
submitted that the availability of s.79 proceedings under paragraph 
(ca)(i) overcomes this impediment. Where insolvency coincides with 
the breakdown of the marriage, there is a contest between creditors 
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and the solvent spouse: should the present rule of "first in, 
first served" be abrogated by the immediate availability of 
property proceedings to provide the disadvantaged spouse with a 
remedy? Should one spouse, unhappy with the other, be able to 
thwart family law claims of the other by causing the property to 
vest in an insolvency administrator under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth.) before the other party is able to take proceedings under 
s.79? The immediate availability of a court decision under s.78 and 
s.79 would provide the solution to these problems. 
Justification for the view that under certain circumstances 
there should be no need for a spouse to wait for actual breakdown 
of the marriage before making an application appears in the judg-
ment of Evatt C.J. and Marshall S.J. in Sieling .85 While they 
recognised that orders under s.79 are not declaratory but prospective 
in their effect, their Honours emphasised that: 
the basis upon which the orders are made has 
a strong retrospective element. Because of that 
retrospective element a spouse's entitlement to 
apply for an order under s.79 is an important 
interest, an interest which has, in a sense, been 
building up during the marriage". 
The Western Australian experience provides interesting 
illumination on this point. According to the Family Law Council 
Annual Report, 1981-2, 8660% of all property applications are 
brought under s.30 of the Family Court Act 1975 whose terms are 
available prior to an application for the dissolution of marriage. 
Of these applications, the vast majority, but not all, are made 
after separation but before the twelve month period of separation 
has elapsed and divorce proceedings may be taken. 87 
Assuming that the amendment will be held to be constitutional 
and that property proceedings may be instituted prior to principal 
relief under paragraph (ca)(i), the adjournment technique employed 
in Emmett88 ought no longer be necessary so long as the proceedings 
fall within the terms of the paragraph. 89 In Emmett, 90 the Full 
Court ruled by a majority that divorce proceedings should be 
adjourned so that a property application could be dealt with while 
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both parties were still married. Had divorce come first and the 
husband then died, Testator's Family Maintenance proceedings could 
not have been maintained as s.3 of the Testator's Family Maintenance 
and Guardianship of Infants Act 1916 (N.S.W.) excluded an application 
under the Act by a divorced wife. 91 The New South Wales legislation 
has been since amended by the Family Provision Act 1982 and a 
divorced wife is no longer precluded from pursuing an application. 
To determine what interests a spouse has built up in property 
during marriage through indirect contribution to its acquisition, 
conservation and improvement and what parameters should be drawn 
around the type of property ownership which may be considered an 
incident of the marital relationship is far from easy. 92 
Consistently with the decision in Russell: Farrelly, 93 property 
disputes between husband and wife must either have some connection 
with the circumstances of the dissolution of the marriage or have 
. 94 some connection with the marital relationship. 	When the marital 
relationship of the husband and wife has broken down or serious 
difficulties with regard to property matters have occurred, it may 
be necessary that the proprietary relationship which has arisen 
between the parties as a result of their marriage should be terminated 
or at least rendered workable to the extent that may be necessary to 
enable the marital relationship to continue. On the other hand, the 
parties may have business or other dealings with each other which 
are completely separate from their marital relationship. For 
example, a dispute in relation to a debt owed one party by the 
other will only be within the definition of paragraph (ca)(i) if 
the dispute has arisen as one aspect of the breakdown of the 
marital relationship or the difficulties of the matrimonial relation-
ship. In Slattery, 95 the Full Court held that neither the powers, 
of the Court relating to maintenance (Sec. 72, 74 and 75) nor the 
power relating to alteration of property interests (s.79) conferred 
jurisdiction to order the repayment of money lent by a wife to a 
husband during the course of a marriage. The Full Court held that 
the repayment of the loan was not a matter of maintenance since it 
did not involve consideration of needs and abilities to pay as 
required by s.75, nor was it a matter of alteration of property 
interests since it did not deal with any particular item of property 
of a party to the marriage. 
76. 
A possible test as to whether property proceedings might be 
said to arise out of the marital relationship is "the time of 
acquisition" test. 96 That is, all property acquired by the parties 
and dedicated to family or domestic use during the course of the 
marriage would be encompassed by paragraph (ca)(i). Excluded 
would be property acquired before marriage or following separation; 
property acquired by reason of gifts or inheritance quite outside 
the marriage; gambling winnings or windfalls which are unrelated 
to the marriage; and common law damages claims, also unrelated to 
the marriage. This test has the disadvantages that have been 
found to be associated with the categorisation of matrimonial 
property in jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Ontario, 97 which 
have adopted a system of deferred community of property with an 
equalization of property of a matrimonial character at the time of 
divorce. 
Another test might be the "use or application test" such as 
that suggested by Professor Kahn-Freund, 98 but as has been already 
indicated in Chapter Three, Part A, of this study, this test has its 
own problems of categorization. 
If there has been a contribution to the acquisition, improvement 
or conservation of an asset during the marriage by reason of the 
matrimonial relationship and the financial inter-dependence intrinsic 
in such marital relationship, and the proceedings are intended to 
seek recognition of that contribution, Chen it would be obvious that 
the proceedings were brought to enforce rights by reason of 
contributions made because of the marital relationship. The home-
maker and parent contributor would be recognized by "the contribution 
test". 
Another test might be called the "limited causation test". It 
might be argued that, because of the marriage, certain property 
arrangements have been made, or but for the marriage, these property 
arrangements would not have been made. This test, however, may be 
criticised on the basis that it is reminiscent of the "pecuniary 
prejudice" approach which has been condemned as encompassing 
considerations of a negative contribution. 99 
All of the tests outlined above involve problems of categorisation 
of property and also give rise to difficulties with regard to property 
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acquired before marriage or business interests built up during 
the marriage solely by the contribution of one party, apart from 
a contribution as homemaker and parent by the other. 
Broun1  is of the view that the correct test could be broader 
than any of those discussed above. What is required by paragraph 
(ca)(i) is that the proceedings (not the property) should arise 
out of the marital relationship. He suggests a "proceedings 
causation test" involving the positing of the question, "But for 
the marital relationship would these proceedings have arisen?" 
This enables an assessment of whether the husband and wife have 
reached a state of marital breakdown or serious marital disfunction 
which has led them into litigation or proceedings to ascertain or 
to determine their proprietary rights or to apply for protection of 
their proprietary rights. Broun claims 2  that: 
"On this test, all the constitutional problems are 
overcome so as to include the widest range of what 
are essentially marital disputes. The only class of 
of proceedings between a husband and wife as to 
property matters which may not fall within the 
definition would be perhaps proceedings relating 
to proprietary rights which had no logical or causal 
connection whatever with the marriage and which did 
not arise out of the state of their marital relationship 
for example because they were still living harmoniously 
together. However, such classes of litigation could be 
envisaged as being very rare". 
• 	What Nygh J. said in Fisher 3 puts the position more succinctly. 
For him, the gravamen of a property claim must arise out of the 
contributions of the parties made during the marriage or the needs 
and disparities created by or arising from the marital relationship. 
The discretion that the court has under s.79(1B) to adjourn property 
proceedings taken under paragraph (ca)(i) would enable it to take 
into account the situation where the parties have not actually 
separated or where there may be the possibility of a reconciliation. 
On the 'proceedings causation test", it could be asserted that 
proceedings between parties concerning the disposition of the 
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matrimonial home would certainly fall within paragraph (ca)(i). 4 
In Caddy and Miller, 5 a recent decision of the Full Court, a 
property dispute between the parties which arose from their 
relationship as married persons prior to their divorce in 1974 
was held to have arisen out of the former marital relationship and 
as a consequence of and thus in relation to its dissolution. This 
liberal interpretation of the scope of paragraph (ca)(i) suggests 
that the Full Court has adopted a "broad brush" approach to the 
amendment. On the other hand, proceedings which did not arise out 
of the mutual liability to maintain each other or out of the joint 
liability to maintain children of the marriage could not be said to 
be "proceedings arising from the marital relationship” .6  
Even on the widest interpretation of paragraph (ca)(i), then, 
a small residual category of property disputes will still fall to 
be decided under State law. Such disputes will not involve 
proceedings arising out of the marital relationship, nor will they 
involve proceedings which relate to concurrent, pending or completed 
proceedings for principal relief, nor proceedings as to the validity 
of a foreign dissolution or annulment or a decree of separation. 
On the other hand, it must be remembered that, in appropriate 
circumstances, State jurisdiction can be effectively pre-empted by 
the use of the injunctive power under s.114 of the Family Law Act 
1975 pending the institution of proceedings for principal relief. 7 
It is clear that the only complete solution to the problem of 
dual jurisdiction over property matters is a reference of power over 
property matters by the States to the Commonwealth. 8 
PART C 
THE EFFECTS OF S.109 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
Section 109 of the Constitution provides that: 
"When a law of the State is inconsistent with a law 
of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and 
the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
be invalid." 
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As Rumble9  puts it, this section is "... the cutting edge of 
Commonwealth supremacy under. the Constitution". 
• Section 39 of the Family Law Act 1975 grants to the Family 
Court of Australia and Magistrates' Courts 10 exclusive jurisdiction 
over matrimonial causes, 11 the Supreme Courts i federal jurisdiction 
under the Act in matrimonial causes having been terminated under 
s.40(3) of the Family Law Act as of 1st June, 1976. 12 The relevant 
matrimonial causes associated with property proceedings are defined 
in s.4(1). Paragraph (ca) of the definition refers to proceedings 
with respect to the property of the parties, being proceedings: 
(i) arising out of the marital relationship. 
(ii) in relation to concurrent pending or completed 
proceedings for principal relief. 
(iii) in relation to the foreign dissolution of 
annulment of that marriage or the legal 
separation of the parties to that marriage, 
if such dissolution, annulment or legal 
separation is recognised as valid in Australia 
under s.104. 
s.4(1)(e) refers to proceedings for an injunction or order in 
circumstances arising out of the marital relationship while s.4(1)(E) 
includes any other proceedings in relation to proceedings under 
•s.4(1)(ca) and s.4(1)(e). 
Theoretically, then, the characterisation of a proceeding as 
a matrimonial cause grants to the Family Court of Australia exclusive 
jurisdiction over the issue concerned. In practice, the notion of 
what constitutes a matrimonial cause has proved to be very elastic. 
As Wade 14has put it, "(T)he somewhat mysterious constitutional 
boundaries of 'matrimonial cause' as contained in s.51 (xxii) is 
discovered only by trial-and-error - that is by statutory amendment 
and subsequent judicial interpretation". 15 
The Supreme Courts have taken any one of four possible courses 
in proceedings with respect to the property of parties to a marriage. 
First, the Supreme Court may hold that the matter should properly 
be categorised as a matrimonial cause. Therefore, it will deny 
13 
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itself any jurisdiction in the matter because of the operation 
of s.8 and s.40(3) of the Family Law Act 1975. 16 Secondly, the 
Supreme Court may deny that the matter is a matrimonial cause 17 and 
therefore entertain the proceedings despite the prospect of incon-
sistent Family Court proceedings. 18  Thirdly, the Supreme Court may 
find that the matter is not a matrimonial cause and that it 
technically has jurisdiction, yet •decline to exercise it on the 
grounds that the Family Court is forum conveniens. 19  Finally the 
Supreme Court may avoid classifying proceedings as a matrimonial 
cause and cede jurisdiction to the Family Court by regarding State 
jurisdiction as being suspended by the operation of s.109 of the 
Constitution. 
As Kovacs 20  points out, the diversity of approach may encourage 
parties to a marriage to undertake "forum shopping" in order to 
obtain the most favourable result. To a certain extent, the amend-
ment to the definition of "matrimonial cause" in s.4(1) by the 
insertion of sub-paragraph (0 will overcome these problems, but 
it has already been indicated that this amendment may well have 
limitations. Of all of the possible approaches, that of abdicating 
Supreme Court jurisdiction to the Family Court has the most to 
recommend it, •since it is in keeping with the philosophy of the 
Family Law Act. 21 In the meantime, State Supreme Courts cannot bind 
each other, and the varied attitudes towards the extent of a State 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction in disputes between the parties to 
a marriage remain. 
The issue of inconsistency as between the laws of the States 
and the Commonwealth has been complicated by the fact that there 
are several approaches to the characterisation of laws as incon- 
sistent. 22 Dixon J. in Victoria v. The Commonwealth 23 (The Kakasiki) 
stated the test of inconsistency as follows: 
"When a State law, if valid, could alter, impair or 
detract from the operation of a law of the Commonwealth 
Parliament, then to that extent it is invalid". 
When considering inconsistency, it is necessary to ask such questions 
as whether the federal law is valid; whether the scope, or field of 
operation, of the State law is the same as or differs from that of 
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the Commonwealth . law; 24 whether the Commonwealth law or the State 
law impose different requirements in respect . of the same subject 
matter; 25 -whether the State law detracts from rights or liberties 
granted by a Commonwealth law; 26 and whether the Commonwealth law 
evinces an intention to cover exhaustively the subject matter it 
deals with, to the exclusion of any other regulation of that 
subject (the "covering the field test"). 27 
The last-mentioned test of inconsistency is, perhaps, the most 
important. 28 Under this test, inconsistency can arise even where 
compliance with both laws is possible and where the Commonwealth 
Act shows a legislative intention to deal with the whole subject 
matter covered by the State Act even if it deals with it by 
abstention. 29 
While the Full Court in Smith 30 examined the scope of s.109, 
no analysis of the "covering the field test" was made. 31 The 
Supreme Courts have grappled with the section but the variation in 
their approach has merely added to the confusion. 
In the New South Wales Supreme Court, for example, Waddle J. 
in Reynolds v. Reynolds 32 regarded his jurisdiction as subsisting 
in property proceedings between the parties to a marriage which 
had broken down but not yet proceeded to divorce. State jurisdiction, 
in his view, survived because the Commonwealth Parliament had not 
intended to "cover the field". Waddle. J. designated the uncovered 
field as that of property proceedings prior to the availability of 
dissolution proceedings. Kearney J. of the same Court also 
declined to find in McLean v. McLean 33 that the field of "enforcement 
of agreements or foreign decrees" was intended to be covered by the 
Family Law Act. Yet South Australian Supreme Court judges are 
inclined to regard the Act as covering a very extensive field: for 
example the view of "the field" of Jacobs J. in Tansell v. Tansell 
was "... the breakdown and dissolution of marriage and the resolution 
of property questions consequent thereon" .34 The understanding by 
Jacobs J. of the field intended to be covered clearly indicates 
those areas left uncovered in the views of his New South Wales 
brethren. 
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The High Court, in examining the extent of the Family Court's 
jurisdiction, has pursued two lines of enquiry, looking either at 
the property which is the subject of dispute between the parties 
or at the nature of the relief sought in the relevant constitution. 
Either approach leads to problems. 
As far as the property which is the subject of the dispute is 
concerned, it has already been shown in the preceding section of 
this chapter that the characterisation of proceedings with relation 
to property as proceedings "arising out of the marital relationship" 
(paragraph (ca)(i) of s.4(1)) will depend entirely on whether a 
broad or a narrow approach to the phrase's interpretation is 
adopted. Therefore, in Tansell v. Tansell, 35 where he was dealing 
with an application for an injunction in "circumstances arising 
out of the matrimonial relationship" under s.4(1)(e), Sangster J. 
denied that proceedings for severance of the joint tenancy in the 
matrimonial home arose out of the marital relationship. In his 
Honour's view, they were referable to the joint ownership of the 
property: the fact that the property in question was used as the 
matrimonial home was irrelevant. 36 The husband and wife in Mills 37 
were denied relief because their dispute over the right to remove 
topsoil from jointly-owned property was held to arise out of their 
position as joint tenants and not out of the fact that they were 
married, yet in Bak, 38 Opas J. was able to designate proceedings 
in relation to a milk-run business, operated by the parties to 
the marriage as a commercial trading partnership, as arising out 
of the marital relationship. 39 
There has also been variation in approach in the interpretation 
of the definition of "matrimonial cause" in paragraph (ca)(ii) and 
its antecedents. In Lansell v. Lansell, 40 a fourteen-year time 
lapse between divorce and property proceedings did not prevent the 
proceedings for property adjustment from being deemed to be 
appropriately related to proceedings for principal relief, whereas 
in Grist and Ford41 and Rennie and Higgon, 42 a five-year lapse 
was held to have severed the necessary relationship between the 
proceedings. 43 
In Re Ross-Jones; ex parte Beaumont, 44 Gibbs J. stated that 
the phrase "in relation to" could be explained in the following 
terms: 
"An application by a divorced wife under sec.79 
of the Act for a settlement and transfer of property 
is an application to the Court to make such financial 
adjustments as may be rendered appropriate by the 
dissolution of the marriage; it is an application for 
an order consequential on the dissolution of the 
marriage, and can properly be said to be incidental 
to the decree of dissolution that has been obtained". 
Holding that by this test the Family Court had jurisdiction in post-
divorce property proceedings where first, the proceedings were 
commenced because the marriage had been dissolved or was about to 
be dissolved; and secondly, where the property subject to the 
dispute is jointly owned, Nygh J. in Rennie and HiRgon45 was unable 
to find the appropriate connection between the application for a 
property settlement and the proceedings for divorce, since the 
parties had asked the Court to settle a dispute between them 
in relation to an agreement they made after their divorce. 
An equally obscure area is the question of when the inconsistency 
arises. Jacobs J. in Tansell v. Tansell 46 was of the view that the 
mere existence of federal jurisdiction in the field intended to be 
covered by the Commonwealth Act gave rise to the inconsistency, but 
Bray C.J. in the same case felt that there needed to be a valid 
application made to the Family Court under the Act before State 
jurisdiction was ousted. 47 Unfortunately, the High Court has not 
undertaken any thorough review of the decisions on s.109 as it 
relates to the Family Law Act. 48 As recently as 1982, in D.M.W. 
and Anor. v. C.G.W., 49 it failed to avail itself of the opportunity 
to settle the law nor did it provide guidelines as to the future 
application of s.109. The Commonwealth submitted directly in 
relation to the Act that the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
established by Chapter III of the Constitution is paramount over 
the judicial power , of the States. Of all the members of the Full 
Bench, only Gibbs CJ. took up the question of s.109, and his 
statement is ambiguous. His Honour said, 50 
"If a law of the Commonwealth either expressely, 
or by implication, provides that a judgment of a 
federal court shall prevail over inconsistent 
decisions of State Courts, that law will take 
effect accordingly, and the decisions of the 
federal court will be paramount." 
In referring to the need for the existence of a federal court order, 
the Chief Justice may have contemplated a timing requirement that 
was more onerous than the "application" test, narrow thought it 
was, used by Bray CJ. in Tansell v. Tansell. 57 On the other hand, 
Gibbs CJ. may have been referring simply to the facts before him in 
D.M.W. and Anor. v. C.G.W. 52 where there was already a Family Court 
order in existence before the matter of State jurisdiction arose. 
Regrettably, •the other six judges of the Full Bench did not 
express opinions as to the application of s.109, deciding that 
the existence of a prior order of the Family Court ousted Supreme 
Court jurisdiction. 
By extrapolation from D.M.W. and Anor. v. C.G.W., Kovacs 53 
suggests a practical test to resolve the conflict between federal 
and State jurisdiction in property disputes between the parties 
to a marriage. First,it may be asserted that, once a Family 
Court order exists, Supreme Court jurisdiction in relation to the 
disputed property is lost while the Family Court order stands 
- (that is, until the order is removed by appeal or by an order for 
prohibition). 54 Secondly, if Supreme Court proceedings are 
commenced at a time when Family Court proceedings are simultaneously 
initiated or when they are foreshadowed,, then while it is not 
possible at this stage to claim that Supreme Court jurisdiction is•
lost, nevertheless as a matter of comity 55 and to prevent abuse 
of its own process, the Supreme Court ought to refuse to entertain 
the action before it. As Kovacs summarises the test, it would be: 
Has there been or will there be a Family Court order? 56 The 
results would be as follows: 
(1) If the Family Court considered the matter before 
it to be a matrimonial cause, then State juris-
diction would give way as the Family Court would 
be likely to make an order in relation to the 
property. 
(2) If the Family Court considered the matter 
before it not to be a matrimonial cause, a State 
order in relation,to the property could be made. 
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(3) Should the Family Court consider the matter 
before it to be a matrimonial cause yet decline 
to hear it, then no question of an inconsistent 
order would arise and the State jurisdiction 
properly could be exercised. 57 
In McKay, 58 Strauss J. expressed the view that the word "matters" 
in s.3(1)(a), which defines the Family Court's jurisdiction, refers 
to matters arising in proceedings for remedies which the Court has 
power to grant. According to this approach, Kovacs' test could be 
expressed as follows: Has the Court granted a remedy or has it the 
power to grant a remedy in this matter? However, as Gibbs C.J., 
Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ pointed out in Thomson Australian  
Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Trade Practices Commission and Others, 59 
although the two matters of whether the Court has the power and 
the jurisdiction to make the orders sought are often treated as 
synonymous, there is "... in general, a distinction ... to be made 
between the jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter and the 
power of that court to grant relief of a particular kind". Nygh J. 
observed in McKay 60 that there nevertheless may be situations where 
the restraint on the power to grant relief is so obvious that it 
is not necessary to inquire into the question of jurisdiction. 
It appears, then, that Kovacs' test is inappropriate, except 
where a Family Court order has already been made. This is unfortunate, 
as those spouses who have inchoate rights to property, the legal 
title of which is held by the other party to the marriage, unless 
they are able to first gain a Family Court order with respect to 
the property, either in the form of an injunction under s.114(1) 61 
or a final order under s.79, are vulnerable to the decisions of 
State Courts, which must resolve property disputes according to 
the general rules of law and equity. Nor does the answer lie in 
the doctrine of stare decisis: neither court can bind the other, 
except to the extent that the Family Court has juri§diction to 
decide non-Federal matters under its accrued jurisdiction, 62 
as they operate within different hierarchies. 63 
Consequently, it may be concluded that the question of 
jurisdiction as between the Family Court and the State Supreme 
Courts cannot be resolved by the application of s.109 of the 
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Constitution, clear cut though this section at first appears, 
because of the uncertainties associated with designating the 
field sought to be covered by the Family Law Act and with 
identifying the time at which inconsistency may be said to arise 
between Federal and State laws. 54 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
THE FAMILY COURT'S PROPERTY JURISDICTION 
PART A  
THE COURTS EXERCISING JURISDICTION UNDER THE FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 
Four court systems, compendiously termed "the Family Court", 
can hear proceedings relating to "financial matters" (property and 
maintenance proceedings: see the definition in s.4(1) of the Act) 
which fall under the terms of the Family Law Act: 
(1) the Family Court of Australia: s.39(1)(a) and 
s.31(1); 
(2) the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory: 
s.39(1)(b), s.40(3) and s.40(4); 
(3) courts of summary jurisdiction: 1 s.39(2). (But 
note that the jurisdiction of these has been 
terminated in the Perth metropolitan district, 
except at the Court of Petty Sessions in 
St. George's Terrace, pursuant to s.39(7)); 
(4) the Family Court of Western Australia: Family Law  
Act 1975 (Cth.), s.41; Family Court Act 1975 (W.A.) 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts of the States and the 
Australian Capital Territory under the Family Law Act 1975 was 
terminated by proclamation of the Governor-General, pursuant to 
s.40(3) of the Act, on 27th May, 1976, 2 with effect from 1st June,1976. 
Although the Family Court is described in s.21(2) of the Act 
as a superior court of record, it does not have a general legal 
and equitable jurisdiction, 3 for its jurisdiction is limited. 4 
The boundaries of its jurisdiction, necessary for constitutional 
reasons, appear from s.31 of the Act. 5 It is clear law that a 
court of limited jurisdiction has the authority and the duty to 
decide whether a controversy brought before it lies within the 
limits of its jurisdiction, but that its decision on such a 
question is not conclusive. 6 The High Court has within its 
discretion a power under s.75(v) of the Constitution to issue 
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prohibition to the judges of a federal court, including the 
Family Court, to prevent them from exercising a jurisdiction which 
they do not possess. 7 Because of the existence of a right of 
appeal to the Full Court of the Family Court, the High Court may 
withhold the writ of prohibition on discretionary grounds, 8 
although this is by no means an invariable rule. 9 As for appeals 
from a decision of the Full Court to the High Court, these will be 
heard only in extreme circumstances: s.95 of the Family Law Act. 
As a result of the Family Law Amendment Act 1983, an Appeal 
Division of the Family Court was established. The Appeal Division 
consists of five permanent members 10 and an unspecified number of 
other judges who hold appointments for two years only. Each Appeal 
Court must consist of at least two members of the Appeal Division; 
the third judge can be drawn from the Judges of the Court, who form 
the General Division. 11 
The considerable variation in the determination of the Full 
Court has been criticised. 12  However, those who advocate equal 
division of assets as a starting point in the Family Court's 
deliberations in order to gain predictability of result obtain no 
support for their views in the words of s.79, as the High Court 
pointed out in Mallet v. Mallet. 13  Such an approach would require 
the judiciary to take two steps, first, •to equate indirect non-
financial contributions with direct financial contributions and 
secondly, once having determined that such contributions were to 
be equated, then to further hold that "entitlement" was to be 
determined by reference to equality as well. 
In the recent case, Norbis v. Norbis, 14 the High Court ruled 
that the Act does not require the Family Court to •take any particular 
method of reasoning in its deliberations regarding s.79 orders, so 
long as the factors specified in the section are taken into account. 
However, their Honours expressed various views on the appropriate 
manner in which to reconcile the preservation of the wide dis-
cretionary jurisdiction with the widespread community desire for 
consistency in its application. 
In a joint judgment, Wilson and Dawson JJ. considered that the 
Family Court should not attempt to formulate abstract principles or 
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guidelines which would confine judicial discretion within a pre-
determined framework. Mason and Deane JJ. (in a joint judgment) 
and Brennan J. took a different view. For them, the only compromise 
was to be found in the development by the Full Court of guidelines 
as to the manner in which the complex discretionary assessments and 
judgments involved in the jurisdiction should be made. Such guide-
lines would not be binding but an unexplained failure by a trial 
judge to apply a guideline might indicate that the judge's dis-
cretion had miscarried. Mason and Deane JJ., however, envisaged 
situations in which an appellate court's guidance would have the 
force of a binding rule whereas Brennan J. emphasised that "... 
the width of a statutory discretion is determined by statute; 
it cannot be narrowed by a legal rule devised by the court to 
control its exercise". 15  
On the other hand, as Wade 16 has pointed out, "... a liberation 
of discretion from precedent or prima facie principles, if it 
occurred, would encourage litigation and forum shopping, discourage 
settlement, reduce legal advice by lawyers and registrars to a 
stab in the dark, and would further increase the suspicions of 
women's lobby groups, that s.79 results in capricious and unfair 
property adjustments". 
Hopefully, the establishment of the Appeal Division will bring 
about greater consistency of decisions, for the select number of 
judges sitting an appeals 17  will bring with them a range of 
experience. 18  In a case where allegations of financial misconduct 
on the part of one spouse have been aired by the other, it is 
submitted that it is highly desirable that certain principles or 
guidelines be available to the Court to assist it to make a 
decision which will be acceptable to both spouses, not necessarily 
because the result is seen as being "fair" but because it is 
regarded as being just under the circumstances. 19 
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PART B 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT AS IT RELATES TO PROPERTY 
The structure of Part VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.), 
so far as it relates to property, enables the Family Court to 
remedy "financial misconduct" in a manner denied to courts 
interpreting the system of separation of property as established 
by the Married Women's Property Acts or applying legislation 
passed prior to 1970 that was intended to reform that system. 
An applicant's entitlement to a property order under Part VIII 
of the Act will depend on a number of factors, including not only 
the contributions of the parties, both direct and indirect, but 
also the means and needs of the parties, both at present and in 
the future. 20 If the economic activities of one spouse have 
jeopardised the chances of the other spouse's being able to have 
his or her direct or indirect financial contributions recognised 
or his or her present and future needs catered . for, these, as well 
as more obvious forms of financial misconduct, can be considered 
by the Family Court.• 
The two principal sections of the Family Law Act relating to 
property are sections 78 and 79, although other sections are of 
particular significance in providing remedies for financial mis-
conduct which results in the dissipation or diminution of assets 
available for distribution. These are s.79A, which provides for 
the setting aside of orders altering property interests under 
certain circumstances; s.85, which provides for the setting aside 
of transactions designed to defeat claims under the Act; s.85A, 
which was inserted by the 1983 amendments in order to allow the 
Court to deal, to a certain extent, with assets settled by way 
of ante - and post-nuptial discretionary trusts; and s.114, which 
empowers the Court to enjoin dealings with property by a party 
as well as to prevent a party seeking Supreme Court orders in 
relation to the property. 21 
With s.39(1), s.31(1)(a) of the Family Law Act vests the 
Family Court with jurisdiction in any "matrimonial cause" and, with 
minor exceptions, notably in cases arising under its accrued 
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jurisdiction, the Court is concerned solely with disputes which 
arise out of the marital relationship and which lie between the 
parties to a marriage or former marriage. 
Generally speaking, therefore, third parties are not bound by 
determinations of the Family Court. Different considerations may 
apply when a third party takes part in the proceedings, either as 
an intervener under s.92 22 or because he has been joined as a 
party to the dispute. 23 A power also exists to make orders of a 
temporary or an interim nature affecting third parties. 24 Other-
wise, there is not jurisdicition in the Family Court to determine 
issues in controversy between a party to the marriage or a former 
marriage and an unconnected third party unless there is a common 
nucleus of fact which enables the Family Court to decide the action 
under its accrued jurisdiction or the proceedings fall within 
s.33 of the Act, which delineates the Court's associated 
jurisdiction. 25 
Since the Family Court has jurisdiction in any "matrimonial 
cause" as defined in s.4(1) 26 and not a general jurisdiction, 
particular provisions of the Act are governed by a particular 
"matrimonial cause". 
THE PRINCIPAL SECTIONS ENABLING THE FAMILY COURT TO REDRESS 
"FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT": 
Section 78  
Section 78 is referable to paragraph (ca) of the definition of 
"matrimonial cause". Therefore, it empowers the Court to declare 
existing rights to property in proceedings "between the parties to 
a marriage"27 arising out of the marital relationship 28 ; in 
proceedings in relation to concurrent, pending or completed 
proceedings for principal relief; 29 or in proceedings in respect 
of property where the parties have obtained an overseas dissolution 
or annulment of the marriage 30 or a legal separation recognised as 
valid under s.104. 31 
Although Asche J. in McDougall 32 held that a s.78 application 
could not be brought unless existing title to the property or rights 
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of the parties were "uncertain or in dispute", it is submitted 
that Gibson J.'s approach in Vance 33 was more proper. His Honour __— 
contrasted the wording of s.17 of the Married Women's Property 
Act 1882 and s.78 and noted that the latter section, unlike s.17,' 
does not require a question as to title or property in dispute as 
a condition precedent for its operation. 34 
Despite the enactment of s.79, the common law relating to 
existing property rights remains particularly important in some 
situations. 35 It should be noted, however, that while the Family 
Court can give common law remedies by declaration under s.78, 
such orders are "binding on the parties to the marriage but not 
on any other person": s.78(3). 36 On the other hand, it has been 
held that third parties (for example, children) may be given leave 
under s.92 to intervene in s.78 proceedings where they may be 
affected by the outcome. 37 The Court may determine that particular 
assets belong not to the parties but to a stranger, in which case 
it makes a finding of ownership by the stranger, but not a 
declaration to that effect. The finding does not vest title in the 
stranger but merely creates an issue estoppel between the applicant 
and the respondent. 38  . Therefore, in Antmann, 39 jewellery in the 
possession of the husband was found in fact to be held by him as 
trustee for his daughter by a previous marriage; the Family Court 
had no power to declare the daughter's interest but merely the 
power to declare that the husband had a better possessory title 
to the jewellery than the wife. The Full Court in Prince 40 
suggested, however, that if a third party submits to the jurisdiction'. 
of the Family Court by becoming directly involved in the proceedings, 
he or she will be bound by the Court's decision. 
The declaration has relevance where one of the parties dies and 
it is alleged that certain property belongs to the survivor rather 
than to the deceased's estate, 41 where one of the parties becomes 
bankrupt and creditors need to define what is not the bankrupt's 
property and when that property allegedly passed to his or her 
partner; 42 where one party to the marriage claims a proprietary 
interest in realty registered in the other's name and wants to 
lodge a caveat on the title to that property; 43 where one party 
seeks a declaration as to the other's indebtedness to him or her; 44 
and where, prior to distributing property under s.79, it is necessary 
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to determine what is not the property of the parties to the 
marriage. 45 If an application for property adjustment under s.79 
is made more than twelve months after a couple's divorce 46 and leave 
,47 to apply out of time is not granted under s.440) , jurisdiction 
under s.79 withers away and the property dispute between the 
divorced couple must be decided according to the common law 
principles in s.78 48 . Prior to the amendment of s.44(3) by the 
Family Law Amendment Act 1983, where more than twelve months had 
elapsed after divorce, it was necessary to seek leave to institute 
proceedings under s.78. There was as a result a quite serious 
hiatus in the law since a Supreme Court might consider its • uris-
diction ousted, leaving the parties with no remedy at all. 49 
There appears to be some doubt as to whether the Court, before 
making an order under s.79, should ascertain and declare the parties' 
respective interests in their property. Where the legal and equit-
able ownership of property indisputably co-incide, to apply s.78 
will present no difficulties. On the other hand, the Court may 
be faced with the difficult task of applying the equity jurisdiction. 50 
An examination of the decided cases shows that while certain judges 
prefer to declare a married couple's respective property interests 
before dividing the property under s.79, 51 Nygh J.'s observation 
in Aroney 52 that "... (i)n many cases it may be helpful to determine 
first what the existing property rights are as a first step in the 
process ... (b)ut that is not an essential pre-requisite" best 
expresses the attitude of the majority of the judges of the Family 
Court. Hardingham and Neave 53 point out that, where existing 
property rights can be varied under s.79, it is unnecessary for the 
party who seeks to claim an interest to first establish that he or 
she has a legal or equitable interest in the property which is the 
subject matter of the dispute, and common law and equitable 
principles will have little relevance. 54 
Section 79 
In deciding any application under s.79, 55 which, like s.78, is 
related to paragraph (ca) of the definition of "matrimonial cause" 
in s.4(1), the Court must take into account the totality of the 
assets of each of the parties 56  irrespective of whether these 
assets bear a matrimonial character. This procedure is necessary 
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in order that the Court can appreciate the applicant's position 
of need in relation to •the respondent's capacity to meet that need 
and also so that it may ascertain the significance and extent of 
indirect domestic contributions made by the applicant to the 
acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property. 
While s.79 gives a general power to the court to "make such 
order as it thinks fit" (s.79(1)), its particular powers are set 
down in s.80.57  Moreover, in deciding what order should be made 
when jurisdiction is invoked under s.79, the Court must have 
regard to the various factors which are set down in s.79(4). 
With limited exceptions, s.79 has no application where the 
dispute does not arise between the married couple but between one 
of the spouses and a third party, as, for example, where one party 
dies or becomes bankrupt and the other spouse claims an equitable 
interest in property the title to which has passed to the deceased 
spouse's personal representative or the bankrupt spouse's trustee 
in bankruptcy. 58 Therefore, the Family Court has no power in 
proceedings between a husband and wife to prevent third parties 
from exercising their legal rights, 59 nor is there provision for 
the Court to make property settlements in favour of third parties. 60 
It should be noted, however, that s.79(1) places a child of the 
marriage in a different position than that of a stranger, since 
the sub-section specifically provides for a property settlement 
in favour of a child of the marriage 61 although even a child does 
not have an independent right to proceed under s.79 62 
On the other hand, if a third party is granted leave under 
s.92 to intervene in proceedings between the parties to the 
marriage 63 under s.79, he or she may bring a claim under s.79 
64 before the Court. 	Orders can be made directly against third 
parties under s.79 in cases of "shams" or "devices" set up to 
escape its provisions, 65 although little use has been made so 
far of this exception, 66 or indirectly against a third party who 
is legally controlled by a party to the marriage, or, in other 
words, is a "puppet" of that party. 67 Also, where the evidence 
brought before the Court suggests that there is a common sub- 
stratum of facts warranting the exercise of the Court's discretion 
to assume its accrued jurisdiction68 to decide non-Federal as well 
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as Federal matters in the case before it, or the matter falls 
within s.33 of the Family Law Act, matters concerning the interests 
of third parties can come within the Family Court's jurisdiction. 
However, the Full Court in Prince 69 held that it would be 
innapropriate for the Family Court to exercise its accrued juris-
diction where a third party has refused to take part in the 
proceedings. 70  In such a case, only if the third party were involved 
in a sham or device to deceive the Court could he or she be forced 
to appear in proceedings. 
As to the distinction between that accrued jurisdiction 71 which 
relates to issues arising directly between the parties and that 
which relates to issues between one or both parties and a third 
party, Evatt CJ. in Prince72 said: 
"It seems to me that in regard to s.79 the first 
question to determine is whether the Family Court 
has jurisdiction to determine a particular issue 
as between the parties to the marriage. If it has 
such jurisdiction (for example, because such a 
determination is a necessary part of deciding the 
s.79 issues) then third parties who intervene (or, 
possible, who appear) can be bound. (af Petersens 
(1981) F.L.C. 91-054; Gillies (1981) F.L.C. 91-054). 
On the other hand, the addition of parties by 
intervention cannot extend the jurisdiction of the 
Court. "73 
In Prince, 74 Fogarty J. doubted whether the wife's property 
claim on the one hand and on the other General Credits' claim 
to the payment of $9 500 000, the amount for which the husband 
had stood guarantor in a certain transaction, could be said to 
be "... aspects of a single matter" or to be derived from"... 
a common nucleus of facts", 75 for these tests leave out of 
consideration the matter of a "... completely disparate claim 
constituting in substance a separate proceeding" . 76 
The Court is required by s.79(4)(a) and (b) to take into 
account the direct and non-direct financial contributions of the 
parties to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of the 
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property to the parties to the marriage of either of them. 77 
To ascertain the extent of the direct financial contribution 
by or on behalf of a party with respect to the property is not a 
difficult exercise, for such contributions are reasonably easily 
ascertained by means of evidence submitted to the Court. 78 Direct 
financial contribution encompasses the payment of expenses such 
as rates and taxes and other charges related to the use of the 
property which cannot be said to have contributed to its 
acquisition, conservation or improvement. 
By indirect financial contribution, it is envisaged that 
parties have shared the burden of their financial obligations 
between themselves, one party (the claimant) making payments of a 
particular type, while the other makes payment by way of direct 
contribution to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of, 
or otherwise in relation to, the property in question. 79 
It should be noted that the Court has insisted on some sort 
of relationship between the claimant's payment and the other 
party's contribution.: the first must facilitate the second. 80 
If a third party, such as a parent, contributes financially to 
the acquisition, conservation or improvement of, or otherwise in 
relation to, the property, then the intention behind the contribution 
must be ascertained. If it was intended as a gift to both parties, 
the it may be regarded as a financial contribution made on behalf 
of both parties, 81 but if it was intended as a gift to one of the 
parties, it may be viewed as a financial contribution on behalf of 
that party alone, as in Rainbird. 82 However, in Antmann, 83 the 
Full Court observed that "... it seems to us inappropriate to 
consider a gift by a third party as a 'contribution' by either 
party. It is preferable ... to consider such a matter as a fact 
or circumstance relevant under s.75(2)(o)". 
A gift by one spouse enabling the other to acquire a 
particular asset is not considered to be a contribution made on 
behalf of the donee spouse; it is regarded as a direct contribution 
by the donor spouse towards the asset's acquisition. 84 
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Under s.79(4)(a), there is no necessity for an applicant to 
trace a financial contribution which was originally made to property 
which was subsequently lost, destroyed or alienated, into some new 
form of asset intended as a replacement for that property. 85 The 
original contribution will be taken into account when the Court 
orders a division of the parties' existing property, but the 
period of time which has elapsed between the disappearance of the 
property and the institution of proceedings under s.79 will clearly 
be a relevant factor in determining how much weight to attach to 
the contribution. 
Non-financial contribution, such as the personal construction 
of the matrimonial home or acts of conservation or improvement, 
may constitute direct non-financial contributions to the property 
in question under the terms of s.79(4)(b). Such contribution 
could also be considered as freeing the other party to the marriage 
to expend money on the acquisition, conservation or improvement 
of the property or otherwise in relation to it and therefore as 
constituting an indirect financial contribution towards the 
second-mentioned property. 86 
Domestic contribution, that is, "the contribution made by a 
party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted 
by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, 
including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker and 
parent" (s.79(4)(c)),is relevant in deciding what order (if any) 
should be made under s.79. Such contribution made even after 
cohabitation has ceased is to be taken into consideration. 87 
Apart from specific contributions made in the capacity of 
homemaker and parent, 88 s.79(4)(a) envisages general contributions 
to the welfare of the family, thereby avoiding the problem inherent 
in the doctrine of resulting trust, 89 under which a contribution 
can give rise to an interest only if directly related to the 
acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property in 
question. General contributions may be of a financial nature, 
encompassing the provision of such necessities as accommodation, 
clothing, food, education and access to medical and dental care. 
They may be of a non-financial nature also, but here parental and 
homemaker contributions will assume a particular relevance. 
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Scutt and Graham90  claim that women, who more often than men make 
purely non-financial contributions to the acquisition of matrimonial 
assets, are vulnerable to the standards of individual judges 
regarding what is "good" or "proper" for the housewife and her 
family, 91 but it it submitted that any attempts to set down guide-
lines would be doomed to failure because of the diversity of 
attitudes in the community as a whole, not just among the judiciary, 
as to what the proper function of a homemaker and parent actually 
is. 92 The Australian Law Reform Commission, for that reason, has 
recommended tentatively that financial contributions should not 
be presumed to be more valuable than non-financial contributions 
in order to overcome the difficulties involved in quantifying 
the contributions made by the homemaker and parent and comparing 
them with economic contributions. 93 
Mention should be made here of the Full Court's recognition 
in Crawford94 that the husband's self-imposed thrift had involved 
the wife, as well as himself, in a more frugal lifestyle while 
savings and superannuation entitlements were accumulated. Describing 
the savings as "fruits of the marriage", the Court awarded the wife 
a share in them as a.consequence of her domestic contribution under 
s.79(4)(c). 95 Conversely, the wife in Quinn, 96 since the marriage 
of the parties was only of short duration, was held to have made 
a minimum domestic contribution to the acquisition of property 
while, in Weber v. Weber, 97 the wife's alcoholism and expenditure 
of housekeeping moneys on alcohol were looked at in the context of 
her homemaker contribution. 98 
In many cases, it will be the wife who relies upon her domestic 
contribution while the husband will rely on his economic contributions. 
Generally, then, the wife will rely on s.79(4)(c) and the husband 
on contribution by both parties, as a husband may establish a very 
real domestic contribution as well as regular property-related 
contributions, while a mother with a part-time job may establish 
significant property-related contributions as well as a domestic 
contribution. 99 In such cases, justice and equity must provide the 
ultimate guide, 1 and a final assessment of equality of contribution 
may afford an attractive solution. 2 This may not meet with 
community approval, however, for the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies in its survey of divorced couples found that both men and 
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women held financial contributions to be more valuable than those 
of a non-financial nature. 3 The implied value shared by the couples 
interviewed was that unpaid work in the home is worth less than 
earnings. 
In Mallet v. Mallet, 4 the High Court emphasised that any Court 
called upon to resolve a property dispute under s.79 has a statutory 
discretion which must be exercised in relation to the facts or 
circumstances of that particular dispute. 5 The discretion to decide 
what is just and equitable in the circumstances of the case must not 
be fettered or constrained by any extrinsic rule, guide or consider-
ation nor set out in the Act. 6 Therefore, the practice of starting 
from a standpoint of equality 7  was described as an impermissible 
fetter or consideration, 8 serving to pre-empt in an illegitimate 
manner the statutory discretion which the Court must exercise under 
s.79. 
At first sight, the decision in Mallet v. Mallet seems to 
encourage what Deane J. described as a "... lawless science" of 
a "... codeless myriad of precedent" and a "... wilderness of 
single instances" . 9  -However, Hardingham and Neave 10 express the 
view that the Family Court will continue to exercise its discretion 
under s.79 by equating domestic effort and economic contributions 
in circumstances where it would have done so before the decision, 
not because of any disloyalty to the High Court, but simply 
because it is appropriate to do so. Indeed, having affirmed that 
a party's domestic contribution ought not be recognised in merely 
a token manner, Mason J. 11 went on to say 12 that 
"... it is open to the Court to conclude on the 
materials before it that the indirect contribution of 
one party as a homemaker or parent is equal to the 
financial contributions made to the acquisition of 
the matrimonial home (by the other). ... To sustain 
this conclusion the materials before the Court will 
need to show an equality of contribution - that the 
efforts of the wife in her role were the equal of 
the husband in his. (Where the property in issue) 
... consists of assets acquired by one party whose 
ability and energy has enabled the establishment 
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or conduct of an extensive business enterprise to 
which the other party has made no financial con-
tribution and where the other party's role does 
not extend beyond that of homemaker and parent", 13 
his Honour considered that the approach will be otherwise. 
In Read, 14 Nygh J. said: 
"If there is any starting point indicated by their 
Honours of the High Court (in Mallet) it is that 
one should perhaps pay greater attention to the 
legal and equitable interests of the parties as a 
starting point and then ask oneself whether, in 
the light of the contributions, both financial 
and non-financial and, of course, in the light of 
the needs of the parties, it is just and equitable 
to adjust those rights in the particular case." 
This view is consonant with Dawson 	statement in Mallet 15 that 
to speak of equality'as a starting point would imply a presumption 
and invite a disregard of the requirements of s.79. 
It does not follow that an order will not be made under s.79 
simply because a party cannot establish a claim on the basis of 
contributions made to property. An order may also be made on the 
basis of the applicant's needs. 16  Reliance will then be placed 
on s.79(4)(e), which incorporates the factors set out in s.75(2). 17 
That a property order may be used as a means of providing for the 
maintenance needs of one or the other spouse has been recognised 
in Australia since the High Court decided Sanders v. Sanders 18 
19 in 1967. 	An applicant who cannot establish an entitlement to be 
maintained by the other spouse within the meaning of s.72 never-
theless may be entitled to rely on factors arising under s.75(2) 
in support of a claim to a share of the property of the parties 
greater than that which might result fram contribution alone. 20 
In yet other cases, a party's entitlements to an order under s.79 
may still leave a maintenance requirement within the meaning of 
21 s.72. 
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In any application under s.79, the totality of the assets 
of each of the parties must be taken into account since it is 
necessary to assess the applicant's needs for financial provision 
in relation to the respondent's capacity to meet them; 22 to 
ascertain, as far as the applicant is concerned, "a standard of 
living that in all the circumstances is reasonable" (s.75(2)(g) 
as incorporated by s.79(4)(e)); 23 and to recognise a contribution 
to the welfare of the family, such as, for example, in the capacity 
of a homemaker and parent, as not necessarily being limited to 
the context of what may be referred to as strictly matrimonial 
property. 24 
In Ferguson, 25 Watson and Wood SJJ. generalised that "... 
maintenance alone is based on need and economic capacity (see ss.72, 
74 and 75) whereas property is based on contribution need and 
economic capacity (see ss.79 and 75)". Nygh J. in Aroney 26 
observed that property and maintenance applications are compli-
mentary: "The proper method is to look at the property adjustment 
first and see whether this would satisfy the wife's needs for 
support or whether it needs to be supplemented by a lump sum or 
by periodic maintenance. 27 
"Property", in relation to the parties to a marriage of 
either of them, is defined in s.4(1) of the Family Law Act as 
"property to which those parties are, or that party is, as the 
case may be, entitled, whether in possession or reversion„ .28  
No attempt is made, therefore, to distinguish between matrimonial 
property and other property. 29 Indeed, the Full Court has stated 
that the concept of matrimonial property is not known to our 
law, 30 and that "... (t)he use of labels to categorise assets tends 
to inhibit the discretion of the trial judge which should only be 
limited by the statute itself "1 . 31 This view is consonant with the 
Australian system of separation of property during marriage with 
extensive powers of readjustment on divorce, based on past con-
tributions ("the retrospective element") and allowance for future 
needs ("the prospective element"). As a result, "property” 
includes all the property of the parties at the time of the 
proceedings. 32 
The Full Court in Crawford33 held that pre-existing assets 
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which are committed to the purposes of the marriage by one of 
the parties and are merged with assets acquired during the marriage 
will lose their significance as separate assets of the marriage as 
the marriage endures, but if they are kept separate and apart from 
the matrimonial assets during the marriage they do not form part 
of the "divisible assets". 34 Moreover, where property is received 
by either party through inheritance, whether during marriage or 
not, this is excluded from "divisible assets", subject to the 
limits set down in Crawford. 35 
In looking at assets, the Court may either adopt a global 
approach or isolate individual items of property and assess the 
proportions in which the parties should be seen to have an interest 
in each item. The approach taken will depend on the circumstances 
in each case. 36 
Consonant with the general view taken of contributions to a 
business enterprise, the Family Court has accorded special treatment 
to business assets. 37 Th e value of contributions of two partners 
to a business will not be equal, for example, if one provides 
services no different from any potential employee and the other 
is particularly industrious and offers a unique or unusual reputation, 
talen or ability that is the major or sole reason for the success 
- of the venture. 38 If one input is unique or without ready substitute, 
its economic worth can be comparatively far greater, being limited 
only by the total return of the enterprise. While the Family Court 
will consider one spouse's domestic contribution to be relevant 
in the division of business assets according to the provisions of 
s.79(4)(c), unless the parties have worked in the business as joint 
venturers, 39 in which case that spouse will not be relying solely 
on domestic contribution, it will be more ready to acknowledge that 
one party has contributed more, in material terms, in labour and 
expertise to the accumulation of the assets. 40  The Court will also 
take into account unrenumerated labours by either party undertaken 
for the benefit of the business enterprise 41 and endeavour not to 
adversely affect the productivity of the business and the earning 
capacity of the active party by the order that it makes, although 
the decision in Magas42 shows that this may not be possible 
... where property which might have given (the parties) a 
reasonable competence will not be sufficient for each when dividee. 43 
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It may be seen,therefore, that whereas any asset over which 
a spouse has legal or equitable control is potentially divisible, 
divisibility under s.79(4)(a), (b) and (c) is dependent on con-
tribution, and one spouse may be able to establish that he or she 
has acquired a specific asset without the benefit of any con-
tribution by the other spouse. It is on this basis that the 
Family Court has been able to take into account negligible 
contribution to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of 
assets, as discussed in Chapter Six. 44  On the other hand, it is 
not open to a party to place all business assets into a company 
or trust and at the time of the divorce claim that these do not 
form "financial resources" within s.75(2)(b) if that party 
effectively controls the assets and income of the company or 
trust. 45  In such a case, the "financial resources" of that party 
will comprise not the capital assets' value but the financial 
benefit derived from those assets. 
Since personal property is either in possession or action, 
a chose in action may be considered to be property. Therefore, 
Carmichael J. in Barkley v. Barkley 46 held that there "... does 
not need to be a proprietary right (for there) to be a relevant 
consideration in making the property settlement; it is quite 
sufficient to warrant consideration if the party has a valuable 
right". The Full Court in Duff 47 cited with approval dicta of 
Langdale M.R. in Jones v. Skinner, 48 who said, "Property is the 
most comprehensive of all terms which can be used, inasmuch as 
it is indicative and descriptive of any possible interest which 
a party can have." 
The statutory definition of property in s.4(1) does not 
include assets or interests over which a party cannot exercise 
legal or equitable control. 49 Thus, that definition may not be 
broad enough to cover the assets of a company or trust, 50 a 
licence personal to the holder 51 or a contingent future interest 
such as an entitlement or benefit under a superannuation fund. 52 
However, such an asset may be regarded as a "financial resource" 
(s.75(2)(b)) which will be taken into account by the Court when 
it is exercising its jurisdiction under s.79. 53 
The expression "financial resource" has been given a wide 
interpretation by the Family Court. The following have been held 
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to amount to financial resources: a long-service entitlement; 54 
a non-transferable fishing licence; 55 a contingent entitlement to 
a superannuation fund; 58 the interest of the object of a dis-
cretionary trust; 57 an insurance policy maturing at a later 
date, 58 capital moved overseas by the means of "transfer 
pricing", 59 and the controlling interest in a group of family 
companies. 60 
If a party with the financial resource can exercise a 
considerable degree of control over it, the value of the resource 
will be readily quantifiable. On the other hand, the quantification 
of a contingent entitlement to superannuation not conferring a 
proprietary interest in a definable portion of the fund will depend 
very much on circumstances. 
Section 79(4)(f) requires the Court to have regard to any 
other order made under the Act affecting a party to the dispute 
and s.79(4)(d) requires it to take into account "... the effect 
of any proposed order on the earning capacity of either party to 
the marriage". The legislature has recognised that to require the 
sale of income-producing property used for conducting manufacturing, 
retailing, farming or a professional practice might well put the 
respondent out of business and dry up the income on which the 
parties are relying. 61 In such a case, the Court may order a 
lump sum to be paid to the applicant in order to allow the res-
pondent to remain in business 62 or vest in the applicant non-
income producing property so that the income-producing property is 
left with the party who depends on it. Further, s.43(c) enjoins 
the Court "to protect the rights of children and to promote their 
welfare"; accordingly, since the matrimonial home may be essential 
to provide continuing accommodation for the custodial parent and 
the children, there may not be simply a question of asset dis-
tribution or allocation. 63 
As the Full Court pointed out in Tuck, 64 it is ultimately a 
question for the judge's discretion whether it is just and equitable 
to order that an applicant receive a share in certain property or 
a fixed sum in lieu thereof. 
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Judicial Discretion under Section 79 
According to Professor Dworkin, 65  the term "discretion" can 
be used in two different senses. In the strong sense, it could 
mean that the judge is authorised to divide property as he thinks 
fit, free from any constraint of existing rights. If the dis-
cretion were of this type, neither spouse could be said to have a 
right to property prior to the court's decision. 	The other 
sense - the weak sense - of discretion implies only that the 
judge must use his judgment in determining the rights of the parties. 
He cannot advance goals which he happens to favour, even if the 
community would approve of the stance which he adopted. He must 
determine the parties' rights according to existing principles 
and rules. It is in this latter sense that Judges of the Family 
Court of Australia exercise their discretion. 66  
The proviso in s.79(2) that "the court shall not make an 
order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the 
circumstances, is is just and equitable to make the order" does 
not require the Court to take two successive steps in the 
decision-making process, namely to decide what order to make and 
then whether to make it. Rather, it is to be read subject to 
the factors set out in s.79(4). Thus, in order to invoke the 
discretionary power under s.79(1), the applicant is required to 
satisfy the Court affirmatively that, by reason of one or more of 
the considerations in s.79(4), it is just and equitable to make 
an order under s.79(2). 67 
While the Family Law Act 1975 provides ample opportunities for 
considerations of matrimonial fault to be taken into account, 
s.75(2)(0) providing the most obvious example, the Court will not 
use its powers in order to punish a party for his or her matrimonial 
misconduct, nor will it enquire into responsibility for the break-
down of the marriage. The section of the Act concerned with 
property matters concentrates on the economic realities of each 
situation, and Section 79 directs the Court's attention to such 
matters as the applicants' property-related contributions and 
future needs and the respondent's capacity to satisfy a proposed 
order. 	Misconduct per se is not relevant. 68 It will be relevant 
if it carries economic consequences, however. In the next 
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chapter, the operation of judicial discretion to achieve a just 
and equitable solution in order to take into account conduct which 
has had an economic significance in the parties' dealings with 
each other will be analysed. 
An order under s.79 does not have to be directed to a 
specific item of property: 
"The Court can order the settlement of a lump sum 
ascertained in relation to an interest in property 
of either party. Further, although orders cannot 
be directed to property other than property of the 
parties to the marriage, the Court can provide that 
its order may be satisfied by the transfer or 
settlement of such other property which may be under 
the control of a party " . 69 
This fact allows the Court to provide relief to an applicant where 
a particular asset has been alienated or assets have been dis-
sipated by the actions of the respondents. 
While the approach of the Court is to ascertain what property 
is owned by the parties as at the time of the hearing, and then to 
apply s.79, if the justice of the matter requires that property 
acquired since separation should be given lesser significance, the 
Court may act accordingly. 70 On the other hand, the determination 
of a claim under s.79 is in no way akin to the taking of a partner-
ship account, although it is within the Court's discretion to 
conduct a tracing exercise into separate items of property in 
order to establish therein "interests" which differ from the 
legal or equitable interests of the parties. 
If the inventory of the assets reveals that both parties have 
little or no property, the Court will rely on their "financial 
resources" (s.75(2)(b); incorporated by s.79(4)(e)). Access to 
"financial resources" is of particular value where the respondent 
has attempted to diminish the assets available for distribution 
under a s.79 order by placing them in a discretionary trust or 
under the control of a family company. 71 The Court is also able 
to take into account the respondent's future earning capacity 72 
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or an expectancy of a superannuation payment 73 or other contingent 
interest. In those situations, special kinds of deferred property 
orders or maintenance orders will have to be made in order to 
divide the "financial resources", or in the case of an expectancy, 
the Court may, if it thinks fit, adjourn proceedings until the 
property rights fall into possession (s.79(5) 74 and (7)) and make 
interim orders relating to the property held at the time of the 
application (s.79(6)) in the meantime. 75 
Section 81  
Section 81 enacts the philosophy that there should be a 
clean break between the parties to a marriage when they divorce. 
In effect, however, rarely can the financial ties of marriage 
truly be severed and a clean break imposed, for as Symes points 
out: 76 
... because of the complexity of the marriage bond, 
the ongoing obligations, the manifold consequences 
of the dependency which marriage has created and 
the economic realities of current social policy, 
modern divorce is often no more than an adjustment". 
For these reasons, s.81 contains saving words: the section imposes 
on the Court a duty, in the formulation of orders under Part VIII 
of the Act, to end, as far as practicable, the financial relations 
of the parties. Therefore, the principle of finality may in 
appropriate cases give way to the need to provide accommodation 
for a dependent spouse and children or to allow the parties to 
continue as active parties in a business or to postpone the making 
of a final order until an expectancy falls into possession. 
It is not in itself a separate head of power: it only comes 
into play once it is decided that s.79 (or, in an appropriate case, 
s.72) is applicable. The section then has a bearing on the final 
form of the order. 77 Thus it may prompt the Court to order severance 
of a joint tenancy as between the husband and wife and sale of co-
owned premises followed by division of proceeds of sale, but it does 
not empower the Court to do these things: the necessary jurisdiction 
78 is given by s.79. 	As pointed out in Cantarella, 79 " Section 81 
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appears to encourage the making of orders for the transfer of 
property 80 or payment of a lump sum, rather than periodical 
payments which can be varied under s.83 1 t. 81 
The Family Law Amendment Act 1983 introduced s.79(5), (6) and 
(7), which enable the Family Court, if so requested by either 
party to the marriage, to adjourn proceedings where it is likely 
that there will be a significant change in the financial cir-
cumstances of the parties, one or both of whom may have a property 
entitlement under a superannuation fund or scheme or a discretionary 
trust, and to make appropriate orders in the interim. 82  
Prior to these amendments, the Court may have been deterred 
by the terms of s.81 from deferring the making of an order under 
s.79 pending the falling-in of these benefits. However, deferment 
as provided for under s.79(5), (6) and (7) may not always give 
rise to just results. For instance, deferment may permit an 
employee-spouse to direct payment under a superannuation scheme 
or discretionary trust away from himself or herself or to alienate 
prospective entitlements 83 by borrowing on them and dissipating 
the proceeds of the loan. These results could also accrue if a 
spouse decided to wait until the expectancy fell into possession 
before making an application for a property order, unless the 
provisions of s.85 could be called into aid to set aside any 
dispositions that were made by the other spouse. 
Section 79A84 
While the policy underlying s.79 as set down in s.81 is to 
finalise the economic relationship between the parties as far as 
possible, 85 s.79A sets down circumstances in which the substantial 
terms of a property order may be varied or set aside by the Court, 
which may, if it thinks fit, make another order under s.79 in 
substitution for the order set aside. 
Of the two sub-sections in s.79A, only s.79A(1) paragraphs 
(a) and (c) are relevant to this study, although it is worthwhile 
noting that if the terms of paragraph (b) are satisfied, the Court 
may do more than vary the machinery provisions by substituting 
its own order under s.79. 86 Paragraph (a) provides the Family 
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Court with both statutory and inherent powers 87 to vary or set 
aside orders under s.79 where it is satisfied that "there has been 
a miscarriage of justice by reason of fraud, duress, suppression 
of evidence, the giving of false evidence or any other circumstances". 
Paragraph (c), which was inserted by the Family Law Amendment Act  
1983, provides for the variation or recission of an order of the 
Court where there has been a default in carrying out the original 
order. 88 
Section 79A(1)(a) 
An application under s.79(1)(a) is not an appeal on the 
merits of the original decision. The applicant must establish that 
the original order should be varied or rescinded as a consequence 
of a miscarriage of justice. Further, it will not be sufficient 
for the applicant to establish, for example, fraud or the giving 
of false evidence; he or she must establish affirmatively a 
miscarriage of justice by reason of fraud or the giving of false 
evidence. 89 
The power to set aside property orders effected under s.79 
in certain narrow circumstances of miscarriage of justice is 
necessary due to the common experience of stress and hostility 
between the estranged couple before a property order, by consent 
or otherwise, is made. For example, to gain an advantageous 
property settlement a party may hide assets, overstate needs, 
understate financial resources or make threats concerning property, 
costs or children. During the various stages of grief associated 
with marriage breakdown, the weaker spouse may be very vulnerable 
to exploitation. 90 • 
While it is often claimed that the only powers available to 
a statutory court, such as the Family. Court, are those powers 
expressly laid down in legislation,- 91 there are exceptions to 
this proposition. Included in these exceptions is the inherent 
power of a court"... to set matters right where there has been 
a failure to observe an essential requirement of natural justice „ . 92 
Under this broad concept of natural justice, 
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"(t)he principle that parties to litigation are 
entitled to be present and heard, either in 
person or by a duly authorized legal representative, 
is of fundamental importance and involves the con-
sequence that, where through no fault of his own, a 
party is deprived of that entitlement, prima facie 
any order of a court made against him may be set 
aside by that court". 93 
Lest the inherent jurisdiction be accorded too much importance, 
however, it should be noted that in Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; 
ex parte Green, 94 Gibbs CJ. said that 
"(S)uch inherent jurisdiction as the Family Court 
may have (cannot) go beyond protecting its function 
as a Court constituted with the limited jurisdiction 
afforded by the Act". 95 
The components of s.79A(1)(a) will be dealt with separately. 
(a) Miscarriage of justice  
This term can be used to describe two situations: where the 
substantive order under s.79 was unjust; and where the procedure 
leading to the order was somehow improper or irregular. 96 It 
should be noted that occasionally, despite improper procedure, a 
"just" or "proper" substantive order may still result. For 
example, despite clear evidence of fraud or duress, the influenced 
party may still have received a property settlement under s.79 
which was not objectively inappropriate. 97 This is consonant with 
Bray C.J.'s statement in Williamson v. Williamson that "... 
(j)ustice miscarries if a party does not have what the law says 
he shall have,, 98 
(b) Fraud 
Where there has been fraud, duress or undue influence 99 or 
unconscionability surrounding a voluntary disposition between 
husband and wife, it may be possible to have the disposition set 
aside. In initial proceedings for a property order under s.79, 
the Court may simply disregard a transfer of property as between 
the husband and wife if it is open to attack on any of these 
grounds. 1  If a disposition is followed by a sale, the impeach-
ability of the original disposition will allow tracing of the 
proceeds of sale. 2 Since a husband is not presumed to exercise 
undue influence over his wife, 3 this must be affirmatively proven. 
According to equitable doctrines, certain dealings, whether 
voluntary or for value, may be set aside as unconscionable. Where 
a purchase is made and the transferor is poor and ignorant, the 
transfer was made at a considerable undervalue and the transferor 
has received no independent advice, the onus will rest on the 
transferee to establish that the disposition was not unconscionable. 4 
In Cresswell v. Potter, 5 Megarry J. held that the "... more usual 
it is to have a solicitor, the more stiking will be his absence 
and the more closely will the courts scrutinise what was done". 6 
The onus of establishing the rectitude of a dealing as being fair, 
just and reasonable will be discharged if it is shown that, prior 
to its conclusion, the effect of the dealing was properly explained 
to the transferor and the need for independent advice was drawn 
to his attention. 7 • 
There is no definition of "fraud" in the Act, but it appears 
that statutory fraud is wider than common law fraud as defined by 
Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek, 8 that is, that fraud is proved 
when it is shown that a false representation has been made 
, 9. knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without 
caring whether it be true or false. The decision of the Full Court 
in Suters 10 suggests that statutory fraud can also include situations 
of non-disclosure of material facts. At common law, mere silence 
or non-disclosure is not normally fraud; generally there is no 
11 duty of disclosure between bargaining parties , and until the 
decision in Suters, 12 it appears that there was no duty of 
disclosure between husband and wife, although there was a duty of 
disclosure to the Court. 13 Recently, in Livesey v. Jenkins, 14 
the House of Lords emphasised the need for full and frank dis-
closure as a matter of principle in financial proceedings between 
spouses and Smithers J. in Briese, 15 who referred to the House of 
• Lords decision, held that there is an obligation on each party to 
act so as to provide a basis upon which the two of them are in a 
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position to resolve a case by agreement, or proceed to a hearing 
as expeditiously as may reasonably be done. The fact that the 
Family Court, in exercising its discretion to adjust property 
interests between spouses, must take into account a number of 
designated criteria, makes full disclosure imperative. 
The duty of the respondent to file a detailed statement of 
financial circumstances "at a reasonable time prior to the return 
day of the application" now finds legislative expression in 
0.17r.2 of the Family Law Rules. 16 
(c) Duress 
In the Marriage of S. 17 established that for duress to be 
proved, it must be shown that, in the circumstances of the case, 
the will of one of the parties was overborne by terror 18 but it 
may also be overborne by more subtle influences such as family 
19 	20 pressure. 	In Kahl, 	Gee J. held that duress involves"... 
the compulsion of a person by threats of physical or mental 
har". Examples would include threats to engage in socially 
unacceptable behaviour such as vexatious litigation, violence or 
child-snatching. 21 The question to be answered in the light of 
the circumstances of each case is whether the will of one of the 
parties was overborne so as to vitiate any concessions made by 
that party. 22 Duress was considered in Soblusky, 23 for at the 
time of the final separation of the parties, the husband, goaded 
by his wife's bullying, had transferred to his wife his income 
and the interest he held in the family home for virtually no 
consideration at all. 
(d) The giving of false evidence 
In Taylor v. Taylor, 24 the High Court ruled that there is 
no reason to read the word "false" in s.79A(1)(a) as meaning 
"wilfully false", particularly since "fraud" is mentioned separately 
in the same provision. 25 However, the mere voicing of doubts and 
suspicions about the respondent's evidence in the original proceedings 
is insufficient. In Wilson v. Wilson, 26 Walsh JA. observed: 
"(I)t is essential, in my opinion, that the applicant 
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... should produce material to the court which is 
such that the court can find affirmatively, if the 
application is based on the alleged giving of false 
evidence, that some of the relevant evidence, given 
at the hearing, on which the decree or order under 
challenge was based, was false". 
Mason J. in Taylor v. Taylor 27 indicated that the courts will 
be slow to find miscarriage of justice by reason of false evidence 
since it is important to bring an end to litigation. This and 
... the evil of allowing cases to be retried on the same evidence 
are powerful deterrents against setting aside a judgment when it 
appears that it has been obtained by false evidence without more". 
On the other hand, his Honour was willing to accept that false 
evidence as to divorce grounds is relevant to the property 
jurisdiction, 28 although Murphy J. was of the view that false 
evidence must related directly to the quantum of the property 
order, not to the collateral divorce order. 
(e) suppression of evidence 
This ground for the variation or rescission of a s.79 order 
was considered by the Full Court in its decision in Taylor. 29 
There, Asche SJ and Dovey J. said, 30 
...'(S)uppression of evidence' ... must go beyond 
the mere giving of one-sided evidence and must 
amount to the wilful concealment of matters which 
it was her (theappellant's) duty to put to the Court. 
Apart from that clear duty which she owed to the 
Court, she was not bound to put the case for the other 
side." 31 
The duty does not require that all the evidence which is 
available and which might be relevant should be placed before the 
Court, but only such evidence as will serve to qualify or contradict 
assertions made to the Court by the party concerned. 32 Thus a 
party must deal with the Court in the utmost good faith and not, 
by withholding evidence, knowingly create a false impression or 
allow the Court to draw a false inference. 33 By the inclusion of 
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0.17r.2, which requires him or her to fill a detailed statement 
of financial circumstances "at a reasonable time prior to the 
return day of the application", the legislature has imposed a 
strong duty of disclosure on the respondent. 34 Variation of a 
s.79 order on the ground of "suppression of evidence" is not 
available to a party who himself simply fails to give relevant 
evidence either by choice or through negligence. 35 The Full Court 
in Suters 36 stressed that both parties have a duty of disclosure 
to the Court in proceedings under s.87. 
(0 Any other circumstances  
This phrase was added to s.79A in 1979 by amendment to the 
Family Law Act 1975 37 in order to give the section a wider 
application. It has been given as broad an interpretation as was 
the equivalent phrase contained in s.75 of the repealed Matrimonial  
Causes Act 1959 (Cth.). 38 For example, in K2kl, 39 the original 
order was rescinded because it did not allow for inflation and, in 
Spratley, 40  Yuill J. held that the words "any other circumstances" 
extended to a case in which a decree nisi had been made although 
the parties had not lived separately and apart for twelve months. 
On the other hand, in In the Marriage of B. and B., 41 the Full Court 
made it clear that there must be a nexus between the original 
property order and the relief sought by the applicant. What the 
Court had really been asked to do was to set aside the original 
order and make a further order under quite different circumstances. 
The most common "other circumstance" under s.79A when a 
miscarriage of justice is alleged is where a party was not present 
at the hearing42  when the property order was made, 43 although non-
appearance per se does not amount to a miscarriage of-justice 
except where the respondent has evidence to place before the Court 
which might have led to a different conclusion; where the respondent 
had an adequate excuse for not attending; 44 and where the applicant 
or the respondent was guilty of some improper conduct when obtaining 
an order for substituted service. 45 
It is not possible to define exhaustively the situations that 
can result in or give rise to a miscarriage of justice by reason 
of "any other circumstances", but it has been observed that the 
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phrase will embrace any situation which sufficiently indicates that 
the order was obtained contrary to the justice of the case. 46 
Section 79A(1)(c) 
Sub-paragraph (c) allows the Court to intervene where "a 
person has defaulted in carrying out an obligation imposed on him 
by the order47 and, in the circumstances that have arisen as a 
result of that default, it is just and equitable to vary the 
order or to set the order aside and make another order in sub-
stitution for the order". 
Nygh J. considered the interpretation of s.79A(1)(c) in 
Gubbay, 48 although his remarks were obiter since no application 
under the section had been made. After saying that the Family 
Court's powers to enforce a s.79 order did not involve a claim for 
damages for breach of trust, his Honour said 49 that: 
"... if it were true, that the wife as trustee had 
defaulted in carrying out the obligation imposed 
on her by the order, and in the circumstances that 
arose as a result of that default it was just and 
equitable to vary the order, then this Court under 
that provision has the power and the authority to 
make such adjustments to the order and to the sums 
ordered to be paid which would take account of any 
default on the part of the wife...". 
Prior to the paragraph's insertion by the Family Law Amendment 
Act 1983, the Court would not have been permitted to affect in any 
way the substantive parts of the s.79 order. However, as a means 
of side-stepping the possible injustice which could arise where 
one party was in default in carrying out the terms of an order, 
the Family Court developed the practice of altering the "machinery 
provisions" of the original order. Thus in McDonald, 50 the Full 
Court held that those provisions of the original order dealing 
with the mode of payment and the effect of any failure to comply-
with time requirements were not substantive, and it was therefore 
prepared to waive strict compliance with them. In Fraser,  51 the 
husband's actions had caused the sale of the matrimonial home to 
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fall through so that the wife did not receive the equal division 
of the proceeds that the Family Court had ordered. Eventually, a 
sale was effected but only at a reduced price. The Full Court 
directed that arrears of maintenance, the costs of the earlier 
abortive auction attempt, certain arrears of mortgage payments and 
the difference between the original estimated value and the actual 
sale price be deducted from the husband's share. 52 It was pointed 
out that this direction did not constitute an alteration of the 
property order but merely "... consequential orders tidying up the 
situation which has existed because of the husband's machinations 
and obduracy existing for four years" .53  
Section 79A(2) 
This sub-section provides that, in the exercise of its powers 
under sub-section (1), 54 a court "shall have regard to the interests 
of, and shall make any order proper for the protection of, a bona 
fide purchaser or other person interested". 55 
In summary, it may be stated that the provisions of s.79A, 
particularly as amended in 1983, enable the Family Court to provide 
a remedy in situations where a miscarriage of justice has occurred 
because of one party's success in obtaining a s.79 property order 
advantageous to himself and inimical to the interests of the other 
party or where one party's default in carrying out the terms of a 
s.79 order has led to financial detriment to the other party. 56  
In either case, provided that the rights of third parties have 
not intervened, and provided that the applicant himself has not 
been guilty of deceit or other unconscionable conduct, nor, in the 
case of s.79A(1)(a), of undue delay, laches or affirmation, the 
Court is empowered to rescind the original order or vary its 
terms according to the justice of the case. It should be noted, 
however, that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain 
proceedings under s.79A if they are instituted after the death of 
one of the parties. 57 
Section 85 
Where its terms are satisfied, s.85 enables the Court to 
recapture property which should have been available for distribution. 
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The section gives the Court power in proceedings under the Act 58 
to set aside (or vary) 59 or restrain the making of an instrument 
or disposition 60 by or on behalf of or by direction or in the 
interest of, a party which is made or proposed to be made to defeat 
an existing or anticipated order in those proceedings or which, 
irrespective of intention, is likely to defeat any such order. 
The Court is required to have regard to and protect the interests 
of a bona fide purchaser or other person interested. The powers 
exercisable under the section are such that persons who are not 
parties to or children of the marriage may be affected by the 
proceedings and by orders made. 
The jurisdiction which s.85(1) confers on the Family Court 
to set aside or restrain dispositions intended to defeat, or likely 
to defeat, existing or anticipated orders may only be exercised 
in61 or after the resolution of separate proceedings under the 
Act, 62 that is, it is a derivative jurisdiction and there is no 
power to commence s.85 proceedings in isolation. 63 By its terms, 
s.85's usefulness is restricted to the circumstances where there 
is some degree of marital estrangement between the married couple, 
although this restriction probably has been modified by the 
insertion of paragraph (ca)(i) in the definition of "matrimonial 
cause" in s.4(1) by the Family Law Amendment Act 1983. 64 In any 
case, however, the section provides no wide-ranging power to 
protect assets generally, for even if paragraph (ca)(i) applies, 
proceedings will be confined to those "arising out of the marital 
relationship". 
On the other hand, the decision in Anderson 65 to apply the 
relevant High Court Rules 66 so that third parties could be joined 
in proceedings, even though they refused to intervene under s.92, 
made available a valuable remedy to be used when third parties 
have participated in a scheme to defeat an existing or anticipated 
order of the Court. Further, the Full Court held that, by applying 
the provisions of s.15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth.), 
it was possible to make ancillary orders against third parties. 
Proceedings under s.85 are a matrimonial cause within paragraph (f) 
in that they are proceedings in relation to any concurrent, pending 
or completed proceedings of a kind referred to in any of the para-
graphs (a) to (eb). Proceedings within paragraph (f) may constitute 
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a matrimonial cause even though a stranger to the marriage is a 
party to them. 67 
It is not necessary to show any actual intention to defeat 
an existing or anticipated order. It will be sufficient that the 
instrument is, "irrespective of intention" (s.85(1)), likely to 
defeat an order; that is, it is enough that the disponor as a 
reasonable person ought to have foreseen 68 that property and main-
tenance proceedings were probable. 69 Therefore, s.85 can be applied 
to situations which are not "shams" or "devices". 
In ascertaining whether a future order may properly be 
described as an "anticipated order", the question for the Court to 
decide is "whether, considering all of the circumstances at the 
time of the disposition ... an application by (the applicant) at 
some time, with a consequent order, was objectively to be foreseen 
or to be expected by (the respondent) as being likely or reasonably 
probable". " 
The instrument or disposition impugned may precede the actual 
institution of proceedings under the Act. The expression "antici-
pated order" comprehends orders arising out of present or future 
proceedings, 71 but it certainly cannot be said that an order is 
anticipated at a time when proceedings under the Act are not 
contemplated at all, 72 nor will the Court freeze a spouse's assets 
for a long period of time simply because the other spouse thinks he 
or she might attempt evasive tactics. 73 Therefore, in the absence 
of an actual disposition, some evidence of either a specific 
intention to effect a disposition or a spouse's propensity to make 
such dispositions is necessary. 74 To establish that a spouse 
intends to make a disposition at some time in the future obviously 
will present evidentiary difficulties. The test of causation will 
readily be established where, for example, a husband has attempted 
to mortgage the matrimonial home, 75 for the applicant wife can 
readily argue that the non-accessibility of this particular asset 
detrimentally affects the orders anticipated in future property 
proceedings. On the other hand, dispositions which still leave 
the disponor with substantial remaining assets and which do not 
affect a particular asset in which the disponor's spouse is 
interested do not cause the probably defeat of later financial 
76 orders. 
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It will not suffice that, for the purposes of s.85(1), the 
offending act having taken place, an order is subsequently 
anticipated and it subsequently appears that the order is likely 
to be defeated by the earlier impugned act. Any other interpretation 
would leave it open to an applicant to impugn very old transactions 
and dispositions effected at a time when orders were not anticipated 
and where disharmony may not even have arisen. On the other hand, 
a plan to avoid financial responsibilities made early in marriage 
will be reasonably effective, as the result in Ascot Investments  
Pty Ltd. v. Harper and Harper 77 indicates. 
The death of a disponor effectively prevents any new property 
or maintenance proceedings from being instituted under the Act so 
it is possible for a spouse to "empty his or her estate" before 
death by disposing of assets to persons outside his or her 
immediate family, thereby frustrating dependants' maintenance 
claims against the estate under State Testator's Family Maintenance 
legislation, 78 except in New South Wales, where sections 21 to 29 
of the Family Provision Act 1982 empower the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales to deal with certain "prescribed transactions". At 
present, post-death obligations contained in the State legislation 
are notoriously easy to evade, and, since, except in New South Wales, 
there are no State provisions equivalent to s.85 to enable the 
setting-aside of dispositions effected during the disponor's life-
time, 79 there is a limit to the transactions that a surviving 
spouse can challenge. However, death does not prevent existing 
property or maintenance orders being enforced against the deceased's 
estate under s.82(2), s.82(3), s.87(5) and s.105(3), and existing 
maintenance orders may be varied against the estate of the deceased. .80 
In either of these proceedings to vary or enforce orders, s.85 can 
be used to set aside dispositions effected prior to the disponor's 
death. Maintenance orders made since 25th November, 1983, when the 
Family Law Amendment Act 1983 came into operation, cannot be 
prospectively enforced against deceased estates (s.82). 
Because of the insertion of s.79(8) 81 by the 1983 amendments, 
pending or completed proceedings will not abate on the death of a 
party, and, in these circumstances, dispositions made before 
death can now be caught by s.85. 
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According to some decisions, there must be a nexus between 
the impugned act and the defeat or likely defeat of the order, 82 
but in Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation, 83 the Full Court 
questioned whether such a causal connection is in fact needed. 
Since the making of the mortgage by the husband was in itself 
sufficient to defeat the anticipated order in favour of the wife 
under s.79, the Court preferred not to give a decided view on the 
matter in the case before it. 
Section 85 envisages the making of orders against third parties. 
While the constitutionality of the orders is therefore suspect, it 
is submitted that theHigh Court would probably uphold the section 
as intra vires despite its applicability to third persons because, 
inter alia, it is socially desirable for the Family Court to be 
able to prevent the evasion of family or financial responsibility. 
This view is reinforced by the fact that, under s.79, orders can 
be made directly against third parties in cases of "shams" or 
"devices" set up to evade the provisions of the section, 84 or 
indirectly against a third party who is legally controlled by a party 
to the marriage. 85 Under s.85, it appears that, in appropriate 
circumstances, the Court may order a transferee, a stranger to the 
marriage, to re-convey property or discharge a mortgage over it 
even if he or she were a bona fide purchaser for value. 86 An 
application seeking such an order may be made in relation to any 
proceedings under the Act, unlike the position prior to the 1983 
amendments, for then proceedings had to relate to a matrimonial 
cause as defined in s.4(1) of the Act, paragraphs (a) to (e). 87 
Nygh J. in Heath and Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation88 
considered the meaning of "bona fide purchaser" 89 and "other 
person interested" which appear in s.85(3). He adopted the 
definition of the words "purchaser for valuable consideration" 
given by Goff J. in Re Windle, 90 that is, that they do not mean 
"... a purchase in the strict sense of a contract of purchase 
and sale, but (they) postulate a person who in the commercial 
sense provides a quid pro quo". 91 While the bank had been a 
purchaser for good consideration, 92 it had not acted bona fide, 
for it had notice of the wife's property claim and a search of 
title would have revealed her caveat. There are, however, dicta 
to the effect that in the absence of being put on notice and 
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having made due search, a bank is not obliged to enquire into 
the marital status of customers before making loans. The importance 
of the placement of a caveat on the title to property to protect 
equitable interests becomes apparent, therefore. Even a defective 
caveat has the effect of temporarily preventing the holder of the 
legal title to Torrens land from selling or mortgaging the 
property. 93 
As to the phrase "other person interested", Nygh J. conceded 
that in the strict grammatical sense the words included any person 
who has acquired an interest in the property other than as a 
bona fide purchaser. 94 Therefore, they would cover a donee as 
well as a purchaser with notice .95 However, on this view, the 
specific reference to "bona fide purchaser" would be meaningless, 
for all persons acquiring an interest, whether bona fide or not, 
would be entitled to the same protection. To include the word 
purchaser" in the phrase, as Baker J. did in Abdullah, 96 would 
also do violence to the words of the section by virtually ignoring 
the concluding four words, "or other person interested", contrary 
to the rules of statutory interpretation, which do not permit a 
court to ignore the prdinary and grammatical meaning of words of 
a statute. However, Baker J. found that the purported sale by 
Abdullah was a sham, so Mr. Jaya was not even "a person interested". 
The word "interest", Nygh J. concluded,must be interpreted to 
indicate the acquisition of an interest, not merely an involvement 
or a curiosity. A sham transaction97 confers no interest. While 
the bank in Heath 98 was clearly "a person interested", for it 
stood to lose $26 000 which it had advanced on the second mortgage, 
it was not "a bona fide purchaser", and its interest was post-
poned to that of the wife. 
In Whitaker, 99 Nygh J. suggested that, in certain circumstances, 
s.85 permits the Court to set aside a subsequent transfer by a third 
party to whom the respondent has transferred property. 
The Court has an injunctive jurisdiction under s.85(1). It 
may "restrain the making of a disposition by, or on behalf of, or 
by direction of, or in the interest of a party". Since s.114(3) 
may be used to restrain a disposition by a third party in a case 
not falling directly within the injunction provisions of s.85(1), 
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it reinforces this jurisdiction. It has been suggested that 
s.85(1) may give a wider power to restrain third parties than 
would be available under s.114(3). Suppose, for example, 1 
directors of a company, in which the husband has a large share-
holding comprising his major asset, acting in the husband's 
interest, propose to allot a large number of additional shares 
to a trust in which the husband has a contingent interest, but not 
a present interest, so as to swamp the husband's shareholding and 
reduce its value. Section 85(1) would give the Court injunctive 
powers sufficiently wide to restrain the directors from making 
such an allotment, but in the light of the decision in  Ascot 
i Investments, 2  it s questionable whether s.114(3) does. 
There is some authority for the proposition that the Court's 
powers under s.85 are not defeated or superseded by subsequent 
bankruptcy, 3 but this is one of the matters at present under 
review of the Australian Law Reform Commission's General Insolvency 
Inquiry. 4 It has also been held that while the Court has power 
under s.85 to set aside an assignment of property to a trustee under 
Part X of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.), 5  it does not have a 
power to upset any change of ownership resulting from an exercise 
of jurisdiction by the Bankruptcy Court. 6 However, the Family 
Court, being a court of Federal jurisdiction, has an associated 
jurisdiction to decide matters arising under other Federal 
legislation such as the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.) 7 in appropriate 
circumstances. 
The contrasting decisions in Page (No.2) 8 and Wallmann9 should 
be noted. In the former case, it was assumed that a husband who 
has no property cannot be the subject of an application for a 
property order. The husband had no assets by reason of their 
having been transferred to the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy 
pursuant to a bankruptcy order. In the latter case, Murray J. held 
that it would "... seem to be manifestly unjust that a party should 
lose the right to claim against any possible surplus (in the 
bankrupt's estate) by virtue of the trustee having the capacity to 
strike out that party's application for property settlement on the 
sequestration of the other spouse's estate prior to any surplus 
being ascertained". The decisions appear to be inconsistent and 
no clear law can be stated, but on the authority of Page (No.2) 10 
123. 
it may be asserted that an applicant who is an undischarged 
11 bankrupt is still able to pursue a claim under s.79. 
As far as protection of a bona fide purchaser's interests, 
as provided for by s.85(3), is concerned, it is open to the Court 
to decide to do nothing more than grant the party, leave to intervene 
in the proceedings. 12  Even if it is submitted by the claimant 
that the involvement of the third party is a sham, it may be 
appropriate to give notice to a third party of the application and 
the material submitted in support in order to give that party 
an opportunity to seek leave to intervene. 13 If the Court is 
unable to formulate any order for the protection of the purchaser 
or other interested party, it does not follow that it lacks 
jurisdiction to make any order under s.85(1). 14  On the other hand, 
the Court may decide that no order should be made under the 
section. In Abdullah, 15 Baker J. was of the view that, in normal 
circumstances, the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction would 
be loath to set aside a transaction entered into with a bona fide 
purchaser for full value in the ordinary course of business. If 
the respondent still has possession of the proceeds of sale, an 
injunction can be granted under s.114(1) to restrain any dealing 
in them. 16  If, on the other hand, the proceeds of the sale have 
been dissipated and restitutio in integrum is no longer possible 
no order should be made, as a matter of discretion. His Honour 
did imply, however, that a dealing with the matrimonial home, 
defeating the occupancy of the applicant spouse and the children 
of the marriage, may be treated as an exception to the general 
17 proposition. 
Summary 
Where assets have been dissipated or alienated by the date 
of a s.79 application, the Court may remedy this "emptying" of the 
pool of assets by setting aside under s.85 a disposition which has 
had the effect of defeating a reasonably foreseeable property 
order, 18 therefore refilling the pool of assets before proceedings 
under s.79 are continued, or by notionally including the dissipated 
or alienated asset in the pool of assets and then considering that 
asset as already transferred to the disponor-spouse as part of his 
19 or her eventual share. 	Alternatively, the Court may disbelieve 
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the evidence of an allegedly penniless spouse, and make property 
orders against him or her. 20 
21 SECTION 85A. 
Section 85A, which was inserted by the Family Law Amendment 
Act 1983, substantially re-enacts the provisions of s.86(2) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth.). 22 The section empowers the 
Family Court, in proceedings under the Act, to make such order as 
it considers just and equitable with respect to the application 
of the whole or part of the property dealt with by ante- and 
post-nuptial settlements made in relation to the marriage (s.85A(1)). 
The matters in s.79(4), so far as they are relevant, are expressly 
included for consideration (s.85A(2)). 
It appears that the purpose of s.85A is to permit the Court to 
deal, to a certain extent, with assets settled by way of dis-
cretionary trusts. 23 Whether the trustee is a party to the marriage 
or not a trust which makes provision for the future needs of a 
family comes within the meaning of a "nuptial settlement" in 
s.85A. Where a party has an interest which cannot be transferred 
and its value depends on future circumstances over which that party 
may have little or no control, s.79 has a limited usefulness. 
Because of the reference in s.85A(1) to "proceedings under 
this Act", it appears that an application under the section may be 
made in isolation from (or in conjunction with) other proceedings 
under the Act; proceedings need not be ancillary, unlike the 
position as far as s.85 proceedings are concerned. 24  Even if the 
proceedings do not constitute a "matrimonial cause" within 
paragraph (ca) or (f) of the definition in s.4(1), the Court has 
the jurisdiction and the power to entertain the proceedings 
(s.31(1)(d) of the Act). 25 Therefore, trustees, even though they 
are neither parties to nor children of the marriage, may fall 
within the terms of the section, subject to the limits set down 
26 below. 
Interpretations of the section's predecessors in legislation27 
gave a wide interpretation to the word "settlement". In Prinsep v. 
28 Prinsep, 	it was held that a settlement"... should provide for the 
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financial benefit of one or the other or both of the spouses and 
(make) reference to their married state". An absolute and un-
qualified transfer of property will not constitute a settlement 29 
unless the disposition makes continuing provision for periodical 
payments. 30 An outright gift would have the effect of providing 
for a spouse's future needs but it is not a settlement: "... 
(t)he decisive factor is the manner in which the disposition seeks 
to make the provision„ .31 The High Court in Dewar v. Dewar 32 
held that, in the context of matrimonial property, the concept 
denotes a disposition importing "... a fetter upon the alienation 
of the entirety” even though the settlement instrument creates 
... no trusts, no successive interests and no express limitations 
tending against mere alienation". However, it has been held that 
there is a settlement on the parties to a marriage when they are 
named as objects of a discretionary trust. 33 In Compton v. Compton, 34 
Marshall J. suggested that a settlement on parties to a marriage may 
exist where, without being given any interest over the settlement, 
the parties are given powers over the disposal of the settled 
property. 
The settlor and. his motive for making the settlement are 
immaterial, 35 and a settlement, in the relevant sense, may be 
created orally or arise by operation of law. 36 It must, however, 
be made in contemplation of the parties' marriage before it can be 
termed an ante-nuptial settlement. 37 To constitute a post- 
nuptial settlement, it must be undertaken on the basis that the 
i i marriage is going to continue 38  if t s not to be ruled invalid 
as being contrary to public policy. 
The Family Court's power to make orders with respect to 
the property dealt with by the settlement concerns the application 
of the property; it is not confined to the interests of the parties 
under the settlement. Discretionary trustees may have their 
discretions overridden 39 and they may be ordered to apply a fixed 
proportion of the income in favour of a nominated party. 40 
Forfeiture provisions in protective trusts have been overriden41 
and non-fiduciary powers of revocation or appointment have been 
suspended. 42 
It appears that in making orders for the application of all or 
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part of the property dealt with by a settlement, the Court may 
adversely affect the rights and entitlements of volunteer-
strangers, provided that those rights and entitlements are remote 
and contingent. 43 Hardingham and Neave express the view44  that 
such a construction is necessary by reason of the limitations 
imposed by the Constitution: a law which permitted the Court to 
alter or destroy the rights of third parties (other than remote 
and contingent rights) could not be said to be a law with respect 
to marriage within s.51(xxi). 
If the rights accorded to children under the settlement are 
withdrawn for some reason by the Court's order directing the 
application of the property dealt with by the settlement, the 
decision in Meller v. Meller45 suggests that they must be compensated 
by some additional advantage which, at a minimum, leaves them 
substantially as well secured and protected as they were in the 
original settlement. 46 
Section 85A is widely cast by the legislation in order to 
provide the Family Court with a means of substantially re-
arranging the terms of discretionary trusts which have been 
designed to defeat the effective operation of the Court's jur- 
isdiction under s.79 of the Act. However, the restrictive judgments 
of the High Court in Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; ex parte Green 47 
suggest that third parties may not be made the direct subject of 
orders of the Family. Court and that the operation of the section 
is as a result limited. 48 
SECTION 11449 
Since a s.114 injunction is a valuable means of controlling 
conduct with economic consequences, in this chapter only the 
jurisdictional bases of s.114(1) and s.114(3) will be analysed. 
The particular situations in which the provisions may be used and 
the extent to which they can remedy conduct resulting in the 
diminution of assets will be discussed in Chapter Six, particularly 
Part F. 
Section 114 delimits the injunctive power of the Family Court. 
An injunction 50 is an order or decree by which a party to an action 
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is required to do, or refrain from doing, a particular thing. 
Injunctions are either restrictive (preventive) or mandatory 
(compulsive). They therefore provide a valuable means of protecting 
property interests against acts of dissipation or alienation. 
As regards time, injunctions are either interlocutory 51 
(interim) or perpetual. A perpetual injunction is granted only 
after the applicant has established his right and the actual or 
threatened infringement of it by the respondent; an interlocutory 
injunction may be granted at any time after the writ is issued 
to maintain things in statu quo. The Court must be satisfied 
that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing and 
that on the facts the applicant is probably entitled to relief. 52 
Once granted, an injunction is enforced by committal for contempt 
of court for any breach. 
Unlike the position in England, where, although there may be 
statutory limits on their jurisdiction, there are no constitutional 
restraints imposed on the courts, 53 s.114 is limited in its 
operation by the terms of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
The words of s.114 make it clear that the power granted by the 
section is available only if the Family Court is exercising 
jurisdiction under the Family Law Act, although, as explained 
below, s.114(1) and s.114(3) have different jurisdictional bases. 
As Gibbs CJ. pointed out in Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; ex parte  
Green, 54 n ... the section means what it says; it confers power which 
the Court may exercise only if it already has jurisdiction - it does 
not confer jurisdiction". 55 Section 114(1) grants the power to 
order an injunction only in proceedings of the kind referred to in 
paragraph (e) of the definitionof "matrimonial cause" in s.4(1). 
Section 114(3) applies when the Court is exercising jurisdiction 
under the Act in any proceedings other than those to which sub-
section (1) applies. The provisions cannot be extended by resort 
to the so-called inherent jurisdiction; such inherent jurisdiction 
as the Family Court may have cannot go beyond protecting its function 
as a Court. constituted within the limited jurisdiction afforded by 
56 the Act. 
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As the Full Court indicated in Siding, "... (t)he power to 
grant injunctions is, of course, a discretionary power, not to 
be exercised lightly" . 57 Each case must be decided according to 
its own facts and circumstances. 58  Further, the Family Court, in 
deciding both whether tc make an order or injunction under s.114 
and the terms of any such order or injunction, must have regard 
to the four principles set out in S.43• 59 
Ordinarily, the Family Court upholds the principles of equity 
when exercising its discretion to make an order or injunction under 
s.114. Thus in McCarney, 60 the Full Court upheld the principle 
that an application for an injunction must be made bona fide and 
in Aldred, 61 Nygh J. was prepared to bar the grant of an injunction 
because the applicant had been guilty of laches. However, Murray J. 
in an obiter statement in Thompson62 indicated that in certain 
circumstances she would not necessarily regard the equitable 
defenses of acquiescence and misleading conduct as being sufficiently 
strong to displace the necessity for protecting a wife in respect 
of support and shelter for herself and her children. Such a 
departure from established equitable principles 63 indicates the 
overriding nature of. the provisions set down in s.43. It is clear 
from the foregoing that considerations of the conduct of both the 
applicant and the respondent will be relevant when the Family Court 
is deciding whether to exercise its discretion to issue an order 
or injunction to restrain the alienation or dissipation of assets 
in which the applicant claims to have legal rights. 64 n exercising 
its discretion, the Court must balance the hardship to each party 
and frame its order in such a manner as to impose no further 
restriction than is necessary to achieve protection of the . 
applicant's interest. 65 An injunction will not be granted if it is 
felt that there is no real risk of the property being disposed of. 
According to 0.12,r.1 of the Family Law Rules, in an urgent 
case on an application made ex parte, the Court may make an order 
until a specified time or until a further order is made. However, 
in ex parte proceedings there is a particularly onerous duty of 
full disclosure resting on the applicant. 66 
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Section 114(1)  
Section 114(1) is an "independent power", for the power 
under it can be exercised without regard to any other form of 
matrimonial relief. By definition (e) of "matrimonial cause", to 
which this sub-section relates, proceedings between the parties 
to a marriage for an order or injunction in"circumstances arising 
out of the marital relationshlpu67  constitute a "matrimonial 
cause" in their own right. 68 Where accelerated relief is not open 
to the parties and the proceedings cannot be brought within 
definition (ca)(i) of the definition of "matrimonial cause", namely, 
"proceedings arising out of the marital relationship", s.4(1)(e) 
enables the Family Court to grant injunctions unconnected with and 
prior to principal relief proceedings. While it is clear that 
s.4(1)(e) may not be used to alter property rights, 69 it is now 
accepted that there is a liberal injunctions jurisdiction by which 
the Family Court may keep safe property which is at risk of 
disposal by a party, or which may be the subject of a prior 
Supreme Court order which could pre-empt Family Court jurisdiction. 
Section 114(1) gives a court exercising powers under the Act the 
power to make both orders and injunctions. 
Although it took the Family Court some time to work out a 
satisfactory relationship between s.114(1) and s.79, 7C1 its approach 
has always been to regard each section as involving a separate 
head of power which may at times overlap with the other but which 
is nevertheless basically distinct. 71  The Courts have always 
based s.114(1) squarely upon matrimonial cause (e) and s.79 
squarely upon matrimonial cause (ca), 72 and they have been 
diligent in their attempts to prevent the limitations pertaining to 
s.79 from being circumvented simply by recourse to s.114(1). 
As drafted prior to the 1983 amendments and as interpreted 
by the Family Court, s. 114(1) had two main applications in the 
property. context. First, it was used to secure exclusive occupancy 
of the home for a party to the marriage pending the institution 
and resolution of property proceedings. 73  Secondly, and more 
importantly as far as the present study is concerned, it 
empowered the Court to restrain a party to the marriage from 
encumbering, alienating or facilitating the alienation of assets 
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in respect of which s.79 proceedings might later be taken. That 
is, it operated not only as an exclusive possession provision but 
also as a "freezing" provision. However, such an injunction had 
to be directed against a spouse and not against third parties such 
as the Registrar-General of Titles 74 or a company. 75 
Hardingham and Neave 76 express the view that although s.114(1) 
was re-worded by the amending legislation of 1983, its substance 
as far as the property jurisdiction is concerned remains unaltered, 
since paragraphs (e) and (f) of s.4(1) refer respectively to 
"an injunction in relation to the property of a party to the 
marriage" and "an injunction relating to the use and occupancy 
of the matrimonial home". However, its application appears to 
have been limited. 
Under the re-worded paragraph (ca) of the definition of 
"matrimonial cause" in s.4(1) of the Act, it is provided that s.79 
proceedings may be instituted on condition that they are "proceedings 
arising out of the marital relationship" (paragraph (ca)(0). 
Previously, only be recourse to s.114(1) could one party to the 
marriage seek to restrain the other from selling, mortgaging, 
leasing or otherwise dealing with property during the period from 
the breakdown of the marriage until proceedings could be commenced 
for principal relief. However, s.114(1) proceedings, in accordance 
with paragraph (e) of the definition of "matrimonial cause", could 
then and may still only be instituted in "circumstances arising out 
of the marital relationship". 
As soon as property proceedings are instituted, the Court, 
in exercise of its powers under s.114(3), may grant injunctions in 
aid of its property jurisdiction, as will be explained below, and 
it may also counter conduct likely to defeat any property order 
arising out of the proceedings. There may still be application 
for s.114(1), however. For example, there may be a delay in the 
institution of property proceedings 77 and the Court may be asked 
to regulate conduct under s.114(1) in the interim. Moreover, some 
property may fall outside the definition of porperty as "arising 
out of the marital relationship" in paragraph (ca)(i) 78 or, even 
after property proceedings have been instituted, the Court may 
resort to s.114(1) pending their ultimate resolution. 
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The interpretations of the phrase "arising out of the marital 
relationship" which appears in s.4(1)(e) have already been canvassed 
in Chapter Four, Part B, of this study. In the property context, 
it appears that proceedings fall within paragraph (e) when their 
purpose is the resolution of a dispute as between the parties 
concerning rights to the use or possession of property, other than 
temporary rights, pending the institution of property proceedings 
under s.4(1)(ca). 
Section 114(1) confers general jurisdiction upon the Family 
Court to "make such order or grant such injunction as it thinks 
proper with respect to the matter to which the proceedings relate". 
It prefaces the types of injunction which may be granted or instances 
in which injunctions may be granted with the word "including". 
As a result, orders and injunctions may be granted under s.114(1) 
in circumstances other than those specified. For example, they 
may be used to direct a party not to dispose of certain property 
when he actually receives it; 79 not to exercise a power in such a 
manner as to adversely affect the applicant; 80or not to remove 
property from the jurisdiction. 81 
Although orders and injunctions cannot be directed against 
third parties in s.114(1) proceedings 82 unless the third party has 
assisted a party to the marriage to defeat rights arising under 
the Act by exercising its legal rights not bona fide for its own 
purposes but for the sole purpose of assisting one spouse to 
disadvantage the other, 83third parties may be indirectly affected 
by them. 84 This restriction is necessary because, by the terms of 
s.4(1)(e), the proceedings must be between the parties to the 
marriage in order to relate the provision to the "marriage" power 
in s.51(xxi) of the Constitution. 
Section 114(3) 
A proceeding under s.114(3) constitutes a "matrimonial cause" 
within paragraph (0 of the definition of that phrase contained 
in s.4(1). 85 For the Court to assume jurisdiction under s.114(3), 
it must have before it proceedings other than those which fall 
within s.114(1), which is based on paragraph (e) of the definition. 
Moreover, to come within paragraph (0, the proceedings in question 
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must bear an appropriate relationship to other proceedings of the 
kind referred to in the definition. 86 Once it has jurisdiction 
under s.114(3), the Court may grant an injunction as a step in 
the making, completion or enforcement of those proceedings. 87 
If the proceedings which are supported by an injunction are 
dismissed for any reason, then the injunction itself must be 
discharged. 88 
An injunction under s.114(3) may be either interlocutory or 
permanent in form, but, in contrast with the position under s.114(1), 
the Family Court has no power under s.114(3) to make orders as 
well as injunctions. In appropriate circumstances, the Court 
may grant an interlocutory injunction under s.114(3) in order to 
restrain the disposal of or other dealings in particular property 
pending the hearing of property proceedings commenced under s.78 
and s.79, 89 such an injunction being an aid to the Court's 
jurisdiction. 
The particular value of the relationship of s.114(3) to 
s.4(1)(f) is that there is no specific requirement in the para-
graph that the proceedings in question be between the parties to 
the marriage, so the section is useful as a means of granting 
injunctions against third parties, including family companies and 
discretionary trusts. However, the High Court, in a number of 
decisions, has opposed any idea of directly restricting the rights 
of third parties. 90 
Summary 
It may be concluded that, while the Family Law Act 1975 
provides the machinery by which financial misconduct may be 
remedied in appropriate cases, there is very limited scope to 
affect the rights of third parties. Limitations of a jurisdictional 
nature also inhibit the effectiveness of the Family Court. 
In the next chapter, specific types of financial misconduct 
and the remedies, if any, that are available will be discussed. 
Also, possible legislative reforms will be described. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT RECOGNIZED AS BEING RELEVANT BY THE FAMILY 
COURT IN ITS DISCRETION TO ADJUSTPROPERTY INTERESTS 
PART A  
THE JURISTIC BASIS FOR TAKING FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT INTO  
CONSIDERATION 
Prior to the reforms to divorce law that began in the 1970's, 
it was necessary to show that a spouse had committed a matrimonial 
offence before a divorce would be granted. As Finlay ' points out, 
"(d)ivorce was conceived of on the basis of a .remedy granted at 
the suit of one party to a marriage, whose legal rights had been 
infringed by the other". Under this system, 2 the parties' conduct 
was of immense importance. If the husband were the guilty party 
in divorce proceedings, he would be liable to compensate the wife 
for the loss which would otherwise flow by reason of her losing 
the right to support which a wife enjoyed. Conversely, if she 
were the guilty party, she would not be eligible for such compen-
sation and would thus in principle no longer be entitled to any 
form of support from her former husband. 3 This principle came 
to be modified, first by the recognition that even a guilty wife 
should receive a so-called "compassionate allowance" so as to 
prevent her from being forced into the streets to starve, 4 then, 
secondly, by the doctrine that a wife would only be denied mainten-
ance if her conduct could be described by such epithets as 
"disruptive", "intolerable" or "unforgiveable". 5 
During the first part of the present century, the divorce 
perspective underwent a transformation: divorce was coming to be 
seen as 
... a misfortune rather than as a manifestation 
of fault calling for retribution. The notion of the 
destruction of marriage came to give way to the more 
complex view of the breakdown of the matrimonial 
relationship. This new concept marked a transition 
from the rather simplistic view of a unilateral 
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event and brought with it the possibility of recog-
nising a principle of mutuality in the deterioration 
of a matrimonial relationship" . 6  
It was not until 1966, however, that the Commission appointed 
by the Archbishop of Canterbury 7 and the English Law Reform 
Commission8 expressed the view that the only possible basis for 
divorce was the notion of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 
The Law Commission recommended that divorce legislation be drafted 
in such a manner as to allow "the empty legal shell of a broken 
marriage" to be destroyed with the minimum bitterness, distress 
and humiliation. 9  It realised that, in fault-based divorce 
proceedings, it is difficult to establish the true cause of the 
disintegration of the marital union and to properly allocate 
blame. 10  The disintegration of the marriage in its turn leads 
to a reduction of the joint responsibility which is the basis 
for the conjugal relationship. The longer a union has lasted, the 
more difficult it is to establish the fault which was the cause 
of its eventual failure. As Ormrod J. has pointed out, 11 
"(While), the forensic process is reasonably well 
adapted to determining in broad terms the share of 
each party for an accident on the road or at work 
... it is much too clumsy a tool for dissecting the 
complex interactions which go on all the time in a 
family. Shares in responsibility for breakdown 
cannot properly be assessed without a meticulous 
examination and understanding of the characters and 
personalities of the spouses concerned... 	12 
In any case, the fault might well be the consequence of the pre-
existing failure of 	13 the union. 	It was the view of the Law 
Commission that to use evidence of separation over a certain 
period of time as a basis for awarding a decree of dissolution of 
marriage would overcome such problems. However, the Divorce Reform 
Act 1969 (Eng.) 14  incorporated both fault and breakdown grounds as 
the basis for 	 15 the dissolution of marriage. 	The Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth.), on the other hand, has the sole ground of irretrievable 
breakdown 16 (s.48(1)). To satisfy the requirements of s.48, there 
must be evidence of an intention to separate followed by the parties' 
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living "separately and apart for a continuous period of not less , 
than twelve months immediately preceding the date of the filing of 
an application for dissolution of marriage" (s.48(2)). 17  The case 
of the persecuted spouse requiring immediate Protection was taken 
care of by the provision of an injunctive jurisdiction under s.114 
of the Act. Proof of breakdown in Australia is based, therefore, 
on observable conduct of "... neutral moral connotation"?' 8 
Harrison has sumnarised the results of the introduction of 
the new divorce legislation in the following manner: 
"... (N)o-fault laws have altered the property and 
other entitlements of divorcing men and women by 
removing the advantage or disadvantage provided by 
the commission of a matrimonial offence. The earlier 
simplistic formula of the 1950s and 1960s was that 
proven guilty conduct of one party, such as desertion 
or adultery, was the cause of the breakdown of the 
marriage. Everything that followed, as a result of 
•that behavious (more importantly the custody of 
children and the allocation of property), was 
considered to be linked to it. However this principle 
was gradually modified by legislative provisions 
which required decisions involving children to be 
made with their best interests as the paramount 
consideration, and property settlements to be just 
and equitable. The no-fault premise of the Family 
Law .Act was therefore not so much a radical step as 
the end point of an evolutionary movement". 19  
The Australian community , readily accepted the abolition of 
matrimonial fault as a ground for the dissolution of marriage. 
Gallup Polls conducted during 1973 showed that 79% of those polled 
supported the proposition that a divorce should be granted if the 
husband and wife were to inform the court that their marriage 
had broken down. 20 The granting of a divorce after twelve months 
separation was favoured by 85.2% of the respondents to that poll. 21 
Few submissions were forthcoming supporting the retention of fault 
grounds and opposing the basic change to divorce law which 
22 ultimately became embodied in the Family Law Act  1975. 
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Since the Family Law Act 1975 came into operation, however, 
there have been calls for the re-introduction of fault-based 
divorce. 23  or, at the very least, for the consideration of fault 
in the adjudication of ancillary matters. For example, in the 
survey of property and income distribution on divorce in Australia 
recently conducted by the Australian Institute of Family Studies, 
a number of respondents expressed the view that they believed 
their property share should have been greater because their spouse 
had left them or in some other way had brought the marriage to an 
end. 24 In an address given to an Australian Labor Lawyers' dinner 
in Adelaide, the Hon. John Bray, formerly Chief Justice of South 
Australia, pointed out 25 that there is a similarity between the 
provisions of the Partnership Act and the provisions of the Family 
Law Act which are concerned with the consequences of dissolution 
in that, in both cases,- considerable attention is given to the 
contribution of each of the parties to the mutual assets. While 
damages sustained by one of the partners through breach of the 
partnership contract is taken into account in the winding-up 
after the dissolution of a partnership, this is not the case with 
a matrimonial partnership. As a consequence, many divorced 
people feel :a deep sense of injustice, believing that their assets 
have been "... ripped away from them - arbitrarily simply because 
their spouse has decided-that he or she would be happier apart". 26 
Even if they think . ajudge has mishandled.a case, people 	will 
often put .up:with:an adverse-decision on'the facts after due 
. hearing if they . think.a.proper yardstick has been used". 27 
In 1980, the Senate Joint Select Committee, which presented a 
report on the operation of the Family Law Act, recommended that 
s.75(2)(o) of the Act be repealed and the following provision be 
inserted: 
"Any fact or circumstance, including any. conduct of 
the applicant for maintenance towards therespondent 
and relevant to the marital relationship, which, in 
the opinion of the Court, the justice of the case 
requires to be taken into account". 28 
The recommendation was strenuously opposed by Senator Durack in a 
speech to the Senate 29 and, in 1983, a proposed amendment to 
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s.75(2)(0), by which a court, in dealing with an application for 
maintenance or property adjustment, should take into account "any 
fact or circumstance, including any conduct of the parties to  
the marital relationship, which in the opinion of the court the 
justice of the case requires to be taken into account", 30 was 
defeated without a division of either House being called. 31 
In 1982, Mr. Justice Opas of the Family Court was murdered and 
acts of violence were directed at other Judges of the Family Court. 
These events caused the Family Court Judges and prominent prac-
titioners who were present at a symposium, "Fault and Violence 
in the Family Court", which was held at Monash University on 
5th September, 1984, 32 to reach the conclusion that "... somehow 
the ventilation of fault which occurred under the old system 
helped relieve emotional pressure which would otherwise find more 
damaging outlets" . 33  However, Professor David Hambly, Commissioner 
for the Australian Law Reform Commission's Matrimonial Property 
Inquiry, in a speech to the Second National Conference of the 
Australian Association of Marriage and Family Counsellors, expressed 
the view that the violent events should not be seen as symptomatic 
of a general dissatisfaction with the operation of divorce law 
in Australia. 34 
In its Discussion Paper, Matrimonial Property Law  (June, 1985), 
the Australian Law Reform Commission gives compelling reasons 
against the re-introduction of fault considerations to the law of 
divorce in Australia: 35 
"What is fault? Marriage is the most complex and 
intimate of relationships. Each spouse sees the 
marriage from his or her own perspective; the 
perspectives are bound to differ, particularly in 
retrospect. It should not be assumed that the 
law is capable of establishing, after a form of 
inquest into the marriage, an objective explanation 
for its demise and an allocation of responsibility 
for it. The factors that might bring a matrimonial 
relationship to an end defy categorization. 
... Considerations of this kind influenced the 
decision of Parliament to abandon the old matrimonial 
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. fault basis for divorce. 36 
Impeding conciliation. To allow imputations of 
fault in the breakdown of a marriage to influence 
property •and financial matters would revive many 
of the worst features of the law 	 If the 
law gave separating spouses an incentive to accuse 
each other of marital wrongdoing unrelated to the 
financial aspect of marriage, there would be a 
risk in every case of an exchange of allegations 
which would aggravate the rupture of the relationship, 
with damage to the spouses' self-esteem and (in many 
cases) to their continuing relationship as parents 
II 37 with shared responsibility for children ... . 
Unlike some United States legislation, 38 the Family Law 
Act 1975 (Cth.) does not specifically exclude considerations of 
misconduct. It might be . thought,however, that considerations 
of misconduct are implicit in some of the provisions, namely 
s.75(2)(0) ("any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the 
.. court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account” ), 39  
s.79(2) ("the court Olen not make an order-under this section unless 
it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and 
equitable to make the order"); s.79(4)(a) and (b), which consider 
contributions made to the acquisition, conservation or improvement 
of any of the property of the parties; and s.79(4)(c), which 
considers "the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the 
welfare of the family. ... including any contribution made in the 
capacity of homemaker or parent". 
Consonant with the intention of the legislators, who omitted 
the word "conduct", which had appeared in s.84 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1959 (Cth.), when s.75 and s.79 of the Family Law Act 
1975 were enacted, most judges in early decisions of the Family 
Court rejected arguments that misconduct should be considered 
relevant, 40 for they indicated that a property distribution should 
not be seen as a means of carrying out retribution for matrimonial 
fault. 41 Gray takes a broader, and, it is submitted, a realistic 
perspective on the matter: 
"No weight should be given to matrimonial misconduct 
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which has exerted no economic influence, since it is 
not a valid function of the Matrimonial...law to punislh. 
wrongdoing by the confiscation of rights 'earned' 
through contributions, or to reward virtue by the 
award of a solatium or bonus". 42 
In Soblusky, 43 which was decided in the first year of the 
operation of the Family Law Act, the Full Court unanimously rejected 
a submission that the terms of s.75(2)(o) permit the Court to 
consider the marital history as such of the parties to a marriage 
but it stated obiter that "... facts or circumstances of a broadly 
financial nature" 44 would be relevant in an appropriate case. 
That case concerned an application for maintenance, but, in 
Ferguson, 45 the Full Court held that it would be proper for the 
Family Court, in determining a property application, to take into 
consideration conduct which "... has produced consequences which 
have diminished or destroyed the property of the parties" or 
the effect of which has been "... to cause the recipient of the 
conduct to act in a way which has resulted in the value of the 
property being diminished or in the property being lost to the 
parties 46 
It is submitted that this is the correct approach to the 
interpretation of s.75(2)(o). All other paragraphs in S.75(2), 
except s.75(2)(1), are concerned with financial matters. As a 
major purpose of the Family Law. Act was to eliminate allegations of 
matrimonial fault from the grounds for divorce, it was unlikely 
that Parliament intended, in the general words of s.75(2)(o), to 
retain the concept of matrimonial fault in relation to property 
and maintenance. 47 The Australian position, therefore, sharply 
contrasts with that in England, where the legislation retains a 
fault basis, 48 and where there does not seem to be wide recognition 
of the fact that 
"Watrimonial misconduct should become a relevant 
consideration only if and to the extent that it has 
resulted in a defective or negative contribution to 
the economic welfare of the family, and is thereby 
causally connected with the acquisition, extent or 
value of the matrimonial assets u . 49 
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It is submitted that to take into consideration conduct which 
has had an impact on the finances of the parties to a marriage 50 
is the only just approach in a system, such as that established by 
Australian legislation, whereby an application may be made for 
property adjustment on the basis of past contribution or future 
need. .It would not be just to deny a party compensation for 
property interests earned through past contribution because the 
assets to which the contribution has been made have been disposed 
of or diminished in value by the other spous e . 51 Nor would it be 
just-to deny future maintenance 52 to a party, particularly a 
parent with responsibility for the care and custody of infant 
children, because the other spouse has unreasonably reduced the 
pool of financial resources from which the maintenance would 
otherwise have come, or impaired his or her future capacity to 
meet maintenance payments. 53 
The following comment from the judgment of Carmichael J. in 
Barkley v. Barkley54 is apposite: 
"Financial circumstances of the parties, their means 
and resources, capacities to earn, entitlements to 
Social Services benefits, are the matters to which 
the court has to look. When one party has stolen, 
or borrowed and squandered, the funds of the other 
party, the economic consequences of that conduct is 
surely a matter to be considered in adjusting their 
proprietary rights according to what is just and 
equitable. The conduct giving rise to the relevant 
economic consequence may be a crime, a tort, or 
simply a right to claim a civil debt. I cannot see 
that because 'a result very relevant to the means of 
a party arose from the conduct of the other party to 
the marriage that the result of that conduct is to be 
ignored because it can be said to fall under the label 
'conduct of the parties' .55 
The change in emphasis that has occurred in most jurisdictions 
with respect to matrimonial causes is cogently summed up in a comment 
by Lenore Weitzman: 
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"(The) shift from a fault-based system of divorce 
to a no-fault system (has been) a shift from a 
morally based system of justice to a morally neutral 
system based on practical economic decisions". 56 
It should be noted, however, that many judges have exhibited 
reluctance to hear detailed evidence on even, economic misconduct 
except where it has been of the grossest kind. Wade 57 expresses 
the view that its consideration involves a judgment as to social 
and cultural expectations. Is it a fault, for instance, for an 
executive's wife to refuse to entertain clients or to be seen 
regularly on the cocktail circuit? 58 Is it a fault for a shop-
owner's wife to work only occasionally in the store and should a 
wife be considered at fault if she insists that, for the sake of 
family stability, a husband forego a transfer that means promotion 
and a salary increase? 
Moreover, if conduct relevant to property allocation other than 
that which has led to the depletion of resources were taken into 
account, it would be possible for parties to introduce evidence of 
the effect of the activity of one spouse upon the other. All 
"fault" has consequences, either negative or positive. One 
spouse's adultery, nagging or cruelty may contribute positively 
to the other's wealth where it forces him or her to spend long and 
peaceful hours at work, or negatively where it causes depression, 
alcoholism and retrenchment. To categorise the complexities 
of a marriage relationship in order to weigh up the various degrees 
of economic consequences presents considerable evidentiary 
difficulties. 59 
The emphasis upon negative contributions by the other party 
leads inevitably to bitter accusation and counter-accusation in 
both written and oral evidence, 60 and this escalation of conflict 
is not only costly in both emotional and financial terms but it 
is clearly inimical to the notion of conciliation that is set down 
in s.43 of the Family Law Act. Accordingly, evidence of economic 
fault will be given little weight unless the causal connection 
between the behaviour and the economic loss is clear and direct. 61 
While it is often claimed that family law is immune to 
precedent, it is desirable that principles which can be seen to be 
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common to a particular class of cases find juridical expression. 
As Brennan J. pointed out in Norbis v. Norbis, 62  the anguish and 
emotion generated by litigation concerning property arrangements 
... are exacerbated by orders which are made without 
the sanction of known principles and which are seen 
to be framed according to the idiosyncratic notions 
of an individual judge. An unfettered discretion is 
a versatile means of doing justice in particular 
cases but unevenness in its exercise diminishes 
confidence in the legal process". 63 
It is submitted that the distillation of principles is particularly 
important where litigation is highly charged emotionally, as is the 
case when allegations have been made to the effect that one spouse's 
conduct has had the effect of diminishing the assets to be 
distributed between the parties to a marriage. On the other hand, 
principles must not be allowed to harden into legal rules or 
presumptions, for these would confine the Family Court's discretion 
more narrowly than Parliament intended. 64 In appropriate cases, 
the Full Court will suggest guidelines which may be applied to 
certain types of fact situation, but the discernment of trends 
in decisions at first instance is not as easy because trial Judges 
often use imprecise language or fail to explain why a particular 
decision has been reached. 
In the sections of this chapter which follow, an attempt has 
been made to isolate the methods by which the Family Court is 
likely to deal with particular types of financial misconduct. 
Classification has proved to be difficult, however, and as a 
result, overlap from category to category will be noted in some 
instances. 
In making orders for property division under s.79, the Family 
Court has considered to be relevant conduct which has resulted in 
a negligible contribution to the acquisiton, conservation or 
improvement of assets; conduct which has diminished the value of 
property; and conduct which has impaired the financial prospects 
of a party to a marriage or altered the basis of his or her 
finances. It has also taken into account a failure to carry out 
the duty of maintenance or to meet the outgoings on property in 
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in the period after separation as well as the manipulation of 
assets to reduce the pool of property available for distribution. 
PART B 
CONDUCT RESULTING IN A NEGLIGIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO ASSETS 
That misconduct such as "... sluttishness or extravagance on 
the part of a wife" or "..• reckless gambling by a husband" should 
be taken into account "... where it has had a direct or indirect 
effect on the family fortunes" was recognised by Lord Simon of 
Glaisdale in Haldane v. Haldane. 65 As Watson and Wood SJJ. pointed 
out in Ferguson: 66 
...(There) may ... be the rare or exceptional 
. case where a party has ignored completely the 
basic concepts upon which the 'partnership' of 
marriage is founded. For example, there may have 
been no contribution whatsoever, not even as a 
homemaker and parent". 
Care must be taken, however, not to regard an interest in property 
as a reward which may be forfeited for bad behaviour, or enlarged 
as a solace for reprehensible behaviour on the part of the other 
spouse. 67 
Conduct which has been adjudged responsible for negligible 
contribution to assets includes alcoholism, gambling, the 
squandering of assets through extravagant living and inadequate 
performance as a homemaker. Just as all contributory activity is 
considered to be relevant, correspondingly any deficiency of 
contribution must be similarly relevant for it is causally connected 
with the accumulation of the parties' assets. 
(a) Alcoholism and gambling 
In a New Zealand case, Madden v. Madden, 68 Jeffries J. 
indicated that not only is alcoholism known to be "notoriously 
expensive" but also that it "usually brings about a diminished 
performance on the part of the sufferer". This has been the 
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attitude of Australian courts which have been presented with 
evidence of alcoholism. 
In a decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 
Boyle L.J.S.C. considered a submission that the wife's alcoholism 
be viewed as a disease in mitigation of her failure to contribute 
to the marriage partnership. His Honour was of the view that, 
while alcoholism is generally accepted as constituting a disease 
or, at least, that a factor in its onset can be a physiological 
disposition, it ought to be distinguished from other diseases 
because of its strong voluntary element. In other wards, it is 
possible for the victim of alcoholism to heal the illness "... 
through the admittedly difficult exercise of will". 69 A review 
of the decided cases in the Australian jurisdiction shows that, 
rather than regard alcoholism form the point of view that it 
is a disease or a disability, the Family Court has also looked at 
its financial effects. It appears that alcoholism on the part of 
the wife will be deemed to have affected her homemaking con-
tributions under s.79(4)(c) while, where a husband is concerned, 
it will be considered to have had an effect on financial 
contributions under s.79(4)(a) and (b). 
In Weber v. Weber, 70 Zelling J., "using a broad axe", 
assessed that the amount of time lost by an alcoholic wife who 
was at times unable to do the matrimonial duties which a wife 
"... ought to perform" 71 was something like ten percent or rather 
more than a year in the total thirteen years of the marriage. 
During such times as the wife was in hospital, the husband was 
unable to attend to his work, or at least not as well as he 
otherwise could have done. Moreover, the wife had spent house-
keeping money on the purchase of alcohol. As a result, her 
share in the matrimonial home was reduced . by one-tenth. Generally, 
rather than attempt a decision based on mathematical computation 
in a case where one spouse's contributions are alleged to have been 
inadequate, the Family Court conducts a balancing exercise, using 
value judgments 72 in order to assess the value of non-financial 
contributions to the accumulation of the assets of the parties. 
By looking at contributions to the acquisition of property, it 
is possible for the Court to avoid making enquiries into matrimonial 
culpability. Of course, for a decision to be of any value in 
subsequent cases, the reasons for its particular form.ought to.be  
specified in a detailed manner. 
In both Krotofil 73 and Mead, 74 it was found that the alcoholic 
husband had been a burden on the family business; accordingly, each 
was awarded a lesser share in the assets to be divided. The judge 
at first instance in Fane-Thompson 75 found that the husband had 
given very little financial support to the household for at least 
a decade: although he had worked hard at times, he had dissipated 
significant portions of his income on drink. As a result, a 
considerable financial burden had fallen on the wife, and had it 
not been for her financial energy there would have been no assets 
for distribution. The husband "... had negated his contribution 
by consuming its fruits ,, . 76 Therefore, he had his share in the 
assets reduced to approximately one-sixth of their value. The 
Full Court upheld the decision, dismissing the claim of the husband 
that he had been penalised because of his alcoholism, on the grounds 
that "... (i)nsofar as the husband's conduct was relevant, it was 
relevant on purely financial matters". 77 
Mead 78 provides an excellent example of the operation of 
judicial discretion in the formulation of a financial order. 79 
The husband was given some credit for the fact that, in the twenty 
years or so of marriage, some of his earnings must have gone towards 
the support of his family, even though a substantial amount of 
money had been used for his own pleasure. However, because Asche SJ.•
was aware that it was unlikely that the husband would make any 
payments on a loan to a co-operative society secured over the 
matrimonial home, he transferred all equity in the home to the 
wife. Although she would have the burden of repaying the loan if 
she wished to preserve the property, his Honour was of the view 
that even if she could not continue the payments, at least the 
wife should have the choice and benefit of selling the property 
and receiving the full equity in it. 
If one party has "drunk a little", the effect of this may 
not have led to greatly impaired homemaking or parenting con-
tribution nor to the dissipation or squandering of the family 
income. Cross JA. of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
Family Law Division in Powell v. Powell 80 expressed the view that 
drinking on .a small scale is "... merely , part of the 'for better 
or worse' for which spouses take each other", 81 while Wood SJ. in 
L., 82 another case in which the applicant led evidence as to the 
respondent's drinking habits, pointed out that "... if conduct is 
to be taken into account, then it must be of such a kind as to have 
had some bearing on the financial situation of the parties". 
Economic loss sustained through gambling or reckless speculation 
on the part of one of the parties to a marriage is clearly a 
matter to be considered by the Court if it has had the effect of 
dissipating85 the assets of both spouses. 84 It would be grossly 
unfair to expect the other spouse to bear the continual whittling 
away of capital (and perhaps even the sale of assets or borrowing 
on them to speculate recklessly) on the slight chance85 that the 
family fortunes will be augmented by a substantial win. 86 It is 
not open for a party to the marriage to argue that his property has 
been lost through gambling and that a financial order cannot there-
fore be made against him. 87  In such a case the dissipated capital 
will be notionally included in the pool of assets then be 
considered as having been transferred to the profligate spouse 
as his eventual share, 88 and the'party's future earnings will be 
taken into account in formulating an order (if any) for maintenance. 
On the other hand, alterations in the distribution of property 
or the financial compensation of the other party would not be 
warranted on the strength of a more minor infraction such as mere 
bad judgment as opposed to - reckless spe -culation. 
While lottery winnings may represent a windfall element in 
certain instances, 89 where, as in Anastasio, 90 the ticket has been 
purchased during marriage for the furtherance of the joint 
matrimonial purpose of buying a home (the ticket was called "New 
Home"), the winnings will be considered to be a matrimonial asset. 
Therefore, the husband's expenditure of $40 000 of a $60 000 win 
on holidays and new clothes was inexcusable. The decision shows 
that an individual who wins money or prizes during the course of 
the marriage may seek to argue that such an asset should be 
considered his or her sole property. However, if the other spouse 
can show that the winning ticker was purchased with the money put 
at risk came from a fund to which both spouses had contributed, 
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either in money or money's worth, the asset will not be treated 
any differently from other matrimonial assets. 
91 . Implicit in what the Full Court decided in Holley is the 
inescapable fact that the Court balances matters of conduct covertly 
if not overtly. The wife had complained that the husband had 
gambled on horses, but the Court held that she, too, had an 
interest in horses. Of course, to assess the amount of money 
which has been dissipated in gambling presents evidentiary 
difficulties, as the decision in Blann 92 indicates. There, it was 
held to be an abuse of process for the wife's solicitors to 
subpoena a sample of the bookmaker husband's clients in order to 
evaluate the husband's income. 
(b) Squandering of assets through extravagant living: 
Treweeke  v. Treweeke, 93 which concerned a claim under s.85 of 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth.), provides an example of 
the reckless 94 squandering of assets through extravagant living. 
The husband had lived a dissolute life, wining and dining at will, 
associating with women, gambling and frittering away his capital 
and borrowing heavily. Since there was a real danger of the 
respondent's capital being dissipated, Begg J. ordered that the 
matrimonial home, presently rented, be purchased in order to 
provide necessary security for the wife and children. 95 As 
Cairns U. pointed out in Martin v. Martin, 96  an English Court 
of Appeal decision, 
"(A) spouse cannot be allowed to fritter away the 
assets by extravagant living ... and then to claim 
as great a share of what is left as he would have 
been entitled to if he had behaved reasonably". 
It should be noted, however, that it is doubtful whether an 
injunction could be granted to control the conduct of a spend-
thrift spouse if the marriage were stable and there were no other 
proceedings between the parties unless the other spouse could 
identify the fund dissipated as being his or her own property. 
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It is not for the husband to say that he has earned the money 
and that therefore he should have control over how the wife should 
spend it, for "... (i)n the normal marriage relationship, the 
husband would be expected to leave to the wife the running of 
the household and the expenditure upon that household according to 
her judgment and discretion". 97 
Extravagant living after separation will be taken into account, 
however. The amount of $10 000 that a husband received from the 
sale of a taxi licence and then spent on an overseas trip was 
taken into consideration when a property order was formulated 
since the wife had established that she had made a contribution to 
the acquisition of the licence during the marriage. 98 
Each of the above forms of "financial misconduct", namely 
alcoholism, gambling and the squandering of assets or income 
through extravagant living, possibly involves the use of funds 
held in a joint bank account. 
The fact that money is deposited in a bank account in the 
joint names of spouses does not necessarily mean that they jointly 
own it. 99 The intention behind the contributions will determine 
the spouses' respective beneficial interests in the fund. If only 
one spouse deposits funds, whether or not the other spouse obtains 
a beneficial interest depends on the contributor's intention. In 
ascertaining this, the presumptions of advancement and resulting 
trust are relevant. In general, where both spouses contribute to 
a joint account, it is presumed that they hold beneficial interest 
proportionate to their contributions despite the fact that such 
accounts are widely treated as belonging to the spouses jointly. 
Should the legislature introduce a statutory presumption that 
funds •in bank accounts and similar accounts in the joint names of 
spouses are owned by them jointly, then a spouse disadvantaged by 
his or her partner's dissolute habits would be protected to the 
• extend of half the funds in the account, particularly since the 
presumption would apply in issues between the spouses and third 
parties. However, since the presumption could be rebutted by 
evidence of a contrary agreement between the spouses, its value 
as a protective device would be circumscribed to a certain extent. 1 
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(c) Inadequate performance as a homemaker: 
Paragraph (c) of s.79(4) requires the Court to consider the 
contribution made by a party to the marriage, whether the husband 
or the wife, 2 to the welfare of the family, including any con-
tribution made in the capacity of homemaker and paren t. 3 Nygh J. 
in Parker4 indica ted that paragraph (c) of s.79(4) ". .. refers to 
contributions which cannot be traced into the acquisition of 
wealth, but can best be seen as a claim for services rendered, 
such as keeping house, nursing, looking after children and the 
like". 5 The homemaker contribution contains both a material and a 
non-material component, the latter comprising the emotional support 
given to the other spouse and the children of the marriage. 6 
Not only is its assessment exceedingly difficult, therefore, 
but the quality of the homemaker contribution may also vary 
enormously. 7 It is for the Court to assess the value of the 
contribution in terms of what is just and equitable in all the 
circumstances of the case. 8 However, it is the intention of the 
Act that it should be recognised in a substantial and not merely 
a token way. 9 
To the extent that poor homemaking may lead to an impaired 
contribution, it is open to the Court to examine the conduct of 
the party who claims a contribution of this nature. 10  In fact, 
because of their intangible nature, it may be difficult to maintain 
a clear distinction between the contributions made as a homemaker 
and parent and the conduct of the spouse concerned. 11 Scutt and 
Graham12 claim that if the husband thinks the wife has not done 
the housework to his satisfaction, his information is admissible 
for it is considered relevant to the build-up of assets. On the , 
other hand, the fact that the husband has kept .a mistress during 
the currency of the marriage is not considered to be relevant 
in a property hearing as to take it into account would amount to 
attributing matrimonial fault. 13  They express the view that his 
conduct ought also to be taken into account. 14  It is submitted 
that to do so is only just since such conduct has almost certainly 
had economic consequences. 
In Sheedy, 15 the wife sought to argue that the husband had 
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maltreated her, rendering her task as homemaker and parent more 
difficult, and that such an allegation was relevant to an application 
under s.79(4)(c). 16  It was held that such conduct is only relevant 
where, by reason of it, the contribution of one party was materially 
lessened and the contribution of the other was materially increased. 
The mere argument that the husband's maltreatment made the wife's 
job as homemaker and parent more difficult did not provide a basis 
for admitting such evidence. 17 As Nygh J. pointed out, it is 
possible for one spouse to be personally obnoxious to the other and 
yet be an adequate homemaker and parent. 18 
It is therefore the significance of the contribution made as 
a homemaker and parent which is important, not the reason for the 
contribution. In Richards, 19 the Full Court rejected the argument 
that the trial judge had given undue weight to the wife's conduct 
during marriage, for the decision at first instance had been made 
against the background of the family history and the way in which 
particular assets were acquired. He had made a finding that "... 
in the general context her contribution to the general family life 
and to the assets of the family was minimal". 20 This approach 
is consonant with the view expressed by the then Attorney-General, 
Senator Lionel Murphy, in his Speech to the Senate on 13th December, 
1973, in which he introduced the Family Law Bill 1973 for the first 
time. He said: 21 
...(A) thrifty wife will presumably have done more 
to conserve the family resources that a spendthrift, 
and should therefore receive more than a spendthrift, 
when the family splits up - not as maintenance, but 
in the division of the matrimonial property." 
In Soblusky, 22 the Full Court stressed that s.79(4)(c) should 
not be interpreted in a negative sense: 
"(i)ts relevance lies only in cases where it is 
relied upon by the wife herself as a circumstance 
which the Court ought to take into account when 
determining whether or not to make any and if so 
what order for maintenance (or property)". 
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Consistent with this view is an obiter statement by Nygh J. in 
Pickard: 23 
"A childless wife who sits at home in a life of 
relative idleness may be said to have made little 
or no effort". 24 
Alternatively, in Kimber25 it was held that the long hours worked 
by a husband were counter-balanced by the greater burdens resting 
on the wife as mother and homemaker. It is somewhat strange, then, 
- to find the Court to hold in Aroney 26 and W. 27 that contributions 
are not detracted from by the employment of home help such as 
gardeners. Perhaps the contribution was made in the capacity of 
seeing that they performed their duties satisfactorily. 28 
Just as the courts have distinguished between alcoholism and 
the habit of "... drinking a little", so judges have distinguished 
between the spouse who has "... had some imperfections or 
limitations" 29 as a homemaker, for these are just part of "... the 
hurly burly of married life„ . 30  Generally, it is the wife's 
domestic contribution which is assessed but, since the Act strives 
to avoid any sexual bias, it is submitted that the husband's home-
maker and parent contribution is also deserving of analysis. 31 
Wilson J. in Mallet v. Mallet 32  stated that: 
"The quality of the contribution made by a wife as 
homemaker or parent may vary enormously, from the 
inadequate to the adequate to the exceptionally good. 
She may be an admirable housewife in every way or she 
may fulfil little more than the minimum requirements. 
Similarly, the contribution of the breadwinner may 
vary enormously and deserves to be evaluated with that 
of the other party.” 
However, as Wade 33 has pointed out, there is a considerable variety 
of community standards as to what constitutes an adequate homemaker 
contribution and, apart from the value judgments that Wilson J.'s 
comments introduce, they also have serious evidentiary consequences. 34 
Similar objections are raised by Mason J.'s statement that, to 
sustain a conclusion that there should be equal division of assets 
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of the parties, "... the Court will need to be shown an equality 
of contribution - that the efforts of the wife in her role (as 
homemaker) were the equal of the husband in his", 35 for the 
valuation of unpaid contributions to the marriage partnership is 
rendered almost impossible by the absence of any scales of value 
for such work or even an acceptance by society that such work can 
be valued. 36 
It is submitted that the decision in Mallet v. Mallet 37 leaves 
it open for the husband to lead evidence as to the inadequacy of 
the wife's contribution under s.79(4)(c), notwithstanding what the 
Full Court said in Soblusky, 38 since the High Court disapproved 
earlier decisions 39 in which the Family Court had presumed that 
the contribution of the wife as homemaker should be equated with 
the contribution of the husband as income earner. As Chisholm 
and Jessep40 have put it, there are problems inherent in taking into 
account serious misconduct, or contributions which may be considered 
to be inadequate: to do so means that less serious conduct has 
also to be taken into account, even if to a lesser extent, in 
order to provide a means of comparison. Evidence of this nature 
may reduce the proceedings to a battle centring on the parties' 
animosity towards each other, each trying to score an advantage 
against the other. 41  On the other hand, evidence of contribution 
will necessarily assume significance when the contribution relied 
on as the foundation for .a claim to the acquisition of an interest 
in property has not been as significant as the applicant has 
maintained. 42 It will be for the Court to decide what evidence 
should properly be taken into account under paragraph (c) of s.79(4). 
It is submitted that the approach in Bates, 43 whereby the Court 
made an objective assessment of what, in fact, the wife had done 
in the way of domestic contribution, is correct for the majority of 
cases. No attempt was made to discover why or under what circum-
stances the wife had not performed her household tasks nor was it 
considered relevant that homemaking was performed unwillingly or 
even with a bad grace. In other words, the fault concerned was 
peripheral to the main issue, namely whether a contribution had in 
fact been made as a homemaker and parent. 
(d) ,Summary  
Section 79(4), in specifying the matters to be taken into 
account in determining what order, if any, should be made under s.79, 
concerns itself in s.79(4)(a), (b) and (c) with those matters which 
relate to contributions made by either spouse, directly or indirectly, 
to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property, 
that is, those factors which have enabled the property to be acquired 
in the first place and maintained as a valuable asset. The sub-
sections proceed on the premise that married persons acquire 
property with a view to looking after it and increasing their 
assets. Although they are silent on the question of what is to be 
taken into account where a party, contrary to normal standards of 
behaviour, does just the opposite with property acquired either by 
both spouses or by one spouse alone, it seems only just and equitable 
within s.79(2) that conduct resulting in a negligible contribution 
to assets should be taken into account when the Court is formulating 
an order under s.79. 44 
PART C 
CONDUCT WHICH HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF DIMINISHING THE VALUE OF  
THE ASSETS.OF.THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE 
The Full Court in Antma nn45 in obiter dicta stated that the 
fact that a party has committed "waste" of the matrimonial assets 
may be a relevant fact or circumstance under paragraph (o) of 
s.75(2). 46 It held, however, that considerations of "negative 
contribution" has no place under paragraph (a) and (b) of s.79(4) 
(now paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) as a result of the 1983 amendments). 
.47 Mr Justice Baker in a later case, Kowaliw, 	expressed a 
different view: 
"It does seem to me ... that if a party has either 
by deliberate act or by economic recklessness reduced 
the value of assets available for distribution then 
the resultant burden to the other party are directly 
relevant to a consideration of the respective 
contributions of the parties contemplated by s.79(4)". 48 
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His Honour went on to say. that "... evidence of wantonness or 
recklessness" 49 having economic consequences is clearly a matter 
which the . Court may take into account pursuant to the provisions 
of s.75(2)(o)". 50 That is, wastage of assets caused deliberately, 
negligently or recklessly by the actions of one spouse ought to 
be the responsibility of that spouse alone. 
As defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the 
transitive verb "waste" means inter alia to destroy, injure, damage 
(property); to cause to deteriorate in value; to consume, use up, 
wear away, exhaust by gradual loss; to spend, consume, employ 
uselessly, unprofitably or without adequate return; to squander; 
to fail to take advantage of (an opportunity). In all of these 
senses, to waste assets is to diminish their value in some 
way, either deliberately or through negligence of recklessness. 
With greater care, such diminution could have been avoided. 
Orders under s.79 are based on a strong retrospective element 51 
comprised of the parties' respective contributions, direct and non-
direct, financial and non-financial, to the acquisition, conservation 
or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage. 
Because of that retrospective element, a spouse's entitlement to 
apply for an order under s.79 is an important interest which has 
been building up throughout the marriage. That it is not for one 
spouse to diminish the inchoate or incipient share of the other is 
made clear by the provisions of the Family Law Act which enable 
the recapture of or protection of property which should properly 
be the subject of a s.79 order. 
A spouse may be guilty of neglect towards the other spouse's 
property interests or he may act in reckless disregard of those 
interests. If he or she is neglectful, by extrapolation from the 
52 definition of "negligence" in Donoghue v. Stevenson, he or she 
has failed to take care to avoid acts or omissions which he could 
reasonably foresee would be likely to diminish the property 
interests of the other spouse, who has been so closely and directly 
affected by the acts or omissions that he or she ought reasonably 
have been within contemplation. To expect such foresight on 
the part of most married people is not unreasonable since in the 
majority of marriages spouses consider their property to be 
jointly owned. 53 
Recklessness is a form of mens rea which amounts to more than 
negligence, for the reckless spouse concerned is normally aware 
of the risk of particular consequences arising from his or her 
acts or omissions but he or she decides nonetheless to continue 
them and take the risk. 
Since such negligence or recklessness may affect significantly 
financial matters between the parties, in appropriate circumstances 
evidence of it will be admissible and highly relevant to s.79 
proceedings. 
For the Family Court to consider financial detriment caused 
by the act of one spouse, the other party must have suffered more 
than the normal risks attendant on the ownership of property and 
the spouse committing the act of waste should have been aware of 
the potential loss to the other party to the marriage, yet never-
theless have persisted in the activity. 
The value of the assets of the parties to a marriage may be 
diminished by a failure to obtain rent for a property during the 
separation period; the disposal of an asset during the separation 
period; and by deliberate acts of waste to property. The incurring 
of debts to third parties also has the result of diminishing the 
assets of the spouses. 
(a) Failure to obtain rent for a property during the separation  
period 
The husband's recklessness in Kowaliw 54 in vacating property 
and allowing a prospective purchaser to go into occupation rent-
free for a period of some twelve months, in the meantime making 
no payments whatsoever in respect of mortgage instalments, rates 
and maintenance levies, was not allowed by the Family Court to 
go unrecognized. Baker J. held that the husband's conduct went 
beyond mere neglect; it was both".., commercially inept and 
economically reckless 1155 and he should bear sole liability for 
the financial loss that resulted. 
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It is not difficult to image other situations where one 
spouse, enraged because of the parties' separation, might behave 
in a manner which could be described as economically reckless. For 
example, he or she might fail to keep up insurance payments on the 
matrimonial home or the "family car" or on plant or machinery 
belonging to a business enterprise essential to the production of 
income necessary, say, for the continuing support of the children 
of the marriage. In such a case, that spouse would be responsible 
for bearing any loss accruing from his or her recklessness. 
(b) Disposal of an asset during the separation period  
The disposal of an asset in the period pending proceedings 
under Part VIII of the Act was considered in Kimber. 56 The 
husband, who sold a taxi licence considered to be part of the 
matrimonial assets and who spent $10 000 of the proceeds on an 
overseas trip for himself and the two children of the marriage, was 
ordered to make a cash payment of $26 000 to the wife, sole 
ownership of the matrimonial home then vesting in him. In 
Wilkes, 57 the Full Court held that, where a party disposes of 
an asset which is the subject of s.79 proceedings, this does not 
prevent the Court from taking the matter into account. In the 
circumstances, the proper approach of the Court is to treat the 
asset disposed of as an asset acquired by the parties during the 
marriage and to take this into account in formulating its final 
order. 58 Alternatively, the proceeds of the sale of the assets 
may be traced into subsequently purchased property. 59 
That the Family Court takes an unfavourable view of 
surreptitious sales of property in an attempt to prevent court 
orders being made against that property is made clear by the order 
of costs awarded jointly and severally against the husband and the 
third party intervener, namely the company controlled by the husband's 
parents, in Howard and Howard: Howard Developments Pty.Ltd. 60 
The Australian Law Reform Commission recently has considered 
the problem of such "pre-emptive strikes" as the removal of furniture 
from the matrimonial home by the departing spouse. 61 At present, 
a spouse can invoke the protection provided by s.85 and s.114(3) 
of the Family Law Act only after proceedings under the Act have 
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been commenced. An order or injunction affecting household goods 
can be made under s.114(1) "in circumstances arising out of the 
marital relationship". The Commission favours the introduction 
of a statutory presumption of co-ownership of household goods as 
this would bring the law into conformity with the general expec-
tations of spouses as well as with the high proportion of joint 
ownership of matrimonial homes in Australia. •Such a presumption 
to a certain degree would restrain a spouse from disposing of or 
otherwise dealing with household goods without the consent of the 
other spouse. 62 
(c) Deliberate acts of waste to property  
Even though the spouse in possession of assets to which the 
other spouse may have a reasonable claim, either wholly or partially, 
may be said to be in the position of trustee to those assets, 
either during the marriage or in the separation period, bitterness 
between spouses may be so extreme that one party may commit a 
deliberate act of waste to property. Since such conduct reduces 
the value of that property, it has economic consequences that will 
be taken into consideration. The order made by the Court depends' 
on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
The husband in Page (No.2), 63 infuriated at an earlier court 
order64 to vacate the matrimonial home, damaged it to the extent 
that repairs cost $4 000 so the wife was allowed a credit of this 
amount. In Kimber, 65 the wife's property share was increased in 
order to compensate for the husband's deliberate neglect of the 
former home once he learned that his wife had a claim against it. 66 
Deliberate mismanagement of business activities in response to 
marital difficulties provides another example of waste to property 
in which the other spouse has an inchoate interest. As an Alberta 
court has pointed out, "(a) spouse claiming an interest in property 
is entitled to expect objectively prudent management of the 
business based on evidence of activity prior to separation„ .67  
A party who has exclusive occupation of jointly-owned property 
has a prima facie obligation to maintain it in good repair; a 
deliberate failure to do so resulting in the waste of assets must 
be borne by that party. 68 Thus in Meverthal v. Meyerthal, 69 
the husband having allowed the house to fall into disrepair, 
Allen C.J. took into account the appreciation to the value of the 
house which would have occurred had the husband kept it in 
reasonable condition. 
MacGregor 70 concerned a dispute over custody, but the parties' 
discord was "... transferred to the house itself, so that as the 
marriage deteriorated, so has the house deteriorated into an extra-
ordinary state of disrepair quite alien to the station of life of 
the parties and to the total inconvenience of the parties and their 
children". 71 Since Wood SJ. found that the deplorable state of the 
house was attributable to the husband's obstinate refusal to effect 
•repairs and improvements, and he was to have sole custody of the 
children, the husband was ordered to restore the house to proper 
habitable condition and make good the deficiencies enumerated by 
the Director of Counselling in his evidence within three months 
of the custody order being made. 
Not only did the wife in Cordell 72 reduce the value of the 
matrimonial home while she had sole occupancy of it, but she disposed 
of certain fixtures and items of furniture and jeopardised the 
family business by taking more money than agreed from the till and 
disrupting the staff. Wood J. held that her behaviour was a fact 
or circumstance to be taken into account under s.75(2)(o) since it 
had economic consequences. Except for arrears in maintenance, she 
was not entitled to the payment of any money from a fund held by 
the Registrar of the Supreme Court representing the proceeds of 
the sale of the former matrimonial home. In any case, Wood J. was 
of the view that, since proceedings in the Supreme Court had not 
been transferred to the Family Court, he had no jurisdiction to 
•order the Registrar to make any payments from the fund, even with' 
respect to maintenance. He was also of the opinion that he could 
not order the Official Receiver to pay out from the parties' 
estates any moneys that he held pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth.) because, by virtue of s.78(3), such an order would not be 
binding upon him. 
By a majority, the Full Court in Fraser 73 held that it was 
within the trial judge's discretion to order that the husband pay 
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from his share of the proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home 
the whole amount by which the sale price was less than that price 
which would have been received but for the husband's machinations 
and obduracy over a period of four years. Just before an auction 
to be held as a result of an order made by Carmichael J. of the 
Family Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the husband 
removed a number of fixtures from the property, including a 
garage. 74 Consequently, the auction was aborted and, in the 
falling market, considerably less was received from the sale of the 
property when it was eventually made. 75 
As a result of the decision in Madieric, 76 it appears that the 
Family Court has jurisdiction in some instances to entertain a 
claim for damages in tort in respect of property which has been 
damaged. The wife claimed that certain chattels, ordered to be 
delivered up by a previous order of the Family Court, had been 
given to her in a damaged state. Elliott J. was of the view that 
he could have made further orders under s.79 within the parameters 
laid down by the Full Court in Molier and Van Wyk 77 to deal with 
the claim, but the wife, who had not had legal advice, had brought 
her claim under s.119, which provides that 
"Either party to a marriage may bring proceedings 
in contract or in tort against the other party " . 78 
While the Family Court, like all federal Courts, is constitu-
tionally subservient in the federal hierarchy to the High Court, 
otherwise 
"... it is consistent with the object and purpose 
for which the court was established that it should 
have all the powers necessary for it to do justice 
in exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
in matters over which it has jurisdiction" .79  
By s.71 of the Constitution, it is provided that the judicial 
• powers of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the High Court and 
in such other federal Courts as the Parliament creates. However, 
the jurisdiction within which the Family Court may exercise these 
powers has been limited by sections 31 and 33 of the Family Law 
Act 1975 (Cth.). 80 
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Elliott J. held that the Family Court had both the power 
and the jurisdiction to hear the claim. As to jurisdiction, the 
proceedings were :a matrimonial cause under definition (ca)(ii), 
being proceedings with respect to property of the parties, and 
under paragraph (f), being proceedings in relation to completed 
proceedings of a kind referred to in paragraph (ca) of the definition, 
namely s.79 proceedings. It has been noted already in Chapter 
Five, under the heading "Section 114(3)" that the recent decision 
of the High Court in Perlman v. Perlman81 raises the question 
whether such a connection is in fact necessary. 
Since marginal notes were not to be taken into account in 
statutory interpretation, 82 for they are not deemed to be part of 
an Act, 83 his Honour considered that s.119 should be construed as 
to its plain and literal meaning and not merely as clearing up 
any doubt that parties to a marriage have capacity to sue each 
other, as the marginal note to the section might suggest. 84 
He found the power to make an appropriate order in s.34. 85 
This interpretation of s.119 leaves it open to a party to 
bring proceedings in tort86 against the other spouse prior to  
the availability of principal proceedings provided that the elements 
of paragraph (ca)(i) of the definition of "matrimonial cause" in 
s.4(1) giving jurisdiction to the Family Court are satisfied. 
A comparison of the result in Madjeric 87  with that in Page88 
demonstrates the advantages that accrue from the approach taken 
in the former case. In Page, Tonge J. considered an application 
made by the wife for an order that any - conversion of certain 
shares made by her husband be set aside under s.85. Since no 
proceedings were on foot under Part VIII of the Act (the case 
was decided before the 1983 amendments), the application was 
dismissed. However, his Honour 89 conceded that if the matter 
could be brought within the ambit of circumstances arising out 
of the marital relationship, then he would have jurisdiction to 
entertain an application for an injunction to restrain dealings 
in the shares. 90 
Because of the operation of s.109 of the Constitution, s.119 
of the Family Law Act displaces State laws, which prior to the 
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introduction of the Act purported to define inter-spousal 
liability in tort, that are inconsistent with the tenor of the 
Commonwealth provision. Hardingham and Neave91 suggest that 
in any inter-spousal tort dispute, the exclusive repository of 
jurisdiction is now s.119 of the Family Law Act. They also express 
the view that s.119 does not require that such dispute be litigated 
in courts as defined in the Act. It is submitted that this is too 
liberal an interpretation of the provision. 
It should be noted that the availability of proceedings in 
tort in the Family Court offers advantages over the summary 
procedure which was provided by the Married Women's Property 
legislation, because although a court exercising jurisdiction 
under this legislation had a discretion regarding the making of 
an order for possession of property, except in New South Wales, 92 
it had no discretion regarding the determination of title. 
In summary, it may be stated that, provided that a party's 
act of waste has been deliberate, reckless or negligent and it has 
resulted in a not insignificant diminution of the value of property 
or its disposal, the Family Court can provide a remedy to the 
aggrieved party in cases which fall within its jurisdiction. 
(d) Debts to third parties 
The incurring of debts to third parties 93  also has the 
effect of diminishing the assets to be distributed between the 
parties to a marriage. In fact, the spouse who has legal title to 
most or all of the parties' assets can entirely destroy those 
assets by incurring personal or secured debts beyond the value of 
those assets. 94 In later sections of this chapter, legislative 
reform which would protect one spouse against the irresponsibility 
of the other will be discussed. 
• Certain debts ought to be shared between the spouses. Such 
debts include those incurred with the express or implied consent 
of both parties to the marriage, those whose proceeds have been 
used to benefit family members apart from the borrowing spouse or 
those incurred "... in the course of the pursuit of matrimonial 
objectives". 95 On the other hand, where a debt has been incurred 
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by one spouse without the consent of the other or at the expense 
96 of family involvement, 	that spouse ought to bear liability for 
its repayment. In actuality, a spouse who has had little or nothing 
to do with incurring a debt such as a - loan from a financial 
institution, a credit card transaction or a store account may find 
that its payment may seriously delay that person's access to 
property from the marriage or leave that person in a much more 
unfavourable position than he or she could have envisaged. 97 
Where one partner has incurred the debt (and, according to the 
survey of divorced persons conducted by the Australian Institute 
of Family Studies, this is usually the husband 98 ), and he or she 
renegues on payment, the other partner, who has probably known 
little or nothing about the debt and who is usually in a very weak 
position to pay it, is forced to take responsibility. 99 Further, 
non-asset related debts can be incurred by one partner in the 
period between separation and distribution yet still be taken into 
account by the Family Court when it is considering a s.79 application 
for property distribution) 
The Family Court will disregard debts that are speculative, 
vague or unlikely to .be collected. In appropriate cases, under 
the Family Court's accrued jurisdiction to determine non-Federal 
proceedings which arise from "a common substratum of facts" which 
are relevant to pending Federal proceedings, 2 it may quantify a 
debt. Otherwise, the creditor must apply to a State Supreme Court 
for its quantification. 3  In exercising its discretion to apportion 
debts between the parties, in s.79 proceedings, the Family Court 
can order the spouse responsible for incurring the debt to bear 
sole responsibility for its repayment. However, since property 
cannot be settled directly on third parties in - s.79 proceedings, 4 . 
it may be necessary for the Court to order the transfer of funds 
to third party creditors. If the responsible spouse is insolvent, 
creditors must seek their remedy at common law as secured or 
unsecured creditors. 
It is questionable whether an application by the non-debtor 
spouse for a s.114(3) injunction to temporarily restrain a creditor 
from collecting a debt under the general law will meet with 
satisfaction. If there has been a bona fide commercial transaction, 5 
the Family Court will not interfere, particularly since the High 
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Court's decision in Re Ross Jones and Marinovich; ex parte Green. 6 
In other cases, Family Court Judges have shown themselves to be 
very reluctant to restrain creditors even temporarily from pursuing 
their common law remedies against debtor spouses, whether or not 
the creditor intervenes under s.92 or appears in Family Court 
proceedings. 7 
On the other hand, if a creditor is given leave to intervene 
under s.92 in s.79 proceedings or is allowed to argue the merits 
of his claim without such leave, then the decision of the Family 
Court concerning the alleged debt may become binding by a principle 
of estoppel since other courts may refuse to interfere with the 
Family Court's finding regarding the rights of the third party. 8 
PART D 
CONDUCT WHICH HAS IMPAIRED THE FINANCIAL PROSPECTS OF A PARTY TO 
THE MARRIAGE OR ALTERED THE BASIS OF HIS OR HER FINANCES  
(a) Impairment of financial prospects of a party to the marriage 
In formulating a s.79 order or an order for maintenance under 
s.74, the Family Court, in accordance with the provisions of 
s.79(4)(e) and s.75(1), must consider the matters set down in 
s.75(2) of the Family Law Act. The provisions of s.75(2)(b) and 
s.75(2)(d) respectively provide for the situation where one spouse, 
through direct physical injury or some other means, has injured 
the other to the extent that the injured spouse has not the mental 
or the physical capacity for appropriate gainful employment and 
he or she will in future need to meet financial obligations such 
as medical expenses and payment for special care. If a particular 
case does not fall into any of the categories set down from 
s.75(2)(a) to s.75(2)(n), then the Court has the discretion under 
s.75(2)(o) to consider any fact or circumstance which the justice 
of the case requires to be taken into account. 
The fact that s.75(2)(o) is properly to be regarded as being 
concerned only with the financial implications of conduct was 
recognised in Barkley v. Barkley9 by Carmichael J. of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales. 
164. 
In that case, an assault by the husband 11 had deafened the 
wife to the extent that her future employment prospects were 
impaired. Notwithstanding her injuries, she had retained her job 
as a clerk, however. The Court considered whether the Family Law 
Act allowed it to entertain what was in effect an application that 
the wife be compensated for future economic loss or other damage 
resulting from the assault. 12 Carmichael J., basing himself on 
s.75(2)(b), which inter alia relates to the physical capacity 
of a party to obtain appropriate gainful employment, held that the 
wife should receive as damages for her injured ear the benefit of 
$16 000, an amount slightly in excess of the value of the husband's 
interest in the matrimonial home. In formulating the order, 
Carmichael J. took into account the fact that the wife had already 
prosecuted the husband privately and had obtained an order for $4 000 
compensation from a District Court. His Honour stated: 13 
"I cannot see that because a result very relevant 
to the means of a party arose from the conduct of 
the other party to the marriage that the result of 
that conduct is to be ignored because it can be said 
to fall under the label 'conduct of the parties' ." 14  
Bell J. in Hack 15 made it clear that the manner in which a 
wife had become quadriplegic 16  was not relevant to her applications 
for maintenance and a property settlemtn. He refused both a sub- 
mission by counsel for the wife that he should quantify her property 
settlement according to the heads of damage used in the civil 
jurisdiction and a submission that the wife's forbearance from 
taking civil proceedings against her husband should be taken into 
account in the quantification of orders of the Court. Counsel 
had relied on the fact that Carmichael J. in Barkley v. Barkley 17 
had restrained the applicant by way of injunction from proceeding 
in another court for damages for assault, but Bell J. pointed out 
that, in that case, the respondent had already been found guilty 
of the assault in a criminal trial. His Honour was of the view 
that in the case before him the applicant's cause of action was 
... still alive". 18  However, her quadriplegia was relevant in 
that she was permanently incapacitated for any form of gainful 
employment and would require continuing and expensive medical care. 
While he was of the view that it would be preferable to sever once 
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and for all the financial relationship between the parties, Bell J. 
offered the husband an alternative should he find himself unable 
to pay an amount of $68 000 by way of property settlement and lump 
sum maintenance. The husband was given the option of paying the 
wife a sum of $50 000 by way of property settlemtn and continuing 
maintenance of $50 per week. 19  Since an award for damages made 
under the general law takes no cognizance of the capacity of the 
defendant to meet it, the injured party is more likely to obtain 
satisfaction of an order made by the Family Court for it is 
tailored to suit the respondent's financial resources and his or 
her capacity to pay. The Family Court may order the transfer of 
property to the applicant, the payment of a lump sum or the payment 
of periodic maintenance. 
Orders of the type made in this decision should not be seen in 
the context of punishment for the spouse alleged to have caused 
the injury but as orders made within the discretion of the Court 
to provide for the future needs of an applicant according to the 
provisions of s.75(2), which are incorporated in s.79 by s.79(4)(e). 
It is for the civil or criminal courts to make an order as to 
damages for the past injury should such order be warranted for they 
are better suited to making decisions concerning complex issues 
of fact and relative degrees of fault. 
It is submitted that the approach of the Family Court is 
preferable to that taken in the English jurisdiction, although the 
result for the applicant may ultimately be the same. The Court of 
Appeal's decision in Jones v. Jones 20 illustrates this point. The 
husband had attacked his wife with a razor, severing the tendons 
in her right hand. In formulating an order in relation to property 
and maintenance, the court expressly took into account the husband's 
conduct, although it indicated that the wife was unlikely to obtain 
further work as a nurse because of her injury and that she needed 
a home for the five children of the marriage. Had it looked at 
the financial consequences of the husband's conduct, there would 
not have been any need for the Court of Appeal to have concerned 
itself with conduct as such. 
It is worthwhile to note at this juncture that the apportion-
ment of compensation awarded as a result of civil action may give 
166. 
rise to difficulties where spouses have become estranged. For 
instance, one spouse's contributory negligence may have caused him 
to be seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident and the 
compensation awarded him by the court may be reduced proportionate 
to his negligence. Since such compensation could be viewed as a 
"financial resource" of the parties and since its quantum has been 
reduced because of fault on the part of the injured spouse, 
arguably the other spouse's financial detriment ought to be 
recognised in a subsequent order under s.79. The question of the 
husband's contributory negligence and its relevance to a s.79 
order was raised in O'Brien21 but the case was decided on another 
point and the issue was not resolved. 
In Tye (No.2), 22 the husband's pre-meditated desertion was 
held to have caused the wife's nervous breakdown and hence her 
temporary incapacity for undertaking paid work. The wife had worked 
to support her husband for almost five years while he obtained 
tertiary qualifications and he had then deserted her, claiming 
that after he had settled in Singapore he would send for her. 
Since the husband had no real assets but only future earning 
capacity, the wife was awarded a lump sum of $1 700 as well as 
periodic maintenance for the period of two months in which she 
would be unfit for gainful employment. 23 The decision illustrates 
that the mere fact that one party has caused the breakdown of the 
marriage will be irrelevant to an application for a financial 
order unless the conduct has had economic consequences 24 for it 
is not for the Family Court to punish a party in financial terms 
for bringing about the breakdown. Its function is to give 
financial compensation where this is due, not to mete out 
retribution. 
An Orthodox Jewish wife, whose husband refused vindictively 
to grant her a religious divorce, or "Get", had an award for 
maintenance made in her favour as compensation for the fact that 
his refusal rendered her unmarriageable according to the customs 
of the religious community of wheich she was a member. The lack 
of a "Get" meant that opportunities to remarry and gain economic 
support were jeopardised. 25 Since the husband was likely to try 
to avoid compliance with the Court's order that he pay periodic 
maintenance, the trial judge ordered the payment of interest on the 
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amounts of maintenance ordered pending their payment. This 
approach was approved by_the Full Court when the case was taken to 
appeal. 26 
In the above decisions, maintenance of the injured party 
was ordered by the Family. Court. It is submitted that it is in 
the public interest for the Court, so far as it is possible,to 
place the financial burden of the injury, no matter what its form, 
on the shoulders of the spouse responsible for it. 
(b) Conduct which has altered the basis of the other party's 
finances  
The Family Court has provided a remedy where the basis of 
one party's finances have been altered by the conduct of the other 
where, for instance, the respondent has been responsible for 
resiling from an agreement to sell property; encumbering property 
without the other spouse's permission; spending money on co-owned 
premises without the other spouse's permission; leading the other 
spouse into unnecessary expenditure on legal and/or other expert 
advice; attempting to minimise the other spouse's domestic con-
tribution; incurring unnecessary business liabilities; selling 
property at an undervalue, and being in debt to the other spouse 
or stealing from him or her. 
(1) 	Resiling from an agreement to sell property 
The fact that the wife resiled from her agreement to 
allow her husband, after their separation, to sell a 
certain parcel of land (Whiteacre) in order to finance 
the purchase of another property (Blackacre), provided 
that he did not alienate Blueacre, was considered by 
Asche SJ. in A and A (Breach of Contract). 27 The 
wife placed caveats on both Whiteacre and Blueacre, 
forcing the husband into taking out a loan for $100 000, 
the sum which he had expected from the sale of Whiteacre. 
The husband estimated that the interest lost in this 
way was approximately $22 000 at the date of the 
hearing. His Honour held that there had been a clear 
breach of the agreement and that the resultant 
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financial detriment to the husband should be taken 
into account as a relevant fact or circumstance under 
s.75(2)(o) of the Act in quantifying an order under 
s.79. He was careful to point out that it is not 
always the case that principles of the law of contract 
must be imported into a family law matter, since the 
terms of s.79 and s.75 rest on a much broader basis. 28 
The case before him, however, was a clear instance of 
direct damage being occasioned by the husband and this 
had rendered him less able to pay what would otherwise 
be a proper financial settlement. 29 The wife's property 
share was consequently reduced by $20 000 to offset the 
loss sustained by the husband, since Asche SJ. was of 
the view that it was not necessary to assess damages 
with the same exactitude as at common law. 30 
. (ii) 	Encumbering property without the permission of the 
other spouse 
For one party to encumber property without the knowledge 
and permission of the other is to alter the basis of 
that other party's finances. 31 In fact, if the debtor 
spouse has legal title to most or all of the marital 
assets because they are registered in his name, he is 
able to encumber such property to the extent that the 
other party's inchoate share under s.79 is diminished 
or even destroyed. The Family Court has responded to 
such circumstances in a variety of ways. 
The husband in Kimber32 raised money for the purchase 
of another property by using as part security the 
mortgage on the matrimonial home. The mortgage to 
the bank had been paid off but not discharged so, as 
far as the bank was concerned, there was no impediment 
to providing the funds that the husband requested. 
The trial judge took this transaction into account 
under s.75(2)(o) and included the purchased property 
in the pool of assets to be divided notwithstanding 
that it had been purchased in the husband's sole name 
and it had been sold before the hearing. 
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Nygh J. in Heath and Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation 33 
assessed competing claims to a sum of $26 000 raised 
by the husband as a second mortgage without the wife's 
knowledge. Since .the bank had notice of the wife's 
claim to an interest in the property concerned, because 
the husband had given her impending property claim as 
the reason for his request for the loan and a search 
of the title would have revealed the wife's caveat, 
the bank's interest in the $26 000 was postponed to 
the wife's property claim. 34 
Principally, s.79 orders are designed to allocate 
property interests in such a manner as to recognise 
past contributions. Logically, then, liabilities 
should also be allocated according to the past con-
tributions to those liabilities. Therefore, the Family 
Court may apportion responsibility for repayment of a 
debt according to the benefit each party received from 
the proceeds of the original loan. If a loan has been 
used wholly for the personal benefit of one spouse, then 
that spouse should be responsible for its repayment. 35 
On the other hand, if the other spouse has also received 
benefit from the debt, even though it has been incurred 
without his knowledge or permission, then he or she 
ought to bear part responsibility for its discharge, 
for the Court's concern is with financial detriment, 
not with punishment for certain kinds of conduct. 
In this instance, the debt could be notionally divided 
between the spouses in the same proportions as the 
divided assets or one spouse could be given a higher 
proportion of the assets. 
It is not unusual for a wife to allow her interest as 
joint tenant in the matrimonial home to be mortgaged 
to secure her husband's debts. If her spouse becomes 
bankrupt, normally she is entitled to only a half share 
of the equity of the matrimonial home, for the remaining 
half of the equity will vest in the Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy under s.58 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.) and 
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be quite invulnerable to s.79 proceedings. However, in 
some circumstances, the equitable doctrine of exoneration 
may permit the wife to recoup some of the lost value 
of her matrimonial asset in proceedings before the Bank-
ruptcy Court. 
In Farrugia v. Official Receiver in Bankruptcy; 36 
Deane J. stated that 
"(w)here the property of a married woman is 
mortgaged or charged in order to raise money for 
the benefit of her husband, it is presumed, in the 
absence of evidence showing an intention to the 
contrary, that, as between her husband and herself, 
she meant to charge the property merely as a 
surety. In such a case, she is, as between her 
husband and herself, in the position of surety and 
entitled both to be indemnified by her husband and 
to throw the debt primarily on his estate to the 
exoneration of her own". 
However, before the wife is entitled to payment by the 
Official Receiver of an amount equivalent to the value 
of her property to the extent that it was diminished by 
the husband's debt, she must show that the debt was 
raised solely for her husband's benefit and convince the 
court that s.111 of the Bankruptcy Act, by which "(a)ny 
money or other property of the spouse of a bankrupt 
lent or made available by the spouse to the bankrupt 
shall be treated as assets of the bankrupt's estate...", 
is inapplicable in the instant case. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission has examined a 
range of possible measures to protect the interest of 
a non-titled ("non-entitled" in the terminology used by 
the Commission) spouse in the matrimonial home. 
Alternatives include statutory co-ownership as suggested 
by the English Law Reform Commission; 37 a statutory 
presumption of co-ownership such as that embodied in 
s.161 of the Marriage Act 1958 (Vic.), which will not 
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be applied where there is sufficient evidence of 
• intention to the contrary or where the judge deems it 
38 • unjust in the circumstances; 	a statutory right of 
• 39 occupation and restrictions on dealings; 	and a system 
whereby a claimant spouse may give notice that he or 
40 she has an interest in the property. 
All of the alternatives analysed by the Commission have 
drawbacks but it is submitted that legislation modelled 
on the provisions of ss.6 and 7 of the Matrimonial Homes  
(Family Protection)(Scotland) Act 1982 (Scot.), which 
are designed to restrain the entitled spouse from 
disposing of or encumbering the matrimonial home, 41 
would serve to protect the interest of the non-entitled 
spouse without these being a need to obtain an injunction 
or a s.85 order. Under the Scottish provisions, a third 
party who takes the property bona fide for value without 
notice that it is a matrimonial home obtains a good 
title. This can be established if the owner spouse 
produces an affidavit declaring that there is no non-
entitled. spouse; that the property is not a matrimonial 
home; that the non-entitled spouse consents to the 
transaction or that it has been authorised by a court. 
An entitled spouse who improperly disposes of an interest 
in the home or who swears a false affidavit may be 
compelled to substitute other real property for the 
matrimonial home, or to make monetary compensation to 
the other spouse. 
Such legislation, if introduced to Australia, would be 
better enacted uniformly'by the States rather than 
imposed by enactment of the Commonwealth. To require a 
sworn affidavit - of the 'type described above before the 
transfer of an interest in a house could be registered 
would not be difficult to administer. Since the bona 
fide purchaser would obtain a good title to property 
purchased in reliance on the affidavit, third party 
interests would be protected as well. 
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(iii) Spending money on co-owned premises without the other 
Spouse's permission 
The expenditure of money on co-owned premises without 
the permission of the other was considered in Helliar. 42 
The Full Court held that the husband had no right of 
action against the wife for the moneys used to remodel 
the premises concerned since she had not agreed to 
the expenditure. One tenant-in-common who expends money 
on ordinary'repairs, not being such as are necessary to 
prevent the house from going to ruin, has no right of 
action against his co-tenant for contribution. 43 
Logically, however, if the property in question is sold 
at a profit after renovation, the cost of renovation 
assumes a different perspective and ought to be allocated 
between the co-owners. 
(iv) Leading the other spouse into unnecessary expenditure 
on legal and/or other expert advice 
Unreasonable behaviour by one party may lead to 
unnecessary expense on the part of the other. Not-
withstanding the fact that s.117(1) 'provides that each 
party to a proceedings under the Act shall bear his or 
her own costs, the Court has the discretion to order 
costs against one party under the provisions of s.117(2), - 
which was inserted by the 1983 amendments and is subject 
to s.117(2A), and s.118. 
Section 117(2A)(c) empowers the Court to take into 
account the conduct of the parties to the proceedings 
"... in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, 
inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions 
of facts, production of documents and similar matters". 44 
This paragraph allows the Court to take into consideration 
circumstances such as those which arose in Greedy, 45 
where the husband had presented his case and given his 
evidence in such a manner as to add to the length and 
difficulty and therefore the expense of the case, and 
Kelly (No.2), 46 where the husband did not disclose 47 
anything voluntarily. 48 
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It appears from the High Court decision in Penfold v. 
Penfo1d49 that the Family Court's discretion in awarding 
costs is quite wide. 50 However, it would be unreasonable 
to award costs against a party merely because that party 
has not kept proper business records at a time before 
the parties' separation. An award of costs ought to 
bear some relation to the conduct of the proceedings 
by the parties or to their relative circumstances at 
the time of the application and the hearing of the 
matter. 
Where proceedings have been necessitated by the failure 
of a party to a proceedings to comply with previous 
orders of the Court, the Court is empowered by s.117(2A)(d) 
to award costs against that party. 51 
Where the Court makes a costs order under sec.117(2), 
it is obliged to fix the amount of the costs (0.39 r.19). 
A Judge can do this by considering the evidence of costs 
as submitted by the successful party, and/or making 
an estimate of costs based upon figures contained in 
0.38 of the Rules of Court. If unwilling to make such 
an estimate, then the appropriate course is for the 
Judge to request from the Registrar a report concerning 
the amount of costs which have been properly incurred. 52 
Section 118(1)(b) enables the Court to make an order as 
to costs where it is satisfied that proceedings are 
frivolous or vexatious. 
Costs may also be awarded against a party for refusing 
to make a counter-offer or for rigidly refusing the other 
party's claims, as in Greedy. 53  However, as Nygh J. 
pointed out in Jensen, 54 
"... it is not obligatory on the husband to make 
an offer which anticipates the Court's ultimate 
decision. There must be a certain amount of 
latitude in the conduct of negotiations, otherwise 
one would simply return to the earlier rule that if 
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the husband fails in his claim or counter-claim, 
he pays the costs of the successful wife". 
Where one party has put the other party , to the marriage 
to unreasonable expense by forcing him or her into 
expenditure on expert advice, the Court may order the 
party at fault to pay the cost of that advice even 
though it was obtained without his or her permisswon. 55 
However, before such an order will be made, it must be 
shown that the other party's costs in making financial 
investigations were substantially increased. 56 
If a party has been evasive as to his or her own 
financial position and assets and he or she is unable 
to give any satisfactory explanation as to how moneys 
have been disposed of, a trial judge is entitled to 
make assumptions adverse to that party as to the 
continued existence of such funds. 57 Where there is 
lack of specific evidence that a party has concealed 
assets, but the Court has a suspicion that disclosure 
has not been full and frank, "... (a)t most, if it is 
convinced that the respondent has kept something back, 
it can take that factor or circumstance into account 
under s.75(2)(o) and make a more liberal division of 
the known assets in favour of the applicant". 58 
The lack of sympathy given a party who is evasive is 
illustrated by the statement of Hutley JA. in St. John 
v. St. John: 59 
"Faced with a party whose affairs were tangled 
and who did not give the assistance within his 
power to disentangle them the trial judge in 
my opinion was well entitled to simply take the 
view that it lies upon that party to comply with 
the order". 60 
The failure to disclose a material fact in an ex parte  
application for an injunction has led to the discharge 
of the injunction even though, had the disclosure been 
made, the injunction would still have been granted. 61 
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However, the discharge of the injunction on that basis 
would not prevent the granting of a fresh injunction 
on the merits then established. 62 Such an instance 
as this would cause the other party increased legal 
costs which could be significant enough to warrant the 
Court's exercise of its discretion to make an order for 
costs under s.117(2). 
(v) 	Attempting to minimise the other spouse's u contribution" 
to assets  
The principles of estoppel and illegality may complicate 
the presentation of evidence of past contribution under 
s.79. Frequently, .a husband has attempted to minimise 
income tax63 or evade creditors by representing that 
his wife has been paid regular wages for her extensive 
contribution to a business or partnership, whereas in 
actuality she has been paid little or nothing. However, 
after marriage breakdown, he may deny his former 
assertions in an attempt to minimise his wife's "con-
tributions" to assets when she makes an application 
under s.79 for a property settlement. At common law, 
the husband would be unlikely to be able to retrieve the 
property by giving evidence of his express improper 
intention because the common law courts have been 
reluctant to impose trusts or contractual conditions 
which would assist the improper purpose. 64 However, 
it appears that, under s.79, the Family Court may look 
behind the overtly declared intentions and contributions 
and accept the husband's evidence of what actually 
happened. Therefore, it would be to the advantage of, 
the wife, but disadvantageous to the husband, to take 
proceedings at common law prior to the institution of 
property proceedings in the Family Court where property 
held in partnership by the spouses, the winding up of 
a family company or the severance of a joint tenancy in 
the names of the husband and the wife are concerned. 
The decision in Elias 5 illustrates this point. A 
husband and wife were partners in a smash repair business 
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so that for taxation purposes the income of the business 
could allegedly be divided equally. In fact, the wife 
contributed little to the business and was paid nothing. 66 
After their divorce, the wife sought property orders in 
her favour under s.79. When initially considering the 
common law rights of the parties, Goldstein J. 
commented: 67 
"I thus have to consider when approaching the 
matter of alteration of property interests whether 
the husband can be heard to say to the Commissioner 
for Taxation that the smash repair business is half 
his and half his wife's and to say to her and this 
Court that it is all his." 
At common law, the judge decided that the wife was 
entitled to half of the partnership property, but then, 
under s.79, he reduced the share to about one quarter, 
based upon her "real" contribution. 68 
As pointed out in Elias, 69 it is not open to a husband 
to maintain on one hand that he has transferred part 
or all of his property to his wife as a gift and later 
to deny that any such transaction took place. When the 
gift was originally made, the legal and equitable title 
would have passed to his wife, and he would not then be 
able to claim that he had retained an equitable interest 
in the property. 70 
• (vi) 	Incurring unnecessary business liabilities 
It appears that unnecessary business liabilities are a 
factor to be taken into account in formulating a 
financial order. Murray J. in Kutcher71 held that the 
husband had incurred certain liabilities in his business 
ventures "unnecessarily" and that, accordingly, the 
liabilities could not be taken into account in his 
favour in determining what was just and equitable in 
the way of a property settlement or an order for mainten-
ance. The Family Court will also disregard the financial 
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liabilities incurred by a party if they have been under-
taken in deliberate or reckless disregard of the interest 
the other spouse may be entitled to claim under s.79. 72 
It is submitted that this is the only just approach. 
One spouse should not invest in business ventures on 
a scale which is far beyond his or her •own resources and 
which he or she can only finance by putting into jeopardy 
money or property which the other spouse may be entitled 
to share under a s.79 order. In Royer v. Royer, 73 
a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, the 
wife was compensated for her husband's dissipation of 
assets through "wheeling and dealing" for he had been 
"... careless, indifferent and callous in failing to 
recognize and provide for the rightful share of the 
wife". 
On the other hand, a distinction ought to be maintained 
in the case of losses sustained because of errors of 
commercial judgment rather than reckless speculation. 
Also, in a case where both spouses have engaged in 
speculative activities and both have at times shared 
in the profits of such activities, then both spouses 
should share the losses made. 
(vii) Selling property at an undervalue  
•To sell property at an undervalue 74 when such property 
could be the subject of a s.79 order is a clear instance 
of conduct causing financial detriment to the other 
spouse. The Australian Institute of Family Studies' 
survey of divorced couples to analyse property and 
income distribution on divorce in Australia found it to 
be not uncommon for a business to - be wound down in order 
to minimise its apparent size in the period between 
separation and distribution. 75 In such circumstances, 
if it is not possible to set aside the disposition 
under s.85, it will be open to the Court to reduce the 
property share of the spouse responsible for the sale 
or increase the size of any financial order made to 
the disadvantaged spouse. On the other hand, where the 
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sale of property at an undervalue has been consequent 
upon an order of the Family Court, the Court is 
unable to provide a remedy despite the fact that there 
may have been a considerable financial detriment to 
a party to the marriage. Nygh J. considered this 
situation in Gubbay. 76 The Family Court had made an 
order that the wife should pay the husband on or before 
a certain date some $220 000 plus interest. In 
default of payment,the wife was to sell her interest in 
a New South Wales property and certain overseas 
properties, the net proceeds of such sale to be divided 
equally between the parties. The wife failed to pay 
the sum of money, but she negotiated the sale of the 
New South Wales property, she being the sole registered 
proprietor. The husband claimed $25 000 by way of 
damages, claiming that the property had been sold at an 
undervalue. It was held, however, that the husband's 
claim amounted to a claim for damages for breach of 
trust, the remedy for which arose under State law. As 
Nygh J. pointed out, with regard to the enforcement of 
property'orders, the Family Court only has the powers 
expressly conferred upon it by the Act. 77 His Honour 
held that he was unable to hear the matter under the 
associated jurisdiction of the Family Court (s.33), for 
this arose only in relation to matters which arise under 
Federal laws, other than the Family Law Act 1975, 78 
nor would the Family Court's accrued jurisdiction 
provide the husband with a remedy. 
It is submitted that legislation designed to restrain 
one spouse from disposing of his or her interest in 
the matrimonial home, discussed above in the context of 
mortgages raised without the other spouse's consent, 
would prevent a spouse from selling the matrimonial 
home at an undervalue. Other property would remain 
vulnerable to such dealings, however. 
(viii) Being in debt to the other spouse  
Where one spouse is in debt to the other, opinions vary 
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as to the manner in which such a debt is to be 
recovered. The Full Court ruled in Slattery79 that 
s.79 does not empower the Court to order the repayment 
of loans between the parties, but it appears that s.78 
may provide a means by which certain debts can be 
recovered. In Sharp v. Sharp, 80  Toose J. denied that 
the Court had jurisdiction to order the repayment of a 
debt under Part VIII of the Act. However, he was of 
the view that the Court may declare the existence of a 
chose in action81  and then take it into account in 
making orders relating to maintenance and property. 
Accordingly, he ordered the respondent to pay the 
applicant a lump sum by way of maintenance, taking 
into account in the calculation of such sum his indebted-
ness to her. His Honour then directed that the 
applicant not proceed independently , for enforcement of 
the debt. 82 Barblett J. in Matusewich83  declared the 
existence of an equitable chose in action under s.78(1) 
and then, in exercise of his jurisdiction to make a 
consequential order under s.78(2), gave a money judgment 
to the applicant, since he considered that such a 
judgment comprised a "consequential order" made with 
a view to giving effect to a declaration of entitle-
ment to the chose in action. The husband had sold 
the matrimonial home after the wife had left him and had 
used the entire proceeds to purchase a licensed fishing 
boat despite the fact that the payment of $1 000 by the 
wife to the initial deposit on the house had created a 
resulting trust in her favour. Not only did Barblett J. 
hold that she was entitled to this sum but, on the 
authority of Wallersteiner v. Moir, 84  she was also to 
receive interest on it. The wife had a good equitable 
title to a chose in action constituted by her right to 
recover the monies held by her husband on trust together 
with interest thereon. 
A similar approach was adopted by Joske J. in Schrieber 
and Dixon, 85 which concerned rights in contract, but 
his Honour found the source of the Court's jurisdiction 
to enter a money judgment in s.80. However, as 
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Hardingham and 1'Ieave 86  point out, s.80, unlike s.78(2), 
does not confer any fresh jurisdiction on the Court; 
it merely affords the Court the greatest flexibility in 
the formulation of orders otherwise within jurisdiction. 
Barblett J's approach is to be preferred, therefore. 
There are obvious advantages to the applicant for 
an order concerning a debt owed him or her by the other 
spouse if it can be obtained from the Family Court. 
Under the equivalent to s.17 of the Married Women's  
Property Act 1882 (Eng.), jurisdiction is conferred 
only to resolve disputes concerning identifiable  
property. The court has no power to give what is the 
equivalent of a judgment for a sum of money except insofar 
as it may declare entitlement to an identifiable 
fund. 87 Therefore, a debt owed by one spouse to 
another cannot legitimately form the subject of an 
application under the section, 88 although the benefit 
of a debt owed a third party, being an identifiable 
chose in action, is property within the section. 89 
(ix) 	Stealing property from the other spouse- 
In Burridge, 90  Nygh J., in an obiter statement said in 
reference to . a . provision which Is now paralleled by 
s.114(1)(e): 
"(T)here is little doubt that under s.114(1) a 
party may seek an order for the restoration to 
him or her of property which undoubtedly 
belongs to the. claimant. The very terms of 
s.114(1) which allows the court to make an order 
or injunction 'in relation to the property of a 
party to the marriage' indicates this". 91 
It may be thought that the decision of Elliott J. in 
Madj eric, 92 which was discussed in the previous section 
of this chapter, opens the way for one spouse to make a 
claim in conversion against the other at any time during 
the marriage. However, such an application would not 
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necessarily fall within the terns of paragraph (ca)(i) 
of the definition of "matrimonial cause", namely that 
• the proceedings must arise out of the marital relation-
ship. The mere fact that parties are married to each 
other does not give the Court jurisdiction to hear every 
dispute between them. 93 
The Australian Institute of Family Studies, in its survey 
of divorced couples, found that a high proportion of 
couples had held a joint bank account during their 
94 marriage. 	It also found that, in about 30% of the 
cases in its survey, 95 one party, after separation, 
simply withdrew all of the money from the account without 
consulting the other party. It has recommended that 
the law be reformed to prevent this practice, 96 a clear 
example of theft from the other spouse. 
Summary 
It may be seen, then, that the powers of the Family Court to 
provide a remedy where the basis of the finances of the other party 
to the marriage have been altered vary considerably. However, where 
the Court does have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, the discretion 
that it may exercise under the Act to make such order as it thinks 
fit enables it to tailor the remedy to suit the circumstances of the 
case. 
PARTE 
FAILURE TO CARRY OUT THE DUTY OF MAINTENANCE 97 OR TO MEET THE  
OUTGOINGS ON PROPERTY DURING THE PERIOD AFTER SEPARATION 
As well as being underlain by the concept of contribution to 
the family and to the acquisition, maintenance and improvement of 
assets, Part VIII of the Family Law Act also directs the Court to 
look at the reasonable needs and present resources of the parties 
as a basis for financial adjustment. It is submitted that needs 
and resources have no less importance in the separation period than 
they hold in the period immediately after an order is made under 
Part VIII of the Act. 
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Therefore, a separated spouse with financial resources has 
an obligation to provide reasonable maintenance for the spouse 
with financial needs. Such needs will be particularly pressing if 
that spouse has the care of the children of the marriage. 
That there has been a change from the common law position whereby 
the husband had an obligation98 to maintain his wife and family is 
clear from McCall J.'s statement in Zappacosta 99  to the effect that 
conduct is now seen."... as relating to a fulfilment of (such) 
marital obligations as can be spelt out from the new family law". 
Section 72 of the Family Law Act 1976 provides that a party to 
the marriage "is liable to maintain the other party, to the extent 
that the first mentioned party is reasonably able to do so, if, and 
only if, that other party is unable to support herself or himself 
adequately ..." and, by s.73, that "the parties to the marriage are 
liable, according to their respective financial resources, to 
maintain the children of the marriage who have not attained the 
age of 18 years". 
A Court assessing the order as to maintenance which is "proper" 
(s.74) in all the circumstances of a case finds guidance from 
s.75(2), which, in paragraphs (a) to (0, (m) and (n), concentrates 
on the needs of the applicant, balanced with the ability of the 
respondent to pay. That is, prima facie, maintenance is assessed 
by quantifying the respective needs of each party to maintain a 
reasonable standard of living. 1 "Need" is interpreted to mean 
more than the basic necessities or a survival income, 2 customary 
lifestyle being a principal indicator. 3 
Therefore, when the Family Court is faced with a situation 
where the applicant for a property settlement under s.79 produces 
evidence that, since separation, the respondent has provided no 
maintenance, despite the fact that the applicant has lacked the 
financial means to adequately maintain himself or herself and the 
children of the marriage or, alternatively, that the applicant has 
borne all the outgoings on the property of the parties during the 
separation period, it is only reasonable that the financial 
detriment to the applicant should be taken into account. 4 The 
fact that the Court does so shows the close relationship between 
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"contribution" and "needs" that underlies Part VIII of the Family 
Law Act. 
This approach is consonant with the view of the proper 
functions of the modern law of financial adjustment held in other 
jurisdictions, 5 namely that the law consists of two closely 
related parts, the distribution of assets and the creation and 
enforcement of obligations of support. The modern law is founded 
on a recognition that marriage is ultimately a partnership in 
which the relationship of the spouses is essentially co-operative. 
When the marriage breaks down, the re-allocation of assets and the 
formulation of support obligations are usually integral parts of 
the process of re-arranging family resources in a just and equitable 
manner. 
Where, as in Szelley and Shelley, 6 the husband has accumulated 
assets party because of his failure to maintain his family, then 
the wife should gain recognition when property division under s.79 
takes place. Similarly, where one party, by the exercise of 
extreme thrift, has remained in the matrimonial home after separation, 
preserving the equity in it by paying all the outgoings, as in Mead, 7 
where the wife took in boarders to assist her in meeting outgoings 
on the property and maintaining the children of the marriage, 8 
thenthis is a fact or circumstance to be taken into account in 
the formulation of a property order. 
Further, where a wife has been compelled to leave the matrimonial 
home because of a genuine fear of her husband and as a result has 
had to provide accommodation and sustenance for herself and her 
family of the marriage, this is an economic circumstance to be 
taken into account. 9 
On the other hand, the Family Court has been careful to 
emphasise in such a case that the respondent is not in any sense 
being punished in financial terms, for the applicant has not been 
given a greater share than that to which he or she would be 
entitled. What is being taken account of is the applicant's greater 
financial contribution to the assets of the parties. 10  It is on 
this basis that the decision in Mueller and Hegedues 11 can be 
justified. Smithers J. held that a father's single-handed efforts 
184. 
in caring and providing for his three children, two of whom were 
handicapped, during a nine-year separation period should be taken 
into account. Because the case was decided before the 1983 
amendments, it was not possible for the father's financial 
commitments to his children by way of feeding, clothing, 
accommodating and educating them and paying for domestic assistance 
to be viewed as contributions within s.79(4)(a) and (b) as then 
drafted. However, Smithers J. used the provisions of s.79(2) and 
s.75(2)(o) in order to recognise the very real contribution involved. 
The father's non-financial commitments such as general parental 
care and cooking and cleaning were taken into account under the 
same provisions. Although s.75(2)(o) is to be limited to facts of 
a broadly financial nature, the husband's burden in caring for the 
children had financial implications in that if he had not cared 
for them himself, he would have had to employ a housekeeper. 
The Full Court in V. and G. 14  stressed that the respondent's 
capacity to pay maintenance is a factor to be taken into account. 13  
As a logical consequence of this, it could be argued that the fact 
that a husband who has an obligation to provide for a wife and 
infant children but who, through sheer inertia, has failed to 
seek employment, is an economic circumstance which ought to be 
considered, although in the present economic climate it would be 
difficult to decide whether the husband would have gained employment 
had he sought it. 14 
The fact that the Family Court carefully balances various 
aspects of the parties' contribution to the acquisition, conservation 
and improvement of matrimonial assets is illustrated by the 
decision in Antmann. 15  After separation and until the house was 
• sold, the husband continued to reside in the matrimonial home with 
one child of the marriage while the wife and the other child lived 
in rented accommodation. The trial judge found that, during the 
separation period, no repayment of mortgage instalments was made 
by either party. He held that the continued rent-free occupation 
of the matrimonial home by the husband required consideration in 
deciding the ultimate responsibility for the payment of the debts 
and obligations relating to the property. Accordingly, the husband 
was ordered to bear the brunt of the liability that had accumulated. 
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It appears that a party who has exclusive occupation of 
jointly-owned property, has a prima facie obligation to . maintain the 
i property in repair, 16 although outgoings n the form of rates and 
taxes on jointly-owned premises should be shared equally during the 
separation period, unless there are special circumstances such 
as those which arose in Antmann. 17 
• The normal date for the valuation of the assets of the parties 
is the date of the hearing rather than the date of the separation. 18 
This is so even when an asset has increased substantially in value, 
for example due to inflation or re-zoning, between the date of 
separation and the date of the hearing. 19  There is an exception to 
this rule, however, where the asset has increased in value since 
the date of separation due substantially to the efforts and 
contributions of one spouse only. 20  In Williams v. Williams, 21 
the High Court affirmed that contribution made after cohabitation 
had ceased is a mater to be considered by the Court. 
Where, as described above, one party to the marriage has 
failed in his or her obligations to provide maintenance or has 
not met outgoings on .property since separation, 22 the tendency of 
the Court has been to regard this as a circumstance which ought to 
be taken into account in the quantification of a property order. 
However, it has been careful to point out that the respondent 
is not being punished.for matrimonial fault but rather for a lack 
of contribution to assets. 
PART F. 
THE MANIPULATION OF ASSETS TO REDUCE THE POOL OF PROPERTY AVAILABLE  
FOR DISTRIBUTION 	 • 
Chisholm and Jessep 23  maintain that such cases as Tuck 24 and 
Abdullah 25 should not be seen as creating a new category of "financial 
misconduct", but as examples of the careful analysis that the Family 
Court gives to the contribution that the parties in fact have made 
to the acquisition of property. It is submitted that this view 
patently ignores conduct which amounts to a blatant attempt to 
deprive the other spouse of property interests which are rightfully 
his or hers, or to put the position more simply, conduct which 
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amounts to stealing assets belonging to the other party. 
Admittedly, by focusing on the innocent spouse's contribution, 
there is no need to make an assessment of the other party's mis-
conduct. While this approach conforms with the notion that marital 
conduct should not be at issue where there is no-fault divorce 
legislation, it is submitted that the misconduct to be described 
in this section falls comfortably within the exception encompassing 
conduct with economic consequences laid down in Soblusky 26 and 
Ferguson. 27 
(a) The capacity of the Family Court to affect the interests of 
a third party. 28 
The manipulation of assets to reduce the pool of property 
available for distribution usually, but not always, involves a 
third party. The respondent 29 may allege that he or she has a 
debt to a third party or may arrange for the manipulation of the 
accounts of a partnership or family company or the obfuscation of 
his or her own financial arrangements. He or she may transfer a 
property interest for inadequate consideration or no consideration 
at all or relinquish- control of all assets in his or her name to 
the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy by voluntarily declaring 
insolvency under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.). Finally, through 
the virtual invulnerability offered by discretionary trusts and 
family companies, the respondent may place assets beyond the reach 
of his or her spouse, yet retain all control of them. 
The involvement of third parties means that the outcome of 
s.79 proceedings may have a very real impact on them. For instance, 
a relative or a family company may have a claim to a proprietary 
interest in the matrimonial home, 30 or a claim that property orders 
should not be made which permanently or even temporarily affect 
their interests 31 
It has already been shown in Chapter Five 32  that to vest 
property in a third party may be a very, successful way of keeping 
it beyond the reach of a s.78 declaration or a s.79 order. As to 
partnerships, the Family Court may only declare the parties' 
respective interests in partnership assets; matters such as the 
appointment of a receiver of a partnership business 33 to order 
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the taking of particular accounts or to order the winding up of the 
- partnership will fall to the decision of a Supreme Court. 34 
Unless it can be recaptured by means of s.85 35 or throught the 
Family Court's accrued jurisdiction, property which has been 
alienated by way of settlement in a discretionary trust or by a 
voluntary declaration of brankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act  
1966 (Cth.) also lies beyond the reach of the Family Court. Whether 
or not a particular dispute constitutes a "matrimonial cause", 
in which case the Family Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to 
decide the matter, may be arguable, and for the husband and the 
wife to apply for a remedy with respect to the same dispute in 
separate jurisdictions is not surprising when one considers that 
the remedy given by a particular court may present distinct 
advantages to one party to that dispute. 
Where a third party has not taken an interest in property 
bona fide and for good consideration36 or has acted in collusion with 
the respondent 37 or where the trust or family company is merely 
a "sham" or a "deviceu38  to enable the respondent to avoid his 
responsibilities under the Family Law Act 39 or it is a puppet 
of the respondent, 40 the Family Court has the power to ignore 
strict legal rights and substitute its own order. 
Normally, where the property interests or claims of a third 
party might be affected by s.79 proceedings, the trial Judge will 
order that notice be served on that third party. The third party 
will then have the opportunity to choose to do nothing or to apply 
for leave to intervene under s.92 or to appear before the Court, the 
s.79 proceedings being adjourned in the meantime. The Full Court 
in Anderson41 approved the application of the relevant High Court  
Rules (by operation of s.38(2) of the Family Law Act) so •that 
third parties could be joined in proceedings even though they 
refused to intervene under s.92. This approach made available a 
valuable remedy to be used where third parties have participated 
in a scheme to defeat an existing or a proposed order of the Family 
Court. Further, the Court held that by applying the provisions 
of the Acts Interpretation •Act 1901 (Cth.), it was possible to 
make ancillary orders •against third parties joined in s.85 
42 proceedings. 
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As a matter of substantive law, there is no provision in the 
Family Law Act entitling an intervener who is not a child of the 
marriage to seek in his favour an alteration of property interests 
of the husband and wife. 43 However, Treyvaud J. in Wallace44 
indicated that the Family Court may properly assume jurisdiction 
to determine the issue between a husband and wife and an intervener 
under its accrued jurisdiction. Whether it will exercise its 
discretion to do so will depend upon the balancing of the relevant 
interests of the parties involved and the degree of connection 
between the respective disputes. 45 In its exercise of State power, 
the Family Court will be able to make binding orders against third 
parties whether or not-they intervene or appear in s.79 proceedings. 
If a third party obtains leave to intervene in the proceedings so 
as to contest an "outside" issue or he or she is given leave to 
be heard in relation to such a matter, 46 it would be likely that 
the third party would be faced with an issue estoppel. 47 
(b) Notional debts to family members 
The Family.Court in a number of decisions has refused to take 
into account so-called debts to family members. 48 The wife's claim 
that her father's expenditure of $14 000 on an extension to the 
matrimonial home was a loan was disbelieved in Antmann, 49 
particularly since the father had occupied the extension for a 
period of time up until the time of his death. As a result, the 
50 sum was included in the assets to be divided. 	The husband in 
Kimber51  claimed that his son had participated in the purchase 
of a particular property, and that consequently he had been paid 
a proportion of the proceeds received from its sale, but Elliott J. 
found that the payment was designed "... to mask the full extent 
of his assets and income". 52 Therefore, the entire proceeds were 
taken into consideration when the property order was formulated. 
• The Family Court has considered that a debt to a third party 
should be ignored when it is unlikely that it will be enforced. 53 
In proceedings as to property in af Petersens, 54 it appeared that 
the assets of the parties included share holdings in a company in 
which they were the only shareholders, a partnership between the 
husband and the wife and the proceeds of the sale of some land. 
The husband and his father alleged that certain debts were due to 
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the father from the company, the partnership and the parties 
themselves, although the wife denied that a loan was intended. If 
all the debts were established and paid, no assets for division 
between the parties would remain. The father was left to find his 
remedy, if he wanted one, from the Supreme Court. 55 The fact 
that the husband might in the future have to meet the debt to his 
father was taken into account, however, as also was the fact that 
the bulk of the parties' assets had been derived from the same 
source. Their assets were divided in the proportions of 40% to 
- the wife and 60% to the husband. 56 
(c) The manipulation of company and partnership accounts  
While it is usually quite easy to trace a fictional debt 
to friends or relatives and, in fact, quite reasonable for the 
Family Court to proceed on the assumption that all debts owed to 
friends and relatives are suspect until the respondent convinces 
it otherwise, unsympathetic spouses often manage to obfuscate 
their financial dealings with companies and partnerships to such 
an extent that it is difficult for the Court to recover the funds 
that have been filtered off. 57 
Findings were made in Garrett 58 that a substantial alleged 
debt of $40 000 due from the family company to the husband was not 
in fact due. The inclusion of this sum in the quantification of 
the company's assets altered the value of the company and conse-
quently the value of the wife's share in it. The fact that the 
husband had increased his loan account with the company by lending 
it money saved from his wages while the parties to a large extent 
lived on the wife's earnings made his claim particularly unjust. 
The husband's claim for a debt was based on manipulation of the 
company's accounts so that it appeared that he had made a loan to 
the company. 
The manipulation of partnership accounts by the wife was 
considered by Nygh J. in Pickard. 59 His Honour stated that "... 
(t)o the extent that the wife has appropriated for her own use 
moneys or assets which belong to the parties jointly or to the 
husband solely, she is bound to make restitution. The same applies 
of course in reverse". The wife, in her capacity as bookkeeper for 
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her husband's pharmacy, acting with his tacit consent, had 
extracted money which she placed in bank accounts over which she 
had control. She argued that this raised a presumption of advance-
ment from her husband or, alternatively, that the well-known 
principle applied that a man cannot turn around and say that his 
property was put in his wife's name simply for the purpose of 
evading taxation '. 60 The wife further argued that the husband, in 
allowing her to draw the money out of the business and place it 
in her accounts, was party to an illegal conspiracy to defraud the 
Commissioner of Taxation. Therefore, she claimed, the principle 
of in pan i delicto potior est conditio defendentis applied and 
the law would not enforce a claim to moneys accumulated in fraud 
of the revenue. 61  His Honour held, however, that any presumption 
of advancement is easily rebutted when assets placed in the sole 
name of one spouse are used or acquired for the joint use of both 
spouses. 62 Evidence had been given by the wife that she regarded 
both the savings account and the cheque account as joint accounts, 
the cheque account being used as a source of housekeeping moneys. 
It was not open for her to assert now that they were her sole 
accounts. The issue having been resolved by the rebuttal of the 
presumption of advancement, the questions whether the husband 
allowed money to be placed in the wife's accounts to evade 
taxation and whether there was any need to plead any alleged 
illegality did not arise. 
The husband in Tuck 63 gave himself 'considerable financial 
advantages by manipulating accounts. Moneys 'whichbelonged to 
the partnership.' the' parties - had in a .pharmacy were . diverted by 
• various means to the husband - after.the separation of the parties 
and invested for his sole-benefit,.with the result that, by the 
time of. the . hearing,. there was-a'considerable imbalance in favour 
of the husband. The Full Court took. account of the fact that the 
parties,' both pharmacists, had started out as equal partners in the 
partnership, and that the -wife had made a contribution as a parent 
and homemaker. It was of the opinion 'that the manipulation of 
the accounts by . thethusband- was a factor to be considered under 
s.75(2)(o), regardless of Whether the' wifehad a remedy under the 
general law. As a matter - of partnership law, every partner must 
account to the partnership for any benefit derived by him or her 
without the consent -of the other partners from any-use made of the 
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partnership property or business connections. 64 In this context, 
it is immaterial that the benefit was derived after the partnership 
has ceased to exist. 65 Therefore, the Full Court did not allow 
itself to be side-tracked from the realities of the situation in 
the case where Mr. Tuck had interposed corporate ownership between 
the original joint ownership of assets by the husband and the wife 
and their ultimate ownership by himself. 
While the majority of the High Court in Re Ross-Jones; ex parte  
Beaumont66 held that the Family Court could not make orders under 
pure partnership law for the appointment of a receiver for the 
purpose of winding up the partnership, paying creditors, the taking 
of accounts and so on, the High Court nevertheless held that the 
Family Court, either by way, of injunction or under s.79, could 
make orders for the protection of the property of a party. By 
drawing on the powers granted to it by s.80, the Family. Court, in 
formulating its order under s.79, could appoint a receiver. However, 
the receiver so appointed, the High Court said, would lack the 
powers of a receiver appointed by a State Supreme Court under 
Partnership legislation, for he would be unable to make a determin-
ation of claims made, by other persons against the partnership. 
Since the decision in Beaumont (supra.), however, there have 
been decisions of the High Court 67 concerning the accrued juris-
diction of Federal Courts and these have enabled an expansion of the 
Family Court's jurisdiction. 68 While a Federal Court will not 
exercise its jurisdiction over a non-federal matter if the "... 
federal claim ... is a trivial or insubstantial aspect of the 
controversy", 69 where a question about a partnership arises in 
association with a "matrimonial cause", it is arguable that the 
Family Court, in exercising its discretion to assume an accrued 
jurisdiction, could entertain an application for the appointment 
of a receiver to wind up a partnership under State Partnership 
legislation. 
In Hayes, TO  it was pointed out that the Family Court's powers 
to declare partnership interests under s.78 or s.79 are incidental 
only, jurisdiction arising under paragraph (0 of the definition 
of "matrimonial cause" in s.4(1) rather than under paragraph (ca). 71 
Further, any declaration made by the Family Court as to the parties' 
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respective interests in a partnership will not be binding upon 
third parties (s.78(3)). 72 
In his dissenting judgment in Ascot Investments Ptv.Ltd. v. 
Harper and Harper, 73 Murphy J. referred to the fact that the 
evidence of the husband's extensive financial dealings with the 
family company over which he exercised effective control led to 
the inference (particularly in the light of his evasions and 
refusals to answer questions put to him) that he was channelling 
from the company to himself through another company known as 
Parkvale tens of thousands of dollars which he was spending on 
racehorses, gambling and other pursuits. The majority of the 
Court, however, refused to lift the corporate veil and the husband's 
machinations were unchecked. 
Garrett 74 illustrates two further methods by which accounts 
may be manipulated so that the pool of assets is diminished. In 
order to minimise taxation the value of stock as disclosed on 
the balance sheets of the family company had been under-stated 
generally. The business actually yielded much greater benefit 
than the profit and loss accounts suggested. Further, by a 
system of "transfer pricing", the husband was able to move certain 
company capital offshore to Hong Kong. A company was set up in 
Hong Kong and used for the purpose of establishing credit there 
for taxation purposes. Shares in the company were held by a 
trust in which the husband and the two children (but not the 
wife) were beneficiaries and in respect of which the husband was 
the appointor. The benefits were obtained by ordering goods from 
suppliers from the office of an import company in Australia for 
the ultimate use of that company yet invoicing the goods to the 
Hong Kong company as purchaser. The Hong Kong company as seller 
then invoiced the goods to the Australian company at a higher price. 
The Hong Kong company had no employees in Hong Kong and profits 
accumulated there were subject to a tax rate of 15% only. 
According to counsel for the wife's submission, the net worth of 
the amounts held in Hong Kong was about $86 000. The husband 
claimed there was $10 000 less than this, but the Full Court held 
that the wife's counsel's submission was borne out by evidence 
and should be accepted. The sum was taken into account as a 
financial resource of the husband. 
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The Family Court may be able to deal with the situation where 
accounts have been manipulated, or there is a chance that property 
may be disposed of, by issuing a restraining injunction. 
While it is "... a very serious curtailment of rights to 
deprive any person of the freedom to deal with his or her property 
as that person wishes,, , 75  and the Full Court in McCarnev 76 
realised this, a failure to impose any legal restriction on an 
unsympathetic spouse with property could easily frustrate a well-
founded s.79 claim by the other spouse. It was made clear by the 
Full Court in Tansell 77 that, in appropriate circumstances, an 
injunction could be made under s.114(1) to restrain a spouse from 
dealing with his or her property until such time as an application 
can be made under s.79. Finally, in Sieling, 78 the Full Court, by 
a majority, adopted a realistic rather than a legalistic approach to 
the question. The majority, Evatt CJ. and Marshall J., took the 
view that during marriage, a spouse, as it were, gains "credits" 
towards a future application under s.79 to the extent that the 
criteria in s.79(4) are met. Such "incipient" or "inchoate" rights 
should entitle a spouse to an injunction to restrain the other 
spouse from dealing with his or her property until such time as an 
application could be made under. s.79. 79 In reply to Asche SJ.'s 
dissenting judgment to the effect that it would be wrong to allow 
proceedings under s.114(1) to be determined by reference to a right 
of variation which has not arisen and may never arise, 80 the 
other two Judges held that an injunction could be discharged at a 
later date if it were found to be inappropriate. In the meantime, 
it would provide a safeguard for incipient rights under s.79. 
While the majority's statements were strictly obiter, they have 
been held since to correctly state the law on this subject. 81 
82 . In Stowe, 	it was established that, for a Sieling injunction 
to be validly imposed, "... there must be established an actual 
or potential claim enforceable under s.79 and a real danger that 
the claim may be defeated or prejudiced unless an injunction is 
granted" and the Court must also consider "... the probability of 
success of the applicant in the proceedings and the balance of 
convenience between the parties" . 83  
The development of the equitable remedy known as a "Mareva 
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injunction" enables the Family Court to freeze assets which may 
be moved outside the jurisdiction just as a "Sieling" injunction 
allows it to control the disposition of assets within the juris-
diction. In just over, a decade, since its development in the 
Commercial Court in London in the mid-1970's, 84 the Mareva 
injunction has become established as a powerful remedy to prevent 
respondents from frustrating judgments by removing or dissipating 
assets. Particular impetus for its development came with the 
increasing complexity of commercial dealings and the speed with 
which, by electronic transfer, bank balances can be transferred 
from one country to another or, locally, from one banking corporation 
to an entirely different one, in order to achieve anonymity and to 
put funds out of reach of a creditor. The Mareva injunction's 
potential in the matrimonial jurisdiction for controlling the 
financial machinations of a disenchanted spouse is obvious. 
To obtain suchan injunction, the applicant must. persuade the 
Court in his or her evidence that. the respondent is removing, or 
there is a real risk that he or'she is.about - to-remove, 95 assets 
from the jurisdiction - to avoid the possibility of a judgment.or 
that he or she is otherwise dissipating or disposing of assets in 
a manner clearly distinct from his. or her usual orordinary course 
of business or way of living so as to render - the possibility of 
further tracing of the assets remote, if not impossible, whether 
factually or legally. 
It is frequently obtainedex parte and It may be granted 
before the- issue and service of proceedings,upon -a respondent. In 
effect, the Mareva injunction freezes the respondent's assets for 
the specific purpose of ensuring .that, if and when the applicant 
.gets his judgment,. the assets. will be available to satisfy that 
judgment. It .therefore establishes priority over other 
possible creditors, contrary to ;the long-established tradition of 
English and .Australian . courts that . to.do this is impermissible: 86 
However, English courts will freezeno more of the defendant's 
assets than the amount required to satisfy the eventual judgment 
debts. 87 
If a Mareva injunction is sought in respect of an asset which 
is identified with precision, as in the case of money in an 
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unidentified bank account, the Court may require the;applicant to 
give an undertaking to pay the reasonable costs of a person other 
than the respondent in ascertaining whether any asset is his or 
her possession or control. 88 The injunction will not be granted 
it it is likely to affect a third party's freedom of action and/or 
freedom of trade. 89 
In relation to the admissibility of banking records for the 
purpose of establishing the true status of the respondent's 
financial affairs, whether for an injunction or any order under the 
Act, the Evidence Act 1905 (Cth.) "covers the field"; it excludes 
the provisions of the States' Evidence legislation and it applies 
to proceedings under the Family Law Act. A distinction must be 
drawn, however, between banking records simpliciter (for example, 
bank statements and records of banking transactions) on the one 
hand and the contents of a bank file relating to a customer on the 
other: the former are admissible but the latter are not. 90 
Where property and assets have been transferred overseas, the 
Family Court has no jurisdiction in respect of the title to or 
possession of that land or those assets. 91 If the Court has 
jurisdiction over the parties, it should take the existence of 
property abroad into account in contemplating what order should be 
made under s.79, although the decision in Garrett 92 suggests that 
it will be considered in the context of "financial resources" 
within the terms of s.75(2)(b). Whilst the Court can order a 
party over whom it has jurisdiction to transfer the title to 
property situated overseas as a matter of personal obligation, it 
cannot in the case of refusal have recourse to s.84. 93 
It is difficult to trace property held overseas where the 
spouse has taken adequate precautions. For example, people engaged 
in the travel industry occasionally collect their commissions off-
shore; employees of multi-national businesses sometimes receive 
a proportion of their salaries or other benefits overseas; and 
businessmen can often arrange for money to be left for them in 
overseas bank accounts. Generally, such hidden assets are 
unlikely to be detected. 94 
. 	95 Hawkins 	claims that accountants have reacted to the 
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increasing divorce rate by securing "... the business assets in 
such a way that the husband has control of those assets and control 
over the distribution of the income arising from those assets". 95 
Response to the Australian Law Reform Commission's discussion paper, 
Matrimonial Property Law, 97 as well as to the Australian Institute 
of Family Studies' survey of divorced couples to analyse property 
and income distribution on divorce in Australia,98  has indicated 
a widespread difficulty in obtaining information about a spouse's 
business assets. 99 The appointment by the Family Court of skilled 
auditors to investigate claims of non-disclosure or manipulation 
of accounts with the costs of such investigation being shared 
equally by the parties to the marriage from the proceeds of the 
property settlement made between them would be desirable. 1 
The Full Court in Poulo s2 considered the husband's contention 
that Maxwell J's findings as to the way in which he had moved assets 
around to suit his interests and convenience were not open to the 
Court because these matters were not put to him in cross-examination 
so as to give him an opportunity to answer them. The trial judge 
had found that the husband had not only manipulated assets between 
companies and a family trust to meet whatever purposes he had at 
hand but also, once the wife brought a property application before 
the Court, he had tried to distance himself from the companies, 
relying on the legal entitlements of i the shareholders 3 in order to 
minimise the assets available for the settlement of property in 
favour of his wife. 4 Maxwell J. was also of the opinion that the 
husband might well have siphoned off funds and that these would 
become available to him once the danger of the proceedings had 
passed. The Full Court held that the extent of the parties' 
involvement in the companies and the trust and the way in which the 
assets of these entities were used were clearly relevant to the 
ultimate decision of the Court, so that the failure to cross-
examine on particular aspects of the movement of assets was not 
a breach of natural justice. 
(d) Transfer of property for inadequate consideration or for 
lack of consideration 
Transfer of property for inadequate consideration or for no 
consideration at all is another means by which the pool of property 
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available for distribution is diminished. 5 The husband in V. and  
G., 4 notwithstanding an order restraining him from dealing with or 
disposing of his interest in the matrimonial home, he then being 
sole owner, had transferred a half-interest in the home to his 
second wife. The trial judge had set aside the disposition under 
s.85 as being likely to defeat the wife's claim for a property 
settlement. The Full Court approved 7 his decision to do so, and 
added that since the transfer had been made in breach of an injunc-
tion, the Court had the power in any case to set aside the trans-
action. There are obiter dicta to the effect that this would be 
so where no consideration had passed, although, of course, the 
consideration provided by the second wife's marriage to the 
respondent was sufficient in the case before the Court. 
There was evidence in Cullen8  that the transferee would later 
return the disposition at the disponor's convenience. The wife, 
after separation, executed transfers of her interests in two 
properties, one of which was the matrimonial home, to her mother. 
The husband applied for, and was granted, an order to prevent 
the mother from lodging the transfer of the wife's interest in 
the matrimonial home. for registration. According to Jowitt's 
Dictionary of English Law (1959), 
"The terms 'disposition' and 'devolution' comprehend 
and exhaust every mode by which property can pass, 
whether by act of the parties or by the operation 
of law". 
It is clear that for a disponor to retain any interest in the 
property purportedly disposed of is to nullify the so-called 
disposition. Therefore, the purported transfers made to the 
wife's mother in Cullen9 and to Mr Jaya in Abdullah 10 were shams 
and the transactions conferred no interest. 
(e) Severance of a joint tenancy ll 
Since a property held as a joint tenancy is in law and equity 
held in equal shares, whatever the level and source of contribution, 12 
and the principle of jus accrescendi applies as between the joint 
tenants, obviously the severance of the joint tenancy 13 will hold 
attractions for a spouse who has become disenchanted with his or her 
partner and who wants freedom of testation regarding his or her 
interest in it. 
Because of the important advantages offered by a joint tenancy, 14 
to effect severance, certain rules must be followed. 15 Severance by 
mutual consent 16  will be of no concern in the present context, except, 
of course, where one party's will has been overborne by duress exerted 
by the other, 17  in which case a remedy is provided by the provisions 
of s.79A(1)(a) of the Family Law Act. 18 A joint tenant may operate 
upon his own share so as to create a severance of that share by an 
inter vivos disposition; a party may seek an order for sale and par-
tition under State partition and sale legislation 19 or more likely, 
since the 1983 amendments to the Act, under the provisions of Sections 
78 and 79 of the Family Law. Act, 20  or severance will be effected by 
a course of dealing inconsistent with the notion of joint tenancy. 
Severance of a joint tenancy by alienation can be effected by one 
joint tenant without the consent, or even the knowledge, of the 
other. 21 For the other spouse who has a claim based on contribution 
under s.79(4)(a), (b) and (c) for a share of the joint assets greater 
than fifty percent, alienation clearly amounts to the making of an 
instrument or disposition which is designed to defeat an anticipated 
order in s.79 proceedings. Provided that the requirements of s.85(1) 
are met, and that the interests of a "bona fide purchaser or other 
person interested" can be protected, the Family Court can provide a 
remedy. 22 The Family Law Amendment Act 1983, by amending the defini-
tion of "matrimonial cause" in paragraph (ca) of s.4(1) of the prin-
apal Act, has extended the jurisdiction of the Family Court 23  in its 
application of the provisions of s.85. Provided that proceedings in 
relation to property "arising out of the marital relationship" are 
brought concurrently, a party can apply to have the disposition set 
aside without having to wait until principal proceedings can be taken. 
The Family Court can order the disponee/third party to execute a 
transfer of property or discharge a mortgage if the disposition has 
been set aside under s.85. 24 Should the disponee/third party fail 
to comply with such an order, then a Registrar of the Court may be 
authorised to execute the document on his or her behalf under s.84. 25 
However, to obviate the need for a spouse to make an appliction to 
the Family Court for relief where the other spouse has alienated his 
or her share in a joint tenancy, it is submitted that the enactment 
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of legislation similar to that introduced in Saskatchewan is desir-
able. The Saskatchewan legislation deprives a joint tenant of his 
or her freedom to alienate his or her interest by requiring that no 
instrument shall operate to effect the severance until it is regis-
tered and that no instrument purporting to transfer the share or 
interest of a joint tenant shall be registered until it is accompanied 
by the written consent of the other joint tenant. 
A joint severance will not be effected by a unilateral expres-
sion of intenti 0n, 26 nor by one party's drafting a will attempting 
to devise his or her interest in a joint tenancy. It has recently 
been held that one joint tenant may sever a joint tenancy by means of 
a unilateral declaration of intention communicated to the other joint 
tenant 27 or by one joint tenant executing a form of transfer trans-
ferring his or her share of the joint tenancy to himself or herself 
as a tenant-in-common. 28  However, should such a disposition be 
designed to defeat an anticipated order under s.79, it will be 
vulnerable to proceedings taken under s.85 (supra.), if such are 
available. A joint tenancy will be severed by any course of dealings 
which are detrimental to its value 29  or inconsistent with the notion 
that the property is held in equal shares. A sale of property under 
the writ of fieri facias would therefore sever the joint tenancy, 
the purchaser taking the interest as a tenant-in-common. 
(f) The filing of a debtor's petition under the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth.) 
If a party to a marriage is bankrupt, no property application 
may be brought against the bankrupt, since all the bankrupt's pro-
perty, save for limited exceptions, has been vested in the Official 
Receiver in Bankruptcy. 30 However, since an early or an earlier dis-
charge from bankruptcy, in all the circumstances, may constitute a 
desirable objective and be "for the benefit of" a party within the 
terms of s.79(1), a claim for a property settlement under the Family 
Law Act is not of such a nature as to vest in the bankrupt's Official 
Receiver. 31 Anomalously, a maintenance agreement which has been 
registered under s.86 of the Family Law Act can defeat creditors 
under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.), s.123(6) of which provides 
that nothing in that Act invalidates a transfer, disposition or 
assignment in respect of a registered maintenance agreement. 32 
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The effectiveness of filing a debtor's petition under the Bank-
ruptcy Act so that thewhole of the debtor's assets vest in the 
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy is illustrated by the result in 
Moncada. 33 In November, 1980, the Family Court ordered the husband 
to pay $35 000 to the wife by way of ,property settlement within one 
month. The sum was not paid, and in March, 1981, the husband put all 
his assets beyond his control by vesting them in the Official Trustee. 
The wife brought contempt proceedings in the Family Court, but while 
Baker J. found that he had jurisdiction to hear contempt proceedings 
and that the order of the Family Court made in November, 1980, was a 
judgment debt and enforceable as such, he held that the debt was 
provable under the Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, pursuant to s.58(3) 
of that Act, it was not competent for the wife to enforce any remedy 
against either the person or the property of the bankrupt husband in 
respect of the Family Court of Western Australia's order. This was 
the case even though the debtor's petition was clearly a sham, 34 for 
Ferrier J. in an earlier hearing had found that the husband had 
either in his possession or under his control assets in the vicinity 
of $70 000. In an obiter statement, however, Baker J. said that had 
the wife wished to proceed to enforce an order for maintenance, the 
Family Court could have provided a remedy under Part XIII of the 
• Family Law Act provided that the amount of the arrears which had 
accumulated pursuant to the order had been specified with particularity 
and provided that the maintenance order had been registered in the 
Family Court by the filing of a sealed copy. 
Wallmann35  i llustrates an ingenious, but unsuccessful, attempt 
to avoid the consequences of a respondent's bankruptcy. Counsel for 
the wife submitted that the binding of the doctrine of lis pendens  
on the Official Trustee, in whom all the husband's property had been 
vested under a sequestration order, prevented any ouster of the 
Family Court's jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of a property 
application under s.79. However, the Court held that, since the 
Family Court's powers to alter property interests are purely discre-
tionary, an application for property settlement under the Family Law 
Act is an action in personam and not in rem, and therefore the 
doctrine of us pendens does not apply. 
As to a subsequent bankruptcy, Nygh J. held in Whitaker 36 that 
the Family Court's powers to "restrain the making of an instrument or 
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disposition by or on behalf of, or by direction or in the interests 
of, a party" under s.85(1) or, by the use of s.114(3), to restrain 
a disposition of the property concerned by a third party in a case not 
directly falling within the provisions of s.85(1), are not defeated 
or superseded. However, while the Family Court has a discretion under 
s.85 to set aside an assignment of property to a trustee under Part X 
of the Bankruptcy Act, 37 the Full Court observed in Milland, 38 in 
which the wife had complained that the Deed of Assignment was "a 
property settlement avoidance scheme", that it must consider 
. the consequences to the debtor (which could involve 
sequestration of his estate); the position of creditors; 
the question of delay; the question as to whether (the 
applicant) had a suitable remedy under the Bankruptcy 
Act 1966; notification of creditors; the fact that the 
Family Court would be intruding into a field of law 
normally the province of another court; (and) the fact 
that there must be a significant benefit to result to the 
applicant under s.85". 
The Deed was, in fact, set aside, the Full Court observing that the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.) did not give the Federal Court exclusive 
jurisdiction over Deeds. 
It should be noted that sections 222, 236 and 242 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.) provide a limited basis for setting aside a 
deed or debtor's petition provided that the Bankruptcy Court is 
satisfied that terminating the deed would be in the interests of 
creditors. The interests of a spouse who is a maintenance creditor, 
or a putative creditor,under s.79 of the Family Law Act are not 
recognised. In fact, the bankrupt's spouse is prohibited from voting 
at the creditors' meeting held to decide upon a Deed of Arrangement, 
despite the fact that the decision taken will affect his or her 
standing in the capacity of a creditor. 
In Holley, 39 the Full Court pointed out that each case depends 
on its own facts and the court cannot ignore such laws as s.111 of 
the Bankruptcy Act and the policy underlying it, nor should it dis-
advantage creditors, unless it be for very good reasons, .11.0 Further, 
in the exercise of its jurisdiction under s.85(1), the Family Court 
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lacks the power to upset any change of owernship resulting from the 
exercise of the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. 41 In other 
words, in such a case, the transfer of assets to the Official Trustee 
in Bankruptcy has not taken place by the volition of a party to the 
marriage but as a statutory consequence of that spouse's ordered 
sequestration under the provisions of s.58(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth.). 
It should also be noted that where a consent or contested order 
is made under s.79, it may be subsequently set aside if the transferor 
under that order becomes bankrupt. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the 
trustee in bankruptcy can avoid transactions entered into with the 
intent of defrauding creditors; 42 settlements made without consider-
ation or in consideration of marriage; 43 transfers of property which 
have the effect of giving a creditor a preference or advantage over 
other creditors; 44  and transfers of the bankrupt's property which 
have no effect due to the trustee's title relating back. 45 
While debts comprising of moneys payable under property orders  
are provable in bankruptcy under s.82(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth.), as a matter Qf legislative policy the claims of some creditors 
against a bankrupt's estate are given the right of prior payment. 
"Priority, claims" include a claim of an employee for unpaid wages or 
leave entitlement. "Deferred claims" are those claims which are defer-
red from payment to the general body of creditors. While it might be 
expected that a spouse's claim to an equitable interest in property, 
the legal title of which was vested in the other spouse prior to his 
or her bankruptcy, would be given special treatment, in fact such a 
claim is deferred to the interests of other creditors. The quite law-
ful actions of a secured creditor against the property and the payment 
of priority claims and the debts owed the general body of creditors 
may leave little, if anything, for the spouse applicant. 46 Unless a 
spouse without a legal interest is able first to obtain a property 
order, or at least an injunction to restrain the making of a disposi-
tion, bankruptcy effectively puts the property beyond the reach of 
the Family Court. The inclusion of paragraph (ca)(i) in the definition 
of "matrimonial cause" in s.4(1) has remedied the situation where a 
spouse had to wait for principal proceedings before an order relating 
to property interests could be made, however. 
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Shiff and Waters 47 make the point that if inchoate rights to 
matrimonial property were declared to be rights in rem rather than 
in personam for the purposes of proving them in bankruptcy, no real 
advantage would accrue to the debtor's spouse. Section 79 requires 
an assessment of the property and respective financial resources of 
the parties before redistribution. Therefore, the assessment of the 
provable debt under s.79 cannot take place until all other debts are 
proven in bankruptcy and, arguably, the period prior to discharge 
estimated. The Court exercising powers under s.79 is in the position 
of standing behind all creditors and looking forward to property 
that will be surplus, or in reversion, before it can estimate the 
provable debt. 48 
It may be in the interests of a solvent spouse to claim a 
proprietary interest in the bankrupt's property under ordinary common 
law principles by making an application to the Federal Court of Bank-
ruptcy. 49 If successful, such a claim would effectively reduce the 
bankrupt's estate, for a proprietary claim would rank above the 
claims of unsecured creditors. 
The degree of success for the claimant at common law is depen-
dent on the categorisation of common law and equitable remedies such 
as express, resulting and implied trust, implied contract, proprie-
tary estoppel, unjust enrichment, restitution and quantum meruit as 
either "proprietary" or "personal" in nature. If the remedy is 
categorised as proprietary, the claimant will usually be compen-
sated in full from the apparent assets of the bankrupt's estate in 
preference to unsecured creditors. Otherwise, the claimant spouse 
will only stand as the equivalent of an unsecured creditor. 
It seems irrefutable that legislative reform is required in , 
order to protect the interests of the bankrupt's spouse. Registra-
tion of the equitable interest of a non-titled spouse under the Mat-
rimonial HOMRS Act 1967 (U.K.) has not proved to be effective in 
protecting that interest. On the other hand, it would not be unrea-
sonable to demand that the signatures of both spouses be obtained 
for any hire purchase or similar secured loan agreements. 50 The 
disadvantaged spouse could not then be heard to complain unless he 
or she could show that consent to the loan had been obtained by 
fraud or duress. 51 As for unsecured personal debts incurred through 
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the use of store accounts or bank credit cards, the introduction of 
a statutory "protected interest" would safeguard a non-debtor spouse's 
interest in the matrimonial home or the debtor spouse's estate gen-
erally. New Zealand legislation provides a model for such protection. 
There, each spouse has a protected interest in the home (currently 
up to the value of $21 500) which is not liable for the unsecured 
personal debts of the other spouse. On bankruptcy of a spouse, after 
debts secured on the home and any unsecured debts (other than per-
sonal debts) have been paid, the amount of the protected interest, 
or so much of it as remains after paying those debts, is paid to the 
other spouse. 52 It is submitted that this approach, despite the 
difficulties involved in setting the value of the "protected interest" 
because of the enormous differences from one State to another in the 
cost of private housing or the availability of public or private 
rented accommodation, 53 rather than the alternative of postponing 
the realisation of the bankrupt's interest in the matrimonial home 
in order to protect the interests of his or her family, would better 
serve to emphasize to a potential debtor that he or she has a respon-
sibility not to disadvantage the other spouse by incurring debts 
that are beyond his or her capacity to pay. 
It is also arguable that the interests of creditors should not 
be viewed in isolation from those of the non-titled spouse and 
society as a whole but rather balanced against them. 
It is unquestionable that general creditors deserve to be 
repaid. However, the interests of an unsecured creditor are subject 
to the rights of secured creditors in specific property of the 
debtor and to statutory rights under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth.). 
Just as those priorities have been entrenched in the law as a re-
sult of various policy considerations, so the priority of a non-
titled spouse over non-secured creditors of the other spouse should 
be established in the light of current social policies which stress 
the importance of the family. 
In operating a business, a general creditor must assume a cer-
tain element of risk. For instance, he faces potential loss where 
a debt is neither repaid nor otherwise recovered. Even if a debtor 
has assets at the time he obtains credit, there is no obligation on 
his part not to dispose of or encumber them. Therefore, the sensible 
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general creditor demands higher interest rates to compensate for his 
greater risk. 
Marriage, on the other hand, is not to be seen as a business 
venture. It does not involve the assumption of financial risk in 
return for a profit. A spouse's equitable interest in matrimonial 
property ought not be treated as if it were a result of a commercial 
undertaking. For a separated spouse with the care of young children 
who is not gainfully employed, the loss of that equitable interest 
can be quite devastating while the same loss to general creditors 
can be more easily sustained. 
Where it is important to preserve the matrimonial home in order 
to house the bankrupt's family, the imposition of a restraint upon 
its sale would be of greater value than the protection of the equity 
in the matrimonial home.through the introduction of a statutory 
"protected interest" of the type described above. The British Review 
Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (The Cork Committee) 54 
recommended that the new English Insolvency Act 1985 should extend 
the powers of the Court to postpone the sale of the matrimonial home 
where the title is in the name of one spouse only. It recommended 
that only where there are no dependent children or the non-titled 
spouse has made an informed consent in writing should sale of the 
matrimonial home be made without applicatin to the Insolvency Court. 
The Report defines a matrimonial home and sets out the social and 
financial circumstances to be taken into account by the court in 
exercising its discretion. It also provides for the situation where 
the matrimonial home is already the subject of matrimonial proceedings: 
in such a case, any claim relating to the property, should remain with 
the Family Division with the trustee having a right to be heard. 55 
To allay criticism that a debtor and his family could luxuriate 
in over-adequate housing at the expense of creditors, the Government 
published a White Paper in February, 1984, after the passage of the 
Insolvency Bill through the Committee Stage of the House of Lords. In 
this, the factors a court must consider when contemplating an order 
for postponement are set down with more particularity. For instance, 
the court is directed to consider the prospects of the applicant 
securing alternative accommodation, either from income or from other 
sources such as local authority housing. Also to be considered is the 
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extent to which an applicant is implicated in the bankruptcy and the 
extent to which the house itself has been acquired or improved with 
funds or benefits provided by unsecured creditors. The Cork proposals 
have therefore been revised in order to provide protection for the 
more needy applicant without disadvantaging creditors more than 
absolutely necessary. 56 
(g) The use of discretionary trusts and private companies  
Discretionary trusts and private companies form another potential 
means of manipulating assets to reduce the pool of property available 
for distribution between the parties to a marriage. 57 The terms of 
the trust instrument or the Memorandum and Articles of Association 
of the company may give the appointor/trustee or the managing director 
no apparent legal control of the entity, for to settle property on 
trust or to put capital into the establishment of a company is to 
alienate the property or capital concerned, yet the person acting in 
either capacity in actuality may (and probably will) exercise a very 
real control over the trust or the company and its business. For 
example, the Family Court cannot intervene where a respondent estab-
lishes a trust to which he lends money, which in turn is invested in 
the trust. This "loan" is paid out to the respondent for his daily 
living needs, leaving the applicant no right to the trust assets, for 
the Family Court will not enforce a debt owed by a third party. Also, 
benefits may come to that person by the use of the assets of the 
entity or through the distribution of its income. 
To a certain extent, the Family Court has broken down the strict 
legal entities involved in discretionary trusts and family companies 
in order to view the property of the trust or company as property over 
which a spouse has de facto control.58  and which, therefore, may be 
treated as "property" within the definition in s.4(1) or as a 
"financial resource" within the terms of s.75(2)(b). 59 If a perusal 
of the documents establishing the discretionary trust or the family 
company show that a spouse has independent legal control of trust 
assets for his or her benefit, then this is a "property interest" and 
it is possible that an order under s.79 directly , affecting it can be 
made. If the spouse's independent legal control for his or her bene-
fit is subject to conditions or uncertainties, then that is only a 
potential "financial resource", which may be taken into account in the 
formulation of a more general order under s.79, 60 be it an order for 
division of property or the payment of a lump sum. Under s.79, 
the Family Court can provide that an order for the payment of a 
lump sum may be satisfied by the transfer or settlement of 
property not necessarily owned by, but under the control of, the 
respondent. In Stowe, 61 the Full Court referred to this method of 
payment as an "indirect recourse" to assets. A lump sum order made 
under s.79 need not be directed at any particular property of the 
respondent 62 but the original application must relate to particular 
property of the respondent; an application at large for a lump sum 
order under s.79 would be misconceived. 63 Only where the Court has 
determined that the applicant has a claim to some alteration of 
interests in his or her favour can it then decide that the claim 
ought to be satisfied by payment of a lump sum. 64 
Financial resources may involve a third party's property over 
which the resource-holder exercises either legal or de facto control 
from which he or she is eligible to benefit in the future. 65  However, 
the recent decision of the High Court in Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; 
ex parte Green, 66  which will be discussed later in this section, has 
placed curbs on the Family Court's powers to make restraining orders 
in relation to discretionary trusts and family companies, particularly 
with respect to the latter. 
The trust instrument which gives the trustee 67 a "mere power" 
actually concedes him or her a great deal of control over the trust, 
particularly if he or she also has the power to appoint to himself. 
A trustee with a mere power has the discretion to determine not only 
how the distributable assets of the trust are to be divided among 
the objects of the trust but also whether they will be distributed 
among the defined range of beneficiaries. Pending any valid distri-
bution, the trust property is held on a fixed trust for a person or 
for persons referred to as the taker or takers in default of appoint-
ment. Should the taker in default not be named in the trust instru-
ment, then the trust property is held on trust for the settlor of 
the relevant property. In contrast is the position of the trustee 
who has a "trust power". He or she is directed to distribute the trust 
property, his or her discretion being confined to determining the 
manner in which distribution is to be effected among the objects of 
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the trust. In such a case, there is no taker in default of appointment 
as no failure to appoint is contemplated. 68 
The Family Court in certain circumstances has power to provide 
a remedy to an applicant who claims to be at a financial disadvantage 
because of the respondent's control over a discretionary trust. If 
the respondent is named in the trust instrument as a trustee with a 
power to appoint to himself or herself, he will be treated as having 
a "financial resource" within the terms of s.75(2)(b), the value of 
the resource depending on whether the power is exercisable by the 
spouse alone or whether he or she must act in concert with other 
trustees. 69 He or she will also be seen to have a "financial resource" 
if, in a non-fiduciary capacity as an object of the discretionary 
trust, he or she has the power to revoke the trust in his or her own 
favour or to replace the trustees, the value of the resource being 
assessed as the value of all remaining distributable trust property. 70 
If the respondent is named in the trust instrument as the taker in 
default of appointment, he or she has a recognised proprietary interest 
amounting to "property" within the terms of the Family Law Act. 71 On 
the other hand, the settlor retains no "property" or "financial 
resource" since he or she is regarded as the disponor of the relevant 
trust assets. Moreover, if the trustee has no power to appoint to 
himself or herself, while he or she has "property" in the form of a 
legal interest in trust assets, he or she holds nothing of relevance 
from the Family Court's point of view as, in the strict legal sense, 
the interest carries with it no corresponding right of beneficial 
enjoyment. 72 
Where a respondent to proceedings under s.79 has "property" or 
"financial resources" under a discretionary trust, an applicant may 
establish a contribution to the relevant "property" or "financial 
resource" in proportion to the extent to which he or she can establish 
a contribution in respect of the trust assets themselves. 73 In 
Matusewich, 74 Barblett J. held that the wife had a continuing right 
to claim from her husband the moneys held on trust for her and wrongly 
converted by him to his own use. That this tracing technique is 
appropriate is confirmed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of s.79(4) which 
expressly provide that it is immaterial that property in relation to 
which a party has made a contribution has, since the making of the 
contribution, ceased to be property of the parties or either of them. 
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If the applicant cannot identify, or trace trust assets in the mass 
of assets, he or she will only be able to pursue the trustee as a 
creditor and will be in no better position than other creditors 
should bankruptcy arise. Domestic contribution under s.79(4)(c) 
need bear no relation to the acquisition of property held by the 
respondent, and, provided that the applicant wife can show a contri-
bution within the terms of the paragraph, she may be able to estab-
lish a substantial claim in respect of the respondent's property 
under the trust. That the spouse's contributions to property and 
financial resources are relevant is expressly provided by s.75(2)(j), 
incorporated in s.79(4) by sub-section (4)(e). 75 
When he or she becomes aware that the marriage is about to break 
down, the respondent may transfer assets to a discretionary trust, 
the transfer being completed before the parties have separated and 
perhaps long before the other spouse applies for a financial order 
under Part VIII of the Family Law Act. The Family Court has power 
to set aside the trust instrument or the disposition of assets if it 
can be shown to have the effect of defeating an anticipated order of 
the Court. It is immaterial that the disposition was made long be-
fore the proceedings, seeking the orders under s.79 were commenced, 76 
or that the transaction occurred before the Family Law Act came into 
effect. 77 Under s.85, a transaction which is likely to defeat any 
such order can be set aside "irrespective of intention". The elimin-
ation of intention as a pre-requisite for the operation of s.85 by 
the inclusion of this phrase has enabled the Court to focus its 
attention on the effects that the impugned transaction has had rather 
than the purpose for which it was entered into. Even if the instru-
ment or disposition sought to be set aside was not made by the 
respondent, it still may be caught by the provisions of s.85, for 
the section also applies to dispositions "made in the interests of 
a party". If the trust takes the form of an ante- or post -nuptial 
settlement, it may be possible for the Family Court to make an order 
with respect to the application of the whole or part of the property 
dealt with by the settlement by acting under the provisions of 
S85A. 78 Provided that the Court adheres to the principle in Meller 
v. Meller, 79 whereby it was held that a Family Court may not divest 
children of capital assets but must re-arrange them into assets of 
equal value, its discretion to make an order in such a case will be 
very wide, since no third parties' interests are involved. Should 
the disposition be set aside under s.85 and the trust be wound up 
pursuant to the Court's powers under s.80 (for example, s.80(e) 
gives the Family Court power to appoint or remove trustees), the 
pool of property available for distribution will be considerably 
augmented. 80 
A discretionary trust set up by the husband to minimise 
taxation with no intention of avoiding any claim made under s.79 
by the wife may nevertheless be dealt with by the Family Court if 
the terms of the trust instrument give the trustee a discretion as 
to both capital and income to benefit the husband and the wife and 
the infant children. It is - not for the husband to claim that he 
cannot meet a claim for maintenance or property provision because 
all his assets and income have been disposed of by the trust 
instrument, for the trust fund can still be described as family 
property. Before the trust property can be apportioned, the 
interests of the children in the fund will have to be protected by 
turning them into something of equal value. The Family Court 
might notionally divide the fund in equal shares according to the 
number of beneficiaries under the principle that "equity is- 
,, 	then give each child a vested interest in the beneficial 
share. Once the children's interests have been quantified, the 
Court will be able to proceed with an assessment of the spouses' 
respective contributions to the remainder of the fund. Further, 
if the Court establishes that the assets of the trust were acquired 
by reason of a disposition made by "direction of or in the interest 
of" the husband and the disposition "is likely to defeat" the 
order being sought by the wife, the whole trust instrument is 
likely to be set aside under s.85. 82 
For the purposes of the Family Law Act, a spouse's 
shareholding in a company or trust is deemed to be the property 
of that spouse. 83 However, to value a shareholding in a private 
company whose success depends on the entrepreneurial skills of 
the individual in control or in the situation where shares have 
particular voting or managerial powers attached to them proves 
to be difficult. Valuation methods which have been developed 
for commercial purposes do not take into account the value of the 
shares to the spouse who has control of the company. after a divorce, 
for they do not take into consideration the company's potential 
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for capital growth nor the benefits which that spouse will be 
able to derive from it. As a consequence, for the other spouse 
there is the loss of an opportunity to share in the future benefits 
of that shareholding. In more sophisticated corporate or trust 
structures, the controlling party may rely on less formal means of 
maintaining control and therefore he or she will not hold any 
interest which can be described as property. In such a case, it 
is an easy matter for the controlling party to dispose of the 
interest if marriage breakdown impends. It is clear, then, that 
while the Family. Court can thwart some attempts to minimise 
responsibility under a property or financial order by deeming 
company or trust shareholdings to be the property of a party to 
the marriage, in many cases the nature of the shareholding is 
such that it is beyond the Court's reach. 
The Family Court has a power under s.114(1) to direct a 
. party not to dispose of certain property when he receives It 84  or 
not to exercise a power in such a way as to affect the applicant 
adversely. 85 Third parties may not be restrained under this 
provision, however, 86 and proceedings under s.114(1), being founded 
on paragraph (e) of the definition of "matrimonial cause" in 
s.4(1), must involve "circumstances arising out of the marital 
relationship". However, it is arguable that a contest between 
the parties to a marriage regarding the use by one spouse of the 
powers held under a discretionary trust in a manner detrimental to 
the position of the other spouse under that trust involves 
"circumstances arising out of the marital relationship". 87 
In Tansell, 88 the Full Court pointed out that, unlike the 
position under s.79, where the Court may, if it thinks fit, alter 
rights to property interets, s.114(1) provides for property rights 
to be affected or regulated, but not altered. Injunctions are made 
irrespective of whether the title to the property, is in the husband 
or the wife, in the applicant or the respondent, or in both. 
Section 114(1) orders and injunctions are personal in that they 
are concerned not so much with the ownership of property as with 
the way that spouses deal with it. So long as orders do not make 
an alteration of property rights, they may have an indefinite 
duration. 89 Whether an impermissible alteration of property rights 
has been effected is to be answered by reference. to the law of real 
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and personal property. However, the duration of the orders will 
be fixed by the commencement of a hearing in proceedings for 
property division. Should such proceedings not be instituted, 
the orders or injunctions may be determined. 90 
It appears that, in an appropriate case, the Family Court, 
acting under s.114(1), can temporarily restrain a spouse from 
exercising his powers as a trustee to the detriment of the other 
party to the marriage. Since the decision of the High Court in 
Re Doyey; ex parte Ross, 91 the Family Court has proceeded on the 
basis that, acting under s.114(1), it may direct the manner in 
which a fiduciary exercises his powers even if the interests of 
others (apart from the fiduciary's spouse) are indirectly affected 
(but not defeated) 92 as a consequence. 
Nothing that was said by the High Court in Re Ross-Jones and 
Marinoyich; ex parte Green93 affects the Famiry Court's approach 
to the situation where the spouse effectively controls the trust 
entity. 
•When property or maintenance proceedings have commenced, 
under the provisions of s.114(3) the Court can restrain dealings 
in property which would affect claims made under the Act. 94 The 
High Court in Ascot Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Harper and Harper 
(Ascot Investments), 95 however, denied that the Family Court may 
make an order under s.114(3) against a third party to impose on 
that third party :.a duty which the party otherwise would not be 
liable to perform, 96 eyen'though it has a power pursuant to 
s.114(3) "... to make an order or injunction which is directed to 
a third party or which will indirectly affect'the position of a 
third party". 97 The Court distinguished between an order against 
a party to a marriage "... to do whatever is within his power to 
comply with an order of the court, even if what he does may have 
some effect on the position of third parties" and an order to 
third parties "... to do what they are not legally bound to do". 98 
As to the decisions in Sanders v. Sanders 99  and Antonarkis and 
Anor. v. Derry and Anor., 1 which approved the use of a provision 
similar to s.114(3) in •the Matrimonial Causes Act  1959 (Cth.) to 
restrain third parties, it was demonstrated that neither decision 
could be held to be authority for adversely affecting the rights of 
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third parties by the exercise of the matrimonial jurisdiction for 
in neither case did the injunction concerned directly affect their 
substantive rights. 2 
The result of the decision in Ascot Investments is that 
"(the) Family Court must take the property of a party 
to the marriage as it finds it. The Family Court 
cannot ignore the interests of third parties in the 
property, nor the existence of conditions or 
covenants that limit the rights of the party who 
owns it". 3 
The restrictions imposed on the Family Court in Ascot 
. Investments 4 	its dealing with third parties concerned not 
discretionary trust but a family company, but the principles 
were laid down apply equally, to trust entities. Therefore, any 
interference under s.114(3) with the trustee's control over trust 
property, or any discretion in relation to it, would be contrary 
to the High Court's ruling. 
Notwithstanding the decision, the Family Court reconstructed 
its jurisdiction in relation to both discretionary trusts and 
family companies in order to protect the needs of the family. On 
the authority, of an earlier High Court decision, Re Davey; ex parte 
Ross, 5 the Family Court, in any case, was empowered to make orders 
against third parties which would indirectly affect their interests. 
In Re Dovey, 6 an injunction was granted to a wife, restraining her 
husband from exercising his vote as a director and a shareholder of 
a company which was the legal owner of the matrimonial home. The 
company was owned by both spouses but only the husband's shares 
carried any voting rights. The High Court upheld the order on the 
basis that the order did not prevent the third party company from 
dealing with its own property; it was directed not against the 
company but against the husband, who was a party to the marriage, 
even though he was also a shareholder and director who controlled 
the company. The effect on the third party was therefore indirect. 
In Ascot Investments, 7 the High Court had overturned a 
decision of the Full Court whereby the directors of the company, 
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who were not parties to the marriage, were ordered to register a 
transfer of the husband's shares to the wife to secure the payment 
of a lump sum maintenance order in her favour. The High Court 
ruled that such an order amounted to a permanent interference with 
third parties' rights. The Family Court took the view that the 
ruling could be confined to orders of a permanent nature, and, 
until the High Court's decision in Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; 
ex parte Green, 8 it felt empowered to make interim orders against 
third party creditors, family companies and discretionary trusts 9 
so that they, could be restrained temporarily from dealing with 
their own assets or from enforcing their rights in the State Courts. 
The Family Court has also asserted its jurisdiction'where it has 
been shown that the third party has some special connection with 
the parties to the marriage. It has found the source of its 
jurisdiction to make such orders principally within the terms of 
s.114(3), whereby it may make interlocutory injunctions to support 
other orders. Since such injunctions are referable to the definition 
of "matrimonial cause" in s.4(1)(f), they form part of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Family Court. 10 
Third parties with no special connection who have dealt with 
the parties at arm's length in a commercial transation have been 
regarded by the Court as being beyond the scope of its jurisdiction; 
alternatively, the Court has taken the view that it would be an 
improper use of its discretion to affect a party who may be termed 
an innocent bystander. In Rieck, 11 Nygh J. refused to restrain a 
company from proceeding in the Supreme Court in relation to a 
charge executed by the husband over the matrimonial home since the 
transaction had been concluded on a commercial basis and the company 
had no other connection with the parties. The Full Court recently 
took a similar stance in Prince, 12 where the property claim of the 
wife was stayed in order that the finance company could pursue in 
the Supreme Court its application in relation to an alleged contract 
of guarantee with the husband. The Full Court resolved that, even 
if it had the jurisdiction to hear the dispute as to the contract 
between the husband and the company, to do so would be an improper 
use of its discretion. 13 In Pockran and Crewes; Pockran, 14 a parent, 
who had secured a mortgage in relation to moneys he had lent the 
parties and who had obtained a Supreme Court judgment against the 
wife in respect of $14 000 still owing on the mortgage, was 
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accorded the status of an innocent bystander since he had dealt 
with the parties on a commercial basis. The debt owed him by 
the parties was deducted from their assets before a s.79 order 
was formulated, therefore. 15 
The High Court in Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; ex parte Green 
(Green) 16 considered the case where the wife's mother sought to 
bankrupt her former son-in-law in order to enforce a judgment debt 
she had obtained in the Supreme Court in respect of a loan of some• 
$300 000 and interest outstanding on it. The husband filed an 
application under s.79 of the Family Law Act whereby, he sought orders 
that his former wife indemnify him against his liability to 
Mrs. Green on the basis that the loan moneys had been applied to 
the overall family situation, including the transaction of 
business on behalf of the wife's parents. By applying for orders 
to restrain her until his application under s.79 had been heard, 
he also sought to halt Mrs. Green's proceedings both to enforce 
the judgment debt and to obtain a bankruptcy notice against him 
for the Federal Court. 
It was the husband's application for interim restraining 
orders which formed the subject of the High Court's decision. The 
application came before Ross-Jones J. in January, 1984, but counsel 
sought time to prepare argument on the matter of jurisdiction of 
the Family Court, and the hearing was postponed until a date in 
April, 1984. In the meantime, his Honour made interim orders 
restraining Mrs. Green from enforcing her Supreme Court judgment 
pending further order of the Court. Mrs. Green, however, applied 
directly for orders for prohibition and certiorari against his 
Honour, Ross-Jones J., even though, had he been permitted to hear 
the case, his decision more than likely would have been the same 
as that in the decisions noted above, particularly that in 
Pockran and Crewes; Pockran, 17  which also involved a judgment debt. 
An order nisi for prohibition was upheld by six of the members of 
the Full Bench, 18 Deane J. alone deciding that no particular harm 
would be committed if Ross-Jones J. were allowed to rule on the 
issue. In fact, his Honour was of the view that 'the High Court 
might well benefit from hearing what the Full Court of the 
Family Court's approach to the matter would be. He said, 19 
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...(A) writ of prohibition precluding the Family 
Court from dealing with a matter effectively deprives 
this Court of the benefit of the views of the Full 
Court of that court on the particular case. The 
Family Court's •jurisdiction is a specialist one. 
The judges of that court possess specialist experience 
and knowledge of the content and administration of 
family law and the Family Court's own practice and 
procedures. Where questions of constitutional 
power are not involved, it is undesirable that a 
substantive question which has arisen in the Family 
Court should be determined in this Court without the 
benefit of the views of the Full Court of the Family 
Court on the particular case. The position is, of 
course, a fortiori in a case where prohibition is 
sought before even a primary judge has had an 
opportunity of dealing with the question which it is 
sought to raise in this Court." 
As a result, he stated, the High Court had quite overlooked matters 
of significance "... not apparent to members of this Court whose 
practical experience in family law matters is, ordinarily, at best, 
limited,, 20 
The majority of the Court held that the Family Court had no 
jurisdiction to make even interim orders against the third party, 
Ascot Investments 21 being decisive of the matter. The Family Court 
could not detract from the rights of Mrs. Green under the general 
law to enforce her judgment debt since she was not a puppet of the 
parties to the marriage and it was nowhere suggested that the 
relevant loan transactions were shams. The only extension of the 
jurisdiction to make interim orders, as opposed to permanent orders, 
against third parties which could be envisaged was for the purpose 
of maintaining the status quo for a limited period until the . 
Family Court could decide whether it had jurisdiction in a matter 
brought before it. 22 Except in this respect, "... the Court has no 
wider jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction than a 
" 23 permanent injunction. 
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Effectively, then, the limits of all third party proceedings 
are to be defined by the decision in Ascot Investments. 24 Even as 
an interim measure, it will not be possible for the Family Court to 
prevent one spouse from exploiting his or her position as a trustee 
of a discretionary trust or director of a family company to which 
matrimonial assets have been transferred in order to diminish the 
other spouse's chances of obtaining a property settlement which is 
just in all the circumstances. 
In Harris and Harris; Re Banaco Pty. Ltd. , 25 the Full Court 
made an order against a family company which was not the alter ego  
of a party to the marriage but was legally and factually controlled 
by the husband's mother. The company was taking steps to evict the 
wife and children from the matrimonial home, a company asset, but 
the wife was able to obtain from the Family Court interim orders 
which were ostensibly in aid of maintenance orders already made 
against the husband. The Full Court approved the making of 
interlocutory injunctions against the company until alternative 
accommodation was supplied for the applicant wife and the children 
of the marriage on the grounds that the company had a special 
connection with the parties. 
In Green, 26 Gibbs CJ. and Mason J. expressly denied that a 
finding that there is a special connection between the parties to 
the marriage and a third party in any way enlarges the jurisdiction 
of the Family Court, but while a majority of the High Court 
disapproved of Harris 27 on the matter of its interpretation of 
Ascot investments  28 only the two judges named above went so far 
as to specifically overrule the Full Court decision on the subject 
of the special connection. 29 
Kovacs 30 suggests that Green can be confined on the basis 
that, in cases such as Anderson, 31 a f Petersens, 32 Gillies, 33 and 
Pockran and Crewes; Pockran, 34 the matter of a parental loan arose 
in the context of litigation between the parties concerning certain 
property, most commonly the matrimonial home. On the other hand, 
in Green, the loan to the husband by the wife's mother was the 
subject of the litigation between Dr. Marinovich and Mrs. Green 
as well as of the s.79 proceedings between the husband and the 
wife. That is, there was no matrimonial property dispute between 
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the husband and the wife other than that involving the rights of 
Mrs. Green. It appears, then, that it was entirely appropriate 
that the litigation be confined to the Supreme Court. Where the 
dispute involving the third party is only one facet of the wider 
property litigation between the spouses, on the above interpretation, 
Green is not applicable. Therefore, precedents established by 
the Full Court in such decisions as Buckeridge (No.2) 35 and Smith  
and Saywell, 36 where family companies were restrained by inter-
locutory injunctions from pursuing Supreme Court actions pending 
the hearing of the parties' property claims in the Family Court so 
as to keep the property intact, may still stand. Distinguishable 
also would be cases like Stowe, 37 where the family company was 
prevented from sub-dividing and selling real estate pending the 
hearing of s.79 proceedings in relation to all the assets of the 
parties. 38 In cases such as these, the real objective is not, as 
it was in Green, to ultimately extinguish the right of the third 
party under the general law. The importance of the injunctive 
jurisdiction to a party potentially at risk from the manipulation 
of trust and company assets was emphasised in Stowe: 39 
"A party to a marriage may be able to establish 
a legitimate claim to have assets preserved, pending 
a full investigation (of the financial circumstances 
of both parties), even if those assets or some of 
them are held in the name of a trust or company‘with 
which the other party is closely connected, or over 
which he or she has powers of management or control. 
This is especially important where those assets 
have in reality been created or acquired as a result 
of the efforts of one or both parties during the 
marriage. It may be only as ,a result of such 
investigation that it can be determined whether and 
to what extent a party has a relevant interest in the 
property in question, that is, an interest which the 
Court can deal with directly". 
Further, since the High Court in Ascot Investments 40 expressly 
upheld the use of the Ross injunction41 in relation to both 
temporary42  and permanent orders where the only directors of the 
company are the parties to the marriage, and in Green 43 it held 
that Ascot Investments stated the law regarding the extent to 
which orders of the Family Court may affect the interests of 
third parties, it seems that the Ross injunction remains a valuable 
weapon. 
45 In Stowe, 44 Yates (No.2), Kelly (No.2), 46 and Tiley, 47 the 
notion of effective control of a company or a trust was used to 
declare the benefits received by the party controlling the entity 
to be a "financial resource" of that party within s.75(2)(b) of the 
Act. As a result, the husband (who is generally the spouse to be 
in effective control of an entity) was required to transfer to the 
wife a larger share of his personally owned assets or was ordered 
to pay out "appropriately, augmented' ,48  lump sums by way of comp-
ensation when a property order was formulated. Green in no way 
affected the doctrine of effective control, so the Family Court 
still has a useful remedy to apply against respondents who attempt 
to shelter behind corporate structures in order to evade financial 
obligations to the other party to the marriage. 
The majority in Ascot Investments excepted from their ruling 
the situation where a company could be termed a puppet or a sham 
of a party to the marriage. 49 The exception, up until the 
decision in Green, has not been utilised, although, in Howard, 50 
the Full Court expressed the view that where a third party, in this 
case a family company, exercises its legal rights not bona fide for 
its own purposes_ but for the sole purpose of assisting the husband 
and disadvantaging the wife, it may well be that the Family . Court 
has jurisdiction to intervene by granting injunctive relief. 51 
It is submitted that in the future, where 'a third party is closely 
associated with a party to the marriage to the extent outlined in 
Howard, 52 the injunctive powers under s.114(3) could be employed 
in order to extend the Family Court's jurisdiction in relation 
to both interim and permanent orders. 53  Moreover, where the dispute 
involving a third party is only part of a wider property litigation 
between the parties to the marriage and both disputes can be seen 
to be inextricably linked, the Family Court has a discretion to 
assume an accrued jurisdiction to solve both the non-federal and the 
federal aspects of the proceedings. 54 
The decision in Heath and Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation 
LZU. 
(No.2) 55 to set aside a mortgage by using the provisions of s.85 
even though it meant postponing the bank's interests to those of 
the wife indicates that the Family Court is prepared to use that 
section to its ultimate extent in order to prevent or set aside 
any disposition or transaction of property to a third party which 
is likely to defeat a property order made by the Court. 
Potentially, s.85A confers wide powers, for it clearly envisages 
that, in appropriate circumstances, third parties (for example, 
trustees) will be made the direct subject of orders of the Family 
Court. The section will enable the Court to make orders directly 
in relation to property which has been transferred into an ante-
or post-nuptial settlement made in relation to the marriage. 56 
It can be seen from the foregoing that, within certain para-
meters, particularly those imposed by the interests of third 
parties, the Family Court can provide a remedy where a party to the 
marriage manipulates the assets of the matrimonial partnership in 
a manner detrimental to the interests of the other spouse. Where 
there is a conflict between the interests of the applicant under 
the Family Law Act and the interests of the third party under the 
general law of pertnership, bankruptcy, discretionary trusts and 
trading companies, the interests of the applicant usually, but 




Within the boundaries set by constitutional restraints 1 and 
• the inability of the Family Court to make orders binding third 
parties 2 or directly affecting their rights save within a narrow 
range of exceptions, 3 the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.) provides 
the means by which financial misconduct can be remedied. 
The constitutional restraints on the Commonwealth Parliament's 
powers to legislate with respect to "marriage" and "matrimonial 
causes" and the limits that the High Court has placed on these 
powers 4 are necessary if third parties' interests are to be 
sufficiently protected 5 that they are not deterred from entering 
into contracts or other business dealings with a husband or wife 
because of the risk that the assets of that person could be sub-
stantially reduced by an order of a court acting upon the broad 
basis of judicial discretion rather than upon the ordinary 
principles relating to commercial transactions. 6 That any 
extension of the Commonwealth's control over the rights, duties 
and obligations arising from marriage should be approached with 
care because of its possible impact upon the operation of laws 
made and administered by the States has been recognised by both 
the Senate Joint Select Committee 7 and the Australian Law Reform 
Commission. 8 On the other hand, Kirby J., in an address to the 
Family Law Section of the Victorian Law Institute, remarked on the 
failure on the part of legislators, Federal and State, and legal 
policy makers to understand the close inter-relationship of family 
law with other areas of the law. 9 
Obviously, since "... marriage is an economic as well as a 
social institution-“ ,10  there will be instances where there is a 
conflict between the interests of the spouses inter se and the 
interests that arise in normal commercial dealings. Except where 
a transaction giving rise to the purported rights of a third 
party is a "sham” or "device ” , 11 a third party is acting in 
collusion with a party to the marriage, 12 or the third party is a 
company or trust which is no more than the alter ego of one of the 
parties to the marriage, 13 or where the dispute involving a third 
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party is founded on a common nucleus of facts so that the Family 
Court, if it exercises its discretion to do so, may assume an 
accrued jurisdiction 14 to decide both the federal and the non-
federal aspects of the case before it, there is no jurisdiction 
in the Family Court to make orders encroaching upon a third party's 
rights, whether those rights arise under the law relating to 
contracts, trusts, property, companies, partnerships or insolvency. 
Those trust or company entities which have been established as a 
tax shelter 15 are usually invulnerable to an order of the Family 
Court unless it can be shown within the provisions of s.85(1) 
that the actual reason for their establishment was to defeat an 
existing or anticipated order of the Court. 
The expansion of the Family Court's jurisdiction by the 
insertion of paragraph (ca)(i) in the definition of "matrimonial 
cause" in s.4(1) 16 has provided married persons with a means of 
settling most property disputes between them before the Family 
Court providing that proceedings can be said to arise out of the 
marital relationship. Previously, parties had to resort to the 
State Supreme Courts while the marriage subsisted or they had to 
wait until the expiration of a twelve-month separation period so 
that principal proceedings could be instituted and ancillary 
proceedings relating to property could be heard. Neither course 
was satisfactory. Except in Victoria and Western Australia, the 
relief dispensed by State Courts in property matters which fall 
within their jurisdiction is circumscribed •by the strict rules of 
law and equity and there are no powers to adjust property interests 
according to domestic or other indirect non-financial contribution 
or future need.. On the other hand, if a spouse preferred the 
dispute to be heard in the Family Court because of the advantages 
offered by its discretionary jurisdiction, equitable interests 
were vulnerable during the separation period, the other spouse 
having up to twelve months to arrange his or her property affairs 
in order to reap the maximum benefit from them. This would be to 
the detriment of the applicant spouse unless an injunction under 
s.114(1) or s.114(3) to protect the property could be obtained in 
the interim. 
Notwithstanding the Family Court's power to grant an injunction 
in aid of its jurisdiction to restrain dealings in property (s.114(3)) 
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or to set aside or restrain a disposition which is likely to 
defeat an existing or anticipated order of the court (s.85), its 
powers to make orders or injunctions affecting property independently 
of any other relief under the Act arise only in proceedings between 
parties to the marriage "in circumstances arising out of the marital 
relationship". The scope of this independent jurisdiction has still 
to be determined. 17 
Where it has the jurisdiction and the power to do so, the 
Family Court has the discretion to vary existing legal and equitable 
interests and make orders which do justice according to the 
circumstances of the case before it. If the property in dispute 
has been dissipated or alienated, the Court may order restitution, 
resort to other property of the respondent in order to meet the 
order which it wishes to make, make an order against his or her 
financial resources, or order the respondent to exercise his or her 
fiduciary powers in a particular manner. A respondent who has 
impaired the applicant's future earning capacity may be ordered to 
pay either lump sum or periodical maintenance or to transfer 
property to the applicant as a means of compensation, and an 
applicant who has been disadvantaged by unnecessary legal or other 
costs by the actions or obduracy of the respondent or who has had 
to meet all outgoings on matrimonial property and maintain the 
children of the marriage during the period after separation will 
also be reimbursed, either directly through an order for payment 
of a monetary sum or through an appropriate property order. 
That financial misconduct should be remedied is consonant 
with the policy behind Part VIII of the Family Law Act, for this 
part concentrates on the economic realities of each situation. 
Section 79, the principal property section, which by s.79(4)(e) 
incorporates the guidelines set down in s.75(2), directs the 
Court's attention to such matters as the applicant's property-
related contributions and future needs and the respondent's 
ability to satisfy a proposed order. 	Therefore, conduct which 
carries with it economic consequences is intimately bound up with 
the deliberations of the Family Court which, working within the 
boundaries set by Part VIII, except in the situations where 
commercial expediency demands otherwise, can usually provide 
redress for an applicant whose financial situation has been affected 
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by such conduct. However, as it stands at present, Australian 
matrimonial property law fails to protect as of right 18 a non-
owner spouse against the miner spouse who sells or encumbers 
property such as the matrimonial home which is vital to the marital 
relationship without the other's consent or who mismanages 
property by neglecting or dissipating it or irresponsibly 
burdening it with debt. Only by applying to the Family Court 
can a spouse obtain an order or injunction to protect his or her 
inchoate interests. It is imperative that legislation be enacted 
to ensure that control over dealings with certains assets is 
shared by spouses. 
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avoided in respect of property exceeding $1,000 in value by a 
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9. Mooney v. Commissioner of Taxation  (1905) 3 C.L.R. 221, 236; 
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For Richer, for Poorer (1984), 38 et seq. 
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Reform 134, 135. 
14. (1986) F.L.C. 91-712. 
15. Ibid., 75 175. 
16. (1984) 15 F.L.R. 76, 79. See also Scottish Law Commission 
Family Law on Aliment and Family Provision (1981), pares. 3.37 
and 3.58. 
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19. See further Chapter Six, Part A. 
PART B: 
20. See Nygh J. in Dupont (No. 3)(1981) F.L.C. 91-103 at 76 765; 
Wardman and Hudson (1978) F.L.C. 90-466 at 77 385;Rolfe 
(1979) F.L.C. 90-629 at 78 273; Crawford (1979) F.L.C. 90-647 
at 78 410 and 78 411. 
21. In certain circumstances, a remedy provided by the Supreme 
Court may prove advantageous to one party but detrimental to 
the other. See Chapter Four. 
22. For the jurisdiction of the Family Court over an intervener, 
see Ascot Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Harper and Harper (1981) 
F.L.C. 91-000 at 76 063 per Gibbs J. (with whom Stephen, 
Aickin and Wilson JJ. agreed). 
23. See below, under the heading "Section 85" for the reference to 
Anderson (1981) F.L.C. 91-104 and the use of the High Court 
Rules as a means of joinder. 
24. McKay (1984) F.L.C. 91-573 at 79 635 	Strauss J. As to the 
circumstances, see below, particularly Chapter Six, Part F. 
25. See Chapter Four, Part A, for an analysis of the Family 
Court's accrued jurisdiction and its potential for deciding 
"non-federal" matters and also for an analysis of its 
associated jurisdiction. 
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to paragraph (ca) will be presumed to be constitutional. See 
Chapter Four, Pert B, for an analysis of the amendment. , 
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ultimately contested or not. See Fountain v. Alexander (1982) 
F.L.C. 91-218 at 77 185 to 77 186 per Gibbs CJ. in relation to 
the previous similar wording of the definition relating to 
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28. See Ramsay (No. 2) (1983) F.L.C. 91-323. 
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parte Beaumont (1979) F.L.C. 90-606 at 78 103 (High Court). 
30. See Barriga (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-088; MUstafa (1981) 
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by Peters (1982) F.L.C. 91-202, but compare Espie (1983) 
F.L.C. 91-347. 
32. (1976) F.L.C. 90-076. 
33. (1978) F.L.C. 90-522. 
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Six, Part C. 
35. Decisions such as McDougall (1976) F.L.C. 90-076 and Vance 
(1978) F.L.C. 90-522 make it clear that the approach of the 
Family Court to the interpretation to s.78 is similar to the 
approach of the State Supreme Courts to the interpretation of 
8.17. 
36. Prince (1984) F.L.C. 91-501 	Court); Holley (1982) F.L.C. 
91-257. 
37. Macpherson and Clarke (1978) F.L.C. 90-466; Antmann (1980) 
P.L.C. 90-908 at 75 746 (Full Court). 
38. Ibid. 
39. See also Anderson (1981) F.L.C. 91-104 (Full Court). 
40. (1984) F.L.C. 91-051. 
41. For example, Paul v. Constance (1977) 1 W.L.R. 527: Ogilvie v. 
Ryan (1976) 2 N.S.W.R. 182; Horton v. Public Trustee (1977) 1 
N.S.W.L.R. 182. 
42. Re Solomon, A Bankrupt (1976) Ch. 573; Re Turner, A Bankrupt 
(1974) 1 W.L.R. 556. 
43. For example, McMahon v. McMahon (1979) V.R. 239; Ioppolo v. 
Ioppolo (1978) 4 Fain. L.R. 124. 
44. Gee J. obiter in D and D (S.85 Application) (1984) F.L.C. 
91-593 expresses the view that a broad view of "property" such 
as that taken in Duff (1977) F.L.C. 90-217 would encompass a 
chose is action for debt and would enable s.78 to be used to 
recover such a debt. (Contrast Slattery (1976) F.L.C. 90-110, 
where no consideration was given to the relevance of 3.78.) 
45. Antmann (1980) F.L.C. 90-908; Gillies (1981) F.L.C. 91-054; af 
Petersens (1981) F.L.C. 91-905. 
46. The Family Law Council of Australia proposed that the period 
be extended to three years, but the Family Law Council opposed 
the amendment: Family Law Council Report 1981-2, 57. 
47. For the application of s.44(3), see Hamilton (1984) F.L.C. 
91458. 
48. As, for example, in Grist v. Grist (1979) F.L.C. 90-683. 
49. Murray J. in Pearce (1982) F.L.C. 91-276 at 77 570 recognised 
this. See also Whitford (1979) F.L.C. 90-612 at 78 145 (Mall 
Court). 
50. Garside (1978) F.L.C. 90-488 illustrates the relationship 
between s.78 and s.79. 
51. For the circumstances where to do so is desirable, see Wade 
Property Division upon Divorce (1982), 5. 
52. (1979) F.L.C. 90-709. 
53. Australian Family Property Law (1984), 285. 
54. Ibid., 310. 
55. Note that 8.79(9), inserted in 1983, makes conferences with a 
Registrar compulsory, except in exceptional circumstances. As 
to this, see Waters (1984) 6 Law Soc. Bull. (No. 4.) 4, 5; 
Watt (1985) 20 Aust. Law News 28, 32. 
56. For example, Antmann (1980) F.L.C. 90-908; W. (1980) F.L.C. 
90-872; 'Back (1981) F.L.C. 91-021, especially at 76 219 (Full 
Court); Morris (1982) F.L.C. 91-271 at 77 519; Marinko (1983) 
F.L.C. 91-307. In Norbis v. Norbis (1986) F.L.C. 91-712, the 
High Court held that either the global approach or the 
asset-by-asset approach to the appropriate division of assets 
is capable of producing a just and equitable order. 
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power to make orders otherwise than under... 8.79". (Slattery 
(1976) F.L.C. 90-110 at 75 511 (Rill Court). See also Apathy 
(1977) F.L.C. 90-250; Dench (1978) F.L.C. 90-469. (Contra: 
McDougall (1976) F.L.C. 90-076.) 
58. For example, see Re Densham, A Bankrupt (1975) 3 All E.R. 726: 
Brown v. Wylie (1980) 6 Fain. L.R. 519. See also Donaldson v. 
Freeson (1934) 51 C.L.R. 598, where the rights of a stranger 
were also in issue. 
59. Re Dovey; ex parte Fines (1979) F.L.C. 90-616; Ascot 
Investments (1981) F.L.C. 91-000. 
60. Anderson (1981) F.L.C. 91-104; W. (1980) F.L.C. 90-238. 
61. Erotofil (1980) F.L.C. 90-909. 
62. Branchflower (1980) F.L.C. 90-857; Egan (1985) F.L.C. 91-608. 
63. Note Clifton v. Lodge (1982) A.C.L.D. 292: Holland J. granted 
the father relief in the equity jurisdiction because it was 
unlikely that he would be granted leave to intervene in s.79 
proceedings 
64. This prevents applications to the Court by third parties for 
the recovery of all manner of household debts. The English 
Court of Appeal in Tebbutt v. Haynes and Others (1981) 2 All 
E.R. 238 took the view that the Court had the right to 
determine the rights and interests of third parties who 
intervened in property proceedings for it was fundamental to 
the exercise of jurisdiction under s.24 of the Matrimonial 
Causer Act 1973 (Eng.) that a Judge should know over what 
property he was entitled to exercise his discretion. If there 
was a dispute between a respondent spouse and a third party as 
to ownership of the property, that dispute had to be resolved 
before an effective s.24 order could be made. 
65. Ascot Investments (1981) F.L.C. 91-000 at 76 061 per  Gibbs CJ. 
66. See Chapter Six, Part F. 
67. Re Dovey; ex parte Ross (1979) F.L.C. 90-616 at 78 191 to 78 
192 (Gibbs J.) 
68. For the Family Court's accrued jurisdiction and the possible 
extent to which it can be used to decide matters concerning 
third parties, and also its associated jurisdiction under 
s.33, see Chapter Four, Part A. 
69. (1984) F.L.C. 91-501. 
70. (1984) F.L.C. 91-501 at 79 079. 
71. Pawley J., ibid., at 79 078 referred to the fact that the 
exercise of the accrued jurisdiction is entirely 
discretionary. 
72. Ibid., at 79 078. 
73. Note that in Anderson (1981) F.L.C. 91-110, third parties were 
involved directly as parties to the dispute because the wife 
alleged that false transfers of property had been executed by 
her husband to his brothers. 
74. (1984) F.L.C. 91-501. 
75. These tests were stated by Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane 
JJ. in Fencott v. Muller (1983) 57 A,L.J.R. 313, 317. 
76. Felton v. Milligan (1971) 124 C.L.R. 367, 373, Es Barwick 
CJ. See also Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male 
Fashions (1981) 33 A.L.R. 465, 512. 
77. fi;;;:e7T(No. 2) (1983) F.L.C. 91-323: the husband's 
contribution after the decree absolute had been granted and 
the parties had resumed cohabitation was recognised as having 
earned him an equitable interest. 
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78. For details of the application of 8.79(4)(a), see Hardingham 
and Neave Australian Family Property Law (1984), 311 to 313. 
79. As to this, see CCH Australian Family Law and Practice 
Reporter (Ed. Broun and Fowler), para. 38-214. 
80. Ramsey v. Ramsey (1978) F.L.C. 90-449. 
81. Freeman (1979) F.L.C. 90-697: de Mooy (1978) F.L.C. 90-411. 
82. (1977) F.L.C. 90-256. In White (1982) F.L.C. 91-246, the Mill 
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determine the effectiveness of a purported gift of property._ 
83. (1980) F.L.C. 90-908 at 75 745. 
84. W. (1980) F.L.C. 90-872 at 75 527. 
85. The position is otherwise if one party has dissipated or 
disposed of the asset. For details, see Chapter Six. 
86. Hardingham and Neave Australian Family Property Law (1984), 
316. 
87. Williams v. Williams (1985) F.L.C. 91-628 (High Court). 
88. Note that the homemaker roles of the husband and wife are 
neither stereotyped nor mutually exclusive. Also, since 
8.79(4) (c) contains both a material and a non-material 
component, it is analogous to the division between "services 
and society" in the consortium action in tort: Bailey (1980) 
54 A.L.J. 190, 195. 
89. See, for example, Robinson v. Robinson (1961) W.A.R. 56. 
90. For Richer, for Poorer (1984), 77. 
91. They give the decisions in Richards (1976) F.L.C. 90-037 and 
Gey1 (1978) 7 . Fam. L.R. 219, 223, as examples. 
92. As to this, see Wade (1985) 15 Fed.L.R. 76, 84. 
93. Suniaaxy of Discussion Paper No. 22 (June, 1985), paragraph 11. 
94. (1979) F.L.C. 90-647. 
95. See also Noel (1981) F.L.C. 91-035 at 76 321; Mkirkin (1980) 
F.L.C. 90-806. 
96. (1979) F.L•C. 90-677. For similar decisions, see Lucas v. 
Lucas (1982) 26 R.F.L. (2d.) 253 and Helstein v. Helstein 
(1980) 12 R.F.L. (2d.) 273, both decisions of the Alberta 
Queen's Bench. 
97. (1976) F.L.C. 90-072. 
98. See also Burdon and Nikou (1977) F.L.C. 90-293 at 76 657; 
Sheedy (1979) F.L.C. 90-719. 
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(1979) F.L.C. 90-647 at 78 410 to 78 411; Pbtthoff (1978) 
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4. (1984) F.L.C. 91-507. See also Norbis v. Norbis (1986) F.L.C. 
91-712. 
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Inquiry, in a statement to The Age (4th May 1984, page 13), 
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10. Australian Fhmily Property Law (1984), 326. 
11. (1984) F.L.C. 91-507 at 79 119; see also Gibbs CJ at 79 111; 
Wilson J. at 79 126. See Bates (1986) Cony, and P. Lawyer 19 
for an analysis of the judgments. 
12. Ibid., 79 120. 
13. Ibid. 
14. (1984) F.L.C. 91-527 at 79 279. 
15. (1984) F.L.C. 91-507. 
16. Wilson (1980) F.L.C. 90-880; Albany (1980) F.L.C. 90-905 at 75 
721; Tuck (1981) F.L.C. 91-021. 
17. The content of the sub-section is well summarised in Soblusky 
(1976) F.L.C. 90-124 at 75 580. Goodman (1982) 13 Fed. L.R. 
131, 136 et seq., also analyses it. 
18. (1967) 116 C.L.R. 366. See particularly 379 et seq. 
19. In New Zealand, however, an adjustment on the basis of special 
needs is precluded because of the fixed rules of equal 
division laid down by the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 
(N.Z.). 
20. Dench (1978) F.L.C. 90-469. 
21. Anast and Anastopoulos (1982) F.L.C. 91-201. 
22. Morris (1982) F.L.C. 91-271 at 77 519 per EVatt CJ. See also 
Kelly (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-108 at 76 808. In the latter 
case, the Full Court differentiated between "property" and 
"financial resources". 
23. Analysed by Nygh J. in Aroney (1979) F.L.C. 90-709 at 78 790. 
24. See especially Aroney, ibid. at 78 785. 
25. (1978) F.L.C. 90-500 at 77 605. 
26. (1979) F.L.C. 90-709 at 78 790. 
27. See also W. (1980) F.L.C. 90-872; Woolley (No. 2)(1981) F.L.C. 
91-011; Stowe (1981) F.L.C. 91-027 at 76 262; Mast and 
Anastopoulos (1982) F.L.C. 91-201 at 77 061; Morris (1982) 
F.L.C. 91-271. 
28. For the interpretation of this definition, see Duff (1977) 
F.L.C. 90-127 at 76 127, 76 133. The definition echoes that 
in the English legislation: Bates (1978) 8 Fam.Law 24, 24. In 
White (1979) F.L.C. 90-682, a vested interest in an estate. 
even though postponed during a life interest, was hell to be 
"property" within the ambit of s.79. 
29. Bailey (1980) 54 A.L.J. 190. Compare the position in New 
Zealand, where the legislation recognises three kinds of 
property, and where problems have arisen as a result: Goodman 
(1982) 13 Fed. L.R. 131, 134 to 135. 
30. Carter (1981) F.L.C. 91-061 (relied on by Nygh J. in 
Zdravkovic (1982) F.L.C. 91-220 at 77 207). See Goodman 
(1982) 13 F.L.R. 131, 137. 
31. Miller (1984) F.L.C. 91-542. 
263 
32. Currie (1976) F.L.C. 90-101; Miller (1977) F.L.C. 90-326: 
Ferguson (1978) F.L.C. 90-500 at 77 615; Aroney (1979) F.L.C. 
90-709 at 78 784 to 78 785; W. (1980) 90-872 iE 75 528; 
Garrett (1984) F.L.C. 91-539. 
33. (1979) F.L.C. 90-647. 
34. Compare the wife's grazing property in W. (1980) F.L.C. 90-872 
at 75 527. 
35. (1979) F.L.C. 90-647. See further Wade Property Division upon 
Marriage Breakdown (1984), 213 to 215. 
36. Norbis v. Norbis (1986) F.L.C. 91-712. 
37. Response to the A.L.R.C.'s Discussion Paper No. 22, 
Matrimonial Property Law, indicates that there is widespread 
difficulty in obtaining adequate information about a spouse's 
business assets: (1985) Reform 134, 136. See also Settling Uo  (ed. MbDonald. 1986), 218, 221. 
38. As in  MbIntosh v. McIntosh (1985) 46 R.F.L. (2d.) 249; Reid v. 
Reid (1979) 1 N.Z.L.R. 572. Also discussed in Y. v. Y. (1977) 
2 N.Z.L.R. 385. 
39. As in Tuck (1981) 	91-021, where both were pharmacists, 
and Underwood (1981) F.L.C. 91-020, where for 46 years the 
wife had laboured on the orchard. 
40. Aroney (1979) F.L.C. 90-709; Albany (1980) 90-905; Woodham  
(1984) F.L.C. 91-547. 
41. Scott (1977) F.L.C. 90-251; Bayne (1977) F.L.C. 90-265. 
42. (1980) F.L.C. 90-885. 
43. Ibid., 75 591. See also Scott (1977) F.L.C. 90-251 at 76 353 
(Demack J.). 
44. Part B. 
45. Kelly (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-108 (Rill Court). As to the 
manipulation of assets, see Chapter Six, Part F. 
46. (1977) F.L.C. 90-216 at 76 126. See also Martin (1986) F.L.C. 
91-706. 
47. (1977) F.L.C. 90-217. 
48. (1835) 5 L.J. Ch. 90. 
49. A claim for damages is not property "in possession or 
reversion": Palmer (1985) F.L.C. 91-606 (husband had a common 
law claim for personal injuries). 
50. For example, Kelly (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-108 at 76 802. 
51. Woodham (1984) F.L.C. 91-547. 
52. For example, Bailey (1978) F.L.C. 90-424; Richardson (1979) 
90-603; Crapp (1978) F.L.C. 90-460 at 78 181; Walters (1986) 
F.L.C. 91-733 (Full Court). Compare Woolley (No. 2)(1981) 
F.L.C. 90-011 at 76 318 (husband was held to have a vested 
interest in that particular superannuation scheme). In a 
recent case, Prestwich (1985) F.L.C. 91-569, the Full Court 
'held that there is no decided policy as to the appropriate 
division of superannuation benefits. See generally Hardingham 
and Baxt Discretionary Trusts (1975); Tahminjis (1981) 7 U. L.R. 191. 
53. CCH Australian Family Law and Practice Reporter (ed. Broun and 
Fowler, 1976-1986), para. 16-010. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission has emphasised the fact that, in many marriages, 
the husband's income-earning potential is the major asset, 
whereas the wife's income-earning capacity is often reduced by 
the marriage. 
54. Richardson (1979) F.L.C. 90-603; Whitehead (1979) F.L.C. 
90-673. 
55. Woodham (1984) F.L.C. 91-547. 
264 
56. See note 52, supra. 
57. Whitehead (1979) F.L.C. 90-673. 
58. Lange and Moores (1979) F.L.C. 90-651 at 78 430. 
59. Garrett (1981) F.L.C. 91-539. 
60. Aroney (1979) F.L.C. 90-709 at 78 786; Tiley (1980) F.L.C. 
90-898. 
61. For example, see Scott (1977) F.L.C. 90-251; Elias (1977) 
F.L.C. 90-267. See also Goodman (1982) 13 Fed. L.R. 131, 132 
et seq. 
62. Elias, ibid. 
63. Bailey (1980) 54 A.L.J. 190, 197, outlines a number of fact 
situations and the solutions arrived at by the courts. The 
Ontario Law Reform Commission believed that "the matrimonial 
home must be made the subject of a special treatment 
corresponding to its special position as a major asset, a 
basic family shelter, and a focal point of family . activity": 
Report on Family Law, Part IV: Family Property Law (1974), 53. 
64. (1981) F.L.C. 91-021. 
65. Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 31 to 39 and 68 to 71. For an 
analysis of discretion as used in family litigation, see 
Finlay (1976) 2 Monash L.R. 221. See also the judgment of 
Brennan J. in Norbis v. Norbis (1986) F.L.C. 91-712. 
66. See, for example, the judgment of Strauss J. in Ferguson 
(1978) F.L.C. 90-500 at 77 613; Mallet v. Mallet (1984) F.L.C. 
91-507 at 79 125 (Wilson J.); Norbis v. Norbis (1986) F.L.C. 
91-712, particularly the judgments of Mason and Deane JJ. and 
Brennan J. For an apt description of the type of discretion 
exercised by judges of the Family Court, see Cardozo, The 
Nature of the Judicial Process (1963), 141. 
67. Currie (1976) F.L.C. 90-101; McDougall (1976) F.L.C. 90-076. 
68. Authorities for this proposition will appear in Chapter Six, 
Part A. 
69. Stowe (1981) F.L.C. 91-027 at 76 273 (Rill Court). See also 
Collins (1977) F.L.C. 90-286; Ehljo (1978) F.L.C. 90-445. 
70. Garrett (1984) F.L.C. 91-539 (Rill Court). See also Carter 
(1981) F.L.C. 91-061; Re Ross-Jones; ex parte Beaumont (1979) 
F.L.C. 90-606 at 78 104 per Gibbs CJ. For the procedure to be 
followed in a case where parties resumed cohabitation after a 
8.79 order and one party earned an equitable interest in 
property subsequent to that order, see Ramsay (1983) F.L.C. 
91-301 (Full Court) and Ramsay (No. 2) (1983) F.L.C. 91-323 
(re-hearing by Nygh J.) 
71. See Chapter Six, Part F. Contrast the position under the 
Matrimonial Property-Act 1980 (Alberta). In Burger v. Burger 
(1986) 48 R.F.L. (2d.) 158, the Court was unable to remedy the 
situation where the husband's debts, incurred through the 
dissipation of assets in the separation period, exceeded the 
value of his remaining property. The Court had no 
jurisdiction to award damages for the deficiency to the wife. 
72. Tye (No. 2) (1976) F.L.C. 90-048; Woodham  (1984) F.L.C. 
91-547. 
73. For example, Cramp, (1979) F.L.C. 90-615; MUrkin (1980) F.L.C. 
90-806; Public Trustee (S.A.) and Mays (1986) F.L.C. 91-651. 
74. This paragraph was considered by the Full Court in Martin  
(1986) F.L.C. 91-737 (superannuation entitlement). 
75. Finns v. Finnis (1978) F.L.C. 90-437; White (1979) F.L.C. 
90-682 (although this adjournment was reversed on appeal for 
different reasons) and Murkin (1980) F.L.C. 90-806. These 
265 
cases were decided before the insertion of 8.79(5) by the 1983 
amendments. Note that 8.79(5) is merely an enabling section: 
CCH Australian Fhmily Law and Practice Reporter (ed. Braun and 
Fowler, 1976 - 1986) para. 36-955. For the position regarding 
the sequestration of a bankrupt's estate before the hearing of 
an application under s.79, see Chapter Six, Part F. 
76. (1985) 48 M.L.R. 44, 59. 
77. Woolley. (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-011 at 76 136 ptr Nygh J. 
78. See generally Kelly (1981) F.L.C. 91-033. 
79. (1976) F.L.C. 90 056 at 72 232. See also Ripper (1977) F.L.C. 
90-228. 
80. By s.84, the Court may order the execution of instruments by a 
court officer where a party has refused or neglected to comply 
with its directions. 
81. S.83 is far less stringent that 8.79A, despite the 1983 
amendments to the section. S.83 is useful in times of 
recession and spiralling inflation where a change to a party's 
financial circumstances is usually inevitable. 
82. S.79(5) was considered by the Full Court in Martin (1986) 
F.L.C. 91-737 (superannuation entitlement). 
83. As to this, see Wade Property Division upon Marriage Breakdown 
(1984), 281. 
84. See generally Wade, ibid., 301 et seq.; Hardingham and Neave 
Australian Family Property Law (1984), 408 et seq. 
85. Smith (1984) F.L.C. 91-525 at 79 243 (Rill Court). 
86. Prior to the amendment, the Court could not alter the 
substantive parts of an order: Molier and Van Wyk  (1980) 
F.L.C. 90-911; Holland (1982) F.L.C. 91-243; Ravasini (1983) 
F.L.C. 91-312. The operation of 8.79A(1)(b) is analysed by 
Gee J. in Rohde (1984) F.L.C. 91-592. 
87. Taylor v. Taylor (1979) F.L.C. 90-674 (High Court). 
88. This was anticipated in Kaki (1981) F.L.C. 91-078 by Gee J. 
89. Hardingam and Neave Australian Family Property Law (1984), 
409. 
90. Some of the respondents to the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies' survey of divorced couples reported that they had 
been subjected to physical abuse or blackmail: for example, 
see Settling Up (ed. MbDonald, 1986), 221. 
91. For example, Vergis v. Vergis (1977) F.L.C. 90-275 at 76 470 
to 76 471. 
92. Taylor v. Taylor (1979) F.L.C. 90-674 at 78 590 per Gibbs J. 
93. Ibid. at 78 599 per Aickin J. 
94. (1984) F.L.C. 91-555. 
95. (1984) F.L.C. 91-555 at 79 487. 
96. As in Wilson v. Wilson (1967) 10 F.L.R. 203; Williamson  v. 
Williamson (1974) 24 F.L.R. 226. 
97. For example, Oliver v. Oliver (1978) F.L.C. 90-482 (Husband's 
non-disclosure of a $6,000 account did not influence the 
proprietary of the agreed property division); Wright (1979) 
F.L.C. 90-221 at 76 147 (There is a "broad area of what might 
be considered a just and equitable settlement": Asche J.). 
98. (1974) 24 F.L.R. 226, 228. See also Holland (1982) F.L.C. 
91-243. 
99. For comment on undue influence in family business dealings, 
see (1985) 129 S.J., 211 and 234. 
1. Webley and McMullen (1979) F.L.C. 90-619; Backhouse v. 
Backhouse (1978) 1 W.L.R. 243. 
2. Cresswell v. Potter (1978) 1 W.L.R. 255n. 
266 
3. Snell Principles of Equity (27th. ed., 1973), 549. See 
O'Brien (1981) F.L.C. 91-094. 
4. v. Lane (1888) 40 Ch.D. 312, 322, pgr Kay J. See 
generally Meagher, Gummow and Lehane Equity (1977), Ch. 16. 
5. (1978) 1 W.L.R. 255n. 
6. In Backhouse v. Backhouse (1978) 1 W.L.R. 243 at 251 to 251, 
Balcombe J. suggested that courts should not encourage 
transfers of property, unaccompanied by legal advice, as 
between husband and wife soon after breakdown of their 
marriage. 
7. Cresswell v. Potter  (1978) 1 W.L.R. 255n., 260. As to consent 
orders made within the provisions of 8.79, see Smith (1984) 
F.L.C. 91-512 (Full Court). 
8. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337, 374. 
9. Note the fine line between "mere" negligence and recklessness: 
C.B.C. of Sydney v. R.H. Brown and Co. (1971) 126 C.L.R. 337 
(High Court). 
10. (1983) F.L.C. 91-365. 
11. See Wade Property Division upon Marriage Breakdown (1984), 
461. 
12. (1983) F.L.C. 91-365. 
13. See Wade Property Division upon Divorce (1982), 262. 
14. (1985) 1. All H.R. 106. 
15. (1986) F.L.C. 91-713. 
16. Regarding evidence of financial circumstances, see Serisier 
and Duff Australian Family Law Forms and Precedents (1986). 
See also (1986) 21 Law News 38. 
17. (1980) F.L.C. 90-820 (Concerned a consent to marriage). 
18. In Woolley (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-011, Nygh J. set down the 
pre-requisites. 
19. As in S. (1980) F.L.C. 90-820. 
20. (1981) F.L.C. 91-078 at 76 557. 
21. On the necessary degree of materiality of a particular act of 
duress, see Barton v. Armstrong (1976) A.C. 104. One 
respondent to the Australian Institute of Family Studies' 
survey of divorced couples reported being subjected to 
blackmail: Settling Up (ed. McDonald, 1986), 221. 
22. Hardingham and treave Australian Family Property Law (1984), 
412. 
23. (1976) F.L.C. 90-124. 
24. (1979) F.L.C. 90-674. 
25. While the High Court was considering s.79A in its un-amended 
form, it is submitted that the interpretation remains the 
same. 
26. (1967) 10 F.L.R. 203. 
27. (1979) F.L.C. 90-674 at 78 595. 
28. Ibid., at 78 594 to 78595. 
. 29. (-1777) F.L.C. 90-266. 
30. Ibid., at 76 197. 
31. See also Kokl (1981) F.L.C. 91-078 at 76 557. This statement 
• considerably enlarges Carmichael J.'s succinct definition in 
• Birbeck v. Birbeck (1970) 16 F.L.R. 78, 92: "To withhold facts 
is not to reveal them or suppress them". 
• 32. Krebs (1976) F.L.C. 90-117. 
33. See, generally, Green and Kwiatek (1982) F.L.C. 91-259. 
267 
34. Manitoba legislation provides the means for a party to obtain 
full disclosure of financial and property matters: see Tutiah 
v. TUtiah (1986) 48 R.F.L. (2d.) 337 (C.A.) and academic 
comments by McLeod at the end of head notes. 
35. Rohde (1984) F.L.C. 91-592. 
36. (1983) F.L.C. 91-365. See 0.17, r.2. 
37. Act No. 23 of 1979, s.13, effective 5th April, 1979. 
38. See Byrne v. Byrne (1965) 7 F.L.R. 342; Gilpin v. Gilpin 





42. See  Sieling (1979) F.L.C. 90-627 at 78 255 for a comprehensive 
review of the law relating to ex parte orders. 
43. Moore v. Moore (1962) N.S.W.R. 522; Gilpin v. Gilpin (1969) 
17 F.L.R. 131; McKenna v. Mckenna (1971) 18 F.L.R. 15; Taylor 
v. Taylor (1979) F.L.C. 90-674. 
44. Taylor, ibid. (incompetent lawyers); Cullen (1976) F.L.C. 
90-093. 
45. Hillman v. Hillman (1977) F.L.C. 90-316 (false evidence as to 
whereabouts of wife's relatives). See Williamson v. 
Williamson (1974) 24 F.L.R. 226, 229. 
46. McKenna v. McKenna (1971) 18 F.L.R. 16, 18, per Allen J. See 
also Holland (1982) F.L.C. 91-243 at 77 339 to 77 341. 
47. For example, Lui (1985) F.L.C. 91-572. (Husband defaulted in 
delivering a certificate of title in accordance with a court 
order.) 
48. (1984) F.L.C. 91-545. (Husband sought damages for breach of 
trust since the wife, acting under an order of the Court to 
sell the matrimonial home, had sold it at an undervalue.) 
49. Ibid. at 79 413. 
50. (1976) F.L.C. 90-047. 
51. (1978) F.L.C. 90-447. 
52. Fogarty J. on this point considered that only half the 
difference should be deducted. 
53. (1978) F.L.C. 90-447 at 77 282. See also Molier and Van Wyk 
(1980) F.L.C. 90-911. 
54. And also (1A) or (1C). 
55. For the interpretation of this phrase as it is used in 
8.85(3), see Heath and Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation 
(1983) 91-362. Nygh J. pointed out that the degree of 
protection to be given remains within the discretion of the 
Court: ibid., 78 427 to 78 430. 
56. Remedied, where its provisions are fulfilled, by s.79A(1)(c). 
57. Parker v. Arcus and Caatiglione (1985) F.L.C. 91-581; Phillips 
(1985) F.L.C. 91-634. 
58. "Act" was substituted for "Part VIII" by the 1983 amendments. 
Prior to the amendment, proceedings had to fall within the 
definition of "matrimonial cause" in s. 4(1) of the Act: 
Whitaker (1980) F.L.C. 90-813 at 75 130 (Nygh J.). A 
disposition of property made before the coming into operation 
of the Family Law Act 1975 is not excluded from the Act's 
ambit: Buckeridge (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-114 (Mill Court). 
59. Parker (1983) F.L.C. 91-364 at 78 445 Etr Nygh J., who 










60. "Disposition" is defined in s.85(5) as including a sale and a 
gift. In Bassola (No. 1) (1985) F.L.C. 91-6Z .3, it was held to 
be "any form of alienation" and not "limited to mere 
assignments, sales or gifts-of property. 
61. Page (1978) F.L.C. - 3Q-525; Rickie (1979) F.L.C. 90-626; 
Whitaker (1980). F.L.C. 90-813. 
62; Whitaker, ibid. Hardingam and Neave Australian Family Property 
Law (1984), 426, fn. 1, express the view that, insofar as 
Abdullah (19781) F.L.C. 91-003 contradicts this proposition, 
it was wrongly decided. 
63. Wade Property Division upon Divorce (1982), 193. 
64. See Chapter Four, Part B. 
65. (1981) F.L.C. 91-104. (The wife claimed that signatures on 
transfers of real estate to third parties had been forged by 
her husband.) 
66. 0.16, rr. 4, 7 and 8; s.38(2) of the Family Law Act provides 
that these may be applied. 
67. Yule v. Janek (1978) F.L.C. 90-439 at 77 223; Dowel v. Murray 
and Anor. (1978) F.L.C. 90-516; Fountain and Anor. v. 
Alexander and Anor. (1982) F.L.C. 91-218. (All High Court 
decisions). 
68. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act  1959 (Cth.), s.120, 
subjective intention had to be proved. See Kovacs (1983) 13 
Fed. L.R. 563, 564. 
69. The Full Court in Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation (1984) 
F.L.C. 91-517 at 79 194 provided a definition of "likely" 
which is commensurate with this statement. See also Koufos v. 
Czarnokow Ltd. (1969) 1 A.C. 350; H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. 
v. Uttley Ingham and Co. Ltd. (1977) 3 W.L.R. 990. Wade 
Property Division upon Divorce (1982), 198 to 199, suggests 
tests for the probability of there being proceedings under the 
Act. 
70. Pflugradt (1981) F.L.C. 91-052 at 76 430 per Elliott J. 
(approved by Full Court in Holley (1982) F.L.C. 91-257 at 77 
440). See also Menz (1980) F.L.C. 90-852; Cullen (1980) 
F.L.C. 90-899; Abdullah (1981) F.L.C. 91-003 at 76 084. 
71. Ivanfy (1978) F.L.C. 90-512; Buckeridge (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 
91-114. 
72. Ivanfy, ibid.; Holley (1982) F.L.C. 91-257. 
73. Thompson (1976) F.L.C. 90-115: evidence of propensity to evade 
or default is necessary before an injunction to restrain 
spending will be granted. 
74. Wade Property Division upon Divorce (1982), 196. 
75. Manz (1980) F.L.C. 90-852; Abdullah (1981) F.L.C. 91-003. 
76. Badcock (1979) F.L.C. 90-723: wife's transfer to a trustee did 
not defeat the husband's s.79 claim as the wife still legally 
controlled the trustee. 
77. (1981) F.L.C. 91-000. 
78. See, generally, Davern Wright Testator's Family Maintenance in 
Australia and New Zealand (3rd. ed., 1974); Hardingam, Neave 
and Ford Wills and Intestacy (1983). 
79. For example, Schaefer v. Schuhmann (1972) A.C. 572. 
80. Cummins (1977) F.L.C. 90-209. 
81. For the effects of 8.79(8), see Wade Property Division upon 
Marriage Breakdown (1984), 92 to 96. 
82. Whitaker (1980) F.L.C. 90-813 at 75 129; Holley (1982) F.L.C. 
91-257; Heath (1983) F.L.C. 91-362 (Nygh J. at first 
instance.) 
269 
83. (1984) F.L.C. 91-517 at 71 194. 
84. Ascot Investments (1981) F.L.C. 91-000. 
85. Re Dovey: ex parte lines (1979) F.L.C. 90-616. 
86. For example, Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation (1984) F.L.C. 
91-517. 
87. Whitaker (1980) F.L.C. 90-813 at 75 130 per  Nygh J.; 
Buckeridge (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-005. 
88. (1983) F.L.C. 91-362 at 78 427. 
89. See also Ivanfy (1978) F.L.C. 90-512; Pflugradt (1981) F.L.C. 
91-052; Menz (1980) F.L.C. 90-852; Cullen (1980) F.L.C. 
90-899. 
90. (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1628 at 1637. 
91. Alberta legislation expressly provides that a transfer mala 
fides which reduces the matrimonial assets to the detriment of 
the other spouse maybe taken into account: Shone (1977) 17 
Alb. L.R. 143, 176. 
92. Includes valuable consideration (TWyne's Case (1602) 3 Co. 
Rep. 806; 76 E.R. 809; Mathews v. Feaver (1786) 1 Cox. Eq. 
Cases 278; 29 E.R. 1165; Re David and Adlard (1914) 2 K.B. 
694) and marriage (Campion v. Cotton (1810) 17 yes. 263; 34 
E.R. 102; Hardey v. Green (1849) 12 Beav. 182; 50 E.R. 1029) 
but not consideration of love and affection. 
93. In Heath; Westpac Banking Corporation (1983) F.L.C. 91-362, 
the wife's improper caveat prevented the husband's mortgage 
from being registered by the bank. 
94. Heath, ibid., at 78 427. 
95. See Glass J.A. in Benjamin v. Benjamin (1976) 11 A.L.R. 211, 
216, in relation to similar wording in 8.120(3) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959. 
96. (1981) F.L.C. 91-003. 
97. Such as that in Cullen (1980) F.L.C. 90-899 and Abdullah, 
ibid. 
98. (1983) F.L.C. 91-362. 
99. (1980) F.L.C. 90-813 at 75 130. 
1. This is the example given in CCH Australian Family Law and 
Practice Reporter (1976-1986), para. 35 063. 
2. (1981) F.L.C. 91-000. 
3. Whitaker (1980) F.L.C. 90-813, relying on Ganas v. Ganas 
(1971) 18 F.L.R. 298. • 
4. Issues Paper No. 6, Jan. 1985, 27. 
5. Davies (1980) F.L.C. 90-868; Milland (1981) F.L.C. 91-065; 
Holley (1982) F.L.C. 91-257. 
6. Wallmann (1982) F.L.C. 91-204. 
7. The associated jurisdiction is defined by Nygh J. in Gubbay 
(1984) F.L.C. 91-545 at 79 414. 
8. (1982) F.L.C. 91-241. 
9. (1982) F.L.C. 91-204. 
10. (1982) F.L.C. 91-241. 
11. Ibid., 77 328, per Frederic° J. See further Chapter Six, Part 
F. 
12. As in Buckeridge (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-114; Ivanfy (1978) 
F.L.C. 90-512. 
13. CCH Australian Family Law and Practice Reporter (1976 - 1986), 
para. 45-045. 
14. Szelley and Shelley  (1977) F.L.C. 90-323. 
15. (1981) F.L.C. 91-003 at 76 086. 
16. In Ivanfy (1978) F.L.C. 90-512, an order was made that they be 
paid into court. 
270 
17. As in Ivanfy, ibid. 
18. Pflugradt (1981) F.L.C. 91-052. 
19. Wilkes (1981) F.L.C. 91-060. (Wife disposed of a caravan 
prior to the hearing.) 
20. For example, AbdUllah (1981) F.L.C. 91-003. (Husband's 
evidence that his property had been lost while gambling not 
believed). 
21. Hardin'gam and Neave Australian Family Property Law (1984), 368 
et seq. 
22. For a review of the Court's interpretation of this provision, 
see Joske Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law and Practice  
(5th ed., 1969), 617 et seq. 
23. For example, see Hon. Justice Strauss' comments in (1984) 58 
L.I.J. 1452. 
24. Hardingham and Neave Australian Family Property Law (1984), 
369. 
25. See Perlman v. Perlman (1984) F.L.C. 91-500. 
26. Hardingham and Neave Australian Family Property Law (1984), 
370, suggest that the proceedings must constitute a 
"matrimonial cause" within paragraph (ca) of the definition in 
8.4(1) and therefore be between the parties to the marriage, 
but it is submitted that they have overlooked the 1983 
amendment to 8.31(1). 
27. Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (0th.), 8.86(2); Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 (Eng.). 
28. (1929) P.225, 232 (Hill J.). 
29. Prescott v. Fellowes (1958) P. 260. 
30. Bosworthwick v. Bosworthwick (1927) P. 24. 
31. Miller Family Property and Financial Provision (1974), 202 to 
203, cited by Hardingham and Neave Australian Family Property 
Law (1984), 370. 
32. (1960) 160 C.L.R. 170, 174. 
33. Prinsell v. Prinsep (1929) P. 225. 
34. (1960) P. 201, 210. 
35. Meller v. Meller (1967) 10 F.L.R. 12, 14 (Jenkyn J.). 
36. Cook v. Cook (1962) P. 325. 
37. Hargreaves v. Hargreaves (1926) P. 42; Burnett v. Burnett  
(1936) P. 1. 
38. Young •v. Young (1962) P. 27. 
39. Marsh v. Marsh (1878) 47 L.J.P. 78; Valiance v. Valiance 
(1907) 77 L.J.P. 33. 
40. Prinsep v. Prinsep (1929) P. 225; General Accident Fire and 
Life Assurance Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. I.R.C. (1963) 3 All 
E.R. 259. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Compton v. Compton (1960) p. 261; Purnell v. Purnell (1961) P. 
141. 
43. Prinsep v. Prinsep (1929) P. 225. 
44. Australian Family Property Law  (1984), 372 to 373. 
45. Heller v. Meller (1967) 10 F.L.R. 12; see also Whitton v. 
Whitton(1901) P. 348; Purnell v. Purnell (1961) P. 141. 
46. Meller v. Meller, ibid., 18, per Jenkyn J. 
47. Tiggfr F.L.C. 91-555. 
48. Kovacs (1985) 59 L.I.J. 296. See also Hardingham and Neave 
Australian Family Property Law (1984), 373. 
271 
49. Note that an injunction cannot be categorised as an exercise 
of the Court's power in relation to property unless it effects 
a change of proprietary interests: Mullane v. Mullane (1983) 
F.L.C. 91-303. 
50. Burke Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary (6th. ed., 1976). 
51. For the law relating to interlocutory injunctions, see 
American Cynamid v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) A.C. 396 (applied by 
the Full Court in Smith and Saywell (1980)) F.L.C. 90-856; 
Stowe (1981) F.L.C. 91-027; Buckeridge (No. 2) (1982) F.L.C. 
91-114. 
52. See Aldred (1984) F.L.C. 91-510 (Nygh J.). 
53. The Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 
(Eng.), s. 45(1), provides that mandamus or injunctions are 
available in any division of the High Court. 
54. (1984) F.L.C. 91-555 at 79 487. 
55. See also Re Dovey; ex parte Ross (1979) F.L.C. 90-616 at 78 
190 to 78 191; Re Ross-Jones; ex parte Beaumont (1979) F.L.C. 
90-606 at 78 103. 
56. Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; ex parte Green (1984) F.L.C. 
91-555 at 79 487 per Gibbs CJ., with whom Mason and Brennan 
JJ. agreed. Therefore, for example, powers in the Family 
Court to punish acts in the nature of contempt must be found 
in the Act (s. 35, s.108, 8.80(d) and 8.114(4)). 
57. (1979) F.L.C. 90-627 at 78 264. See also J. (1979) F.LX. 
90-718 at 78 871 (Anderson J.). 
58. Fedele (1986) F.L.C. 91-744 at 75 431 (with special reference 
to s.114(1). . 
59. For example, see Dean (1977) F.L.C. 90-213 at 76 096; Rowe 
(1980) F.L.C. 90-895 at 75 643; Page (1981) F.L.C. 91-625 at 
76 248. Of course, the very terms of the section exhort 
Judges exercising jurisidiction under the Act to have regard 
to the principles. 
60. (1977) F.L.C. 90-200 at 76 057 (Full Court). Note that the 
application of the principle to that case has since been held 
to be erroneous). 
61. (1984) F.L.C. 91-510 at 79 155 (Injunction to restrain 
dealings with property pending determination of an application 
under 8.44(3)). 
62. (1976) F.L.C. 90-115 at 75 524. 
63. See Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies (3rd. ed., 
1980), Chapter 4. 
64. Regarding applications for injunctions, see Serisier and Duff 
Australian Family Law Forms and Precedents (1986). 
65. Stowe (1981) F.L.C. 91-027. For a close analysis of the 
reasons for refusal to grant an injunction, see Spry The 
Principles of Equitable Remedies (3rd. ed., 1980), Chapter 4. 
66. See especially Stowe, supra., at 76 260 to 76 261. 
67. But note the proviso "other than proceedings under a• law of a 
State or Territory prescribed for the purposes of s.114AB" 
inserted in 1983. S.114AB preserves the operation of a 
prescribed law of a State or territory that is capable of 
operating concurrently with s.114. 
68. See, for example, Tansell (1977) F.L.C. 90-307 at 76 633. 
69. Farr (1976) F.L.C. 90-133. 
70. Dickey Family Law and Property: 3 Essays (McCall, Dickey and 
Wade, 1980), 55 at 59. 
272 
71. See, for example, Davis (1976) F.L.C. 90-062 at 75 308; King 
(1977) F.L.C. 90-299 at 76 582; Thnsell (1977) F.L.C. 90-307 
at 76 632, 76 634. 
72. McCarney (1977) F.L.C. 90-200 at 76 058; Tlinsell v. Thnsell 
(1977) F.L.C. 90-280 at 76 495 and especially at 76 502 to 76 
503; Sieling (1979) F.L.C. 90-627 at 78 258 to 78 259. 
73. The matter of exclusive occupancy is of no relevance to this 
study. For the law relating to it, see Mullane v. Mullane 
(1983) F.L.C. 91-303 (High Court). 
74. For example, see Rickie (1979) F.L.C. 90-626; Mkrtiniello 
(1981) F.L.C. 91-050 at 76 419. 
75. Page (1978) F.L.C. 90-525, especially at 77 792 andRe Dover; 
ex parte Ross (1979) F.L.C. 90-616 at 78 191 to 78 192 
(although in the latter case the injunction was allowed to lie 
to prevent the husband from exercising his voting rights as a 
shareholder and director of the company so it could sell the 
matrimonial home.) 
76. Australian Family Property Law (1984), 432. 
77. As when there is an application for leave to institute 
proceedings out of time under 8.44(3): Aldred (1984) F.L.C. 
91-510. 
78. Regarding the uncertainties of the application and 
interpretation of paragraph (ca)(i), see Chapter Four, Part B. 
79. Murkin (1980) F.L.C. 90-806 at 75 082. 
80. As in Re Davey; ex parte Ross (1979) F.L.C. 90-616; Stowe 
(1981) F.L.C. 91-027, where a spouse was restrained from 
exercising fiduciary powers. 
81. The so-called 1Mareva injunction" gets its name fromliareva 
Campania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers  
(1980) 1 All E.R. 213. 
82. Page (1978) F.L.C. 90-525; Rickie (1979) F.L.C. 90-626; Harris 
(1980) F.L.C. 90-812; BurriaiW7980) F.L.C. 90-902. (Contra: 
Cullen (1980) F.L.C. 90-899; Walker (1977) F.L.C. 90-306. In 
Cullen, it was suggested that the Court might be able to bind 
the respondent's agent under s.114(1). See also W. (1982) 
F.L.C. 91-238.) 
83. Howard (1982) F.L.C. 91-279. 
84. Kalenjuk (1977) F.L.C. 90-218. (Husband was restrained from 
selling, disposing of or otherwise dealing with his 
half-interest in a house notwithstanding that this would 
affect the ability of the co-owner of the property to deal 
with his interest in the property.) In Re Dovey; ex parte 
Ross (1979) F.L.C. 90-616, the High Court took this approach. 
85. For example, see Buckeridge (No. 2) (1982) F.L.C. 91-114 at 76 
871 (Simpson J.). Note the comment about the High Court's 
approach in Perlman v. Perlman (1984) F.L.C. 91-500 below. 
86. Perlman v. Perlman (1984) F.L.C. 91-500 at 79 056 per Gibbs 
CJ.; Re Ross Jones and Marinovich; ex parte Green (1984) 
F.L.C. 91-555 at 79 485 to 79 486 per Gibbs CJ., with whom 
Mason and Brennan JJ. agreed. 
87. For example, McCarney (1977) F.L.C. 90-200 at 76 056, 76 058. 
For the law relating to enforcement, see Perlman v. Perlman 
(1984) F.L.C. 91-500. 
88. Schmidt (1980) F.L.C. 90-873. 
89. Kovacs (1983) 57 L.I.J. 563, 564. 
90. For the extent to which it can control third parties, see 




1. Finlay (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 120, 123. 
2. Cretney Principles of Family Law (4th ed., 1984), 99 to 103, 
passim. See also Finlay (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 120, 120 to 125, 
passim . 3. By c.85 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (Eng.), an 
adulteress was absolutely barred from receiving maintenance. 
4. The first reported case where this concession was made appears 
to be Ashcroft v. Ashcroft (1902) P. 270. 
5. The tenor of these is reflected in Lord Denning M.R.'s use of 
the phrase "obvious and gross" in Wachtel v. Wachtel (1973) 
Fain. 72. 
6. Finlay (1978) 98 L.Q.R. 120, 125. As reasons for this, he 
gives an increasingly secular outlook, more discerning and 
complex psychological insights into human relationships and 
the progress of women towards equality. See also Payne (1969) 
3 Ottawa L.R. 373, 391. 
7. The Commission reported in 1966 in Putting Asunder. 
8. In The Grounds for Divorce: The Field of Choice  (1966) Cmmd• 
3123. 
9. Ibid.,. para. 15. The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce 
(1956) - the Morton Commission - had discussed irretrievable 
breakdown as a basis for divorce but all except one member 
(Lord Walker) . favoured the retention of the matrimonial' 
offence principle, and nine were opposed to the introduction 
of breakdown even as an alternative ground for divorce: see 
Cretney Principles of Family Law (4th ed., 1984), 103, and 
authorities there cited. 
10. See Thomson (1985) Scots Law Times 29, 33 to 35. 
11. Wachtel v. Wachtel (1973) 2 W.L.R. 84, 90 (decision at first 
instance). 
12. See also Cretney Principles of Family Law (4th ed., 1984), 800 
to 806; (1985) 14 Aust. Family Physician 434 to 435; 439 to 
440; (1985) Reform 122, quoting Professor David Brambly, 
Commissioner for the Matrimonial Property Inquiry being 
conducted by the Australian Law Reform Commission. 
13. Neumayer in The Reform of Family Law in Europe (ed. Chloros, 
1978), 1 at 6. 
14. See McKenna (1970) 30 M.L.R. 121 for the background to the 
legislation. The spirit of the Act has been retained by its 
successors in legislation. 
15. Criticised by Finlay (1975) 38 M.L.R. 153, 153 to 155. See 
Putting Asunder (1966), para. 9: fault and breakdown grounds 
are incompatible. Cretney Principles of Family Law (4th ed. 
1984), 214, 216 to 217 claims that the fault concept is still 
significant in English law. 
16. The Report of the Joint Select Committee on the Family Law Act 
(1980), Vol. 1, 42, recommended that this not be changed and 
the Commonwealth Parliament itself, on a bipartism basis, 
re-affirmed the policy in 1983. As to the Act's effect on the 
divorce rate, see Carmichael "Australian Divorce Rates: is a 
Real Decline at Hand?" in Making Marriage and Family Work 
(Report of National Conference 1986 University of Melbourne, 
Vic. Marriage Institute), 63. See also McDonald A.I.F.S. 
Newsletter No. 16, August 1986, 19. 
274 
17. For a recent interpretation of 8.48, see Batty (1986) F.L.C. - 
91-703. 8.104 of the Act provides for the recognition of 
foreign divorces. The Hague Convention on the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal Separations expressly provides that 
findings of fault do not apply to the recognition of divorce, 
so that accession to the Convention by the Australian 
Government is consonant with the general provisions of the Act 
and their judicial interpretation. For comment, see (1984) 58 
A.L.J. 128 and Mb-Clean Recognition of Family Judgments in the 
Commonwealth (1983), 73 to 83. 
18. Settling Up (ed. McDonald, 1986) 6. 
19. Finlay (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 120, 132. As to whether fault is 
nevertheless covertly taken into consideration by the courts, 
or is a matter taken into account when financial matters are 
sttled by consent or as the result of an agreement worked out 
with a Registrar, little is known: Chisolm and Jessep (1981) 4 
U.N.S.W.L.J. 43, 44. Baxter (1975) 25 Uhl. Toronto L.J. 239, 
260, claims that fault considerations are present in latent 
form. A survey conducted by the Wolfson College, Oxford, in 
1977 suggests that this is so: Barrington Baker et al. The 
Matrimonial Jurisdiction of Registrars: The Exercise of the  
Matrimonial Jurisdiction by Registrars in England and Wales  
(C.S.S.S. 1977). 
20. Page (1986) Australian Family Lawyer 11. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. For example, see A.L.R.C. Discussion Paper No. 22 Matrimonial 
Property Law (June 1985), para. 50. The English Law 
Commission has reported a similar attitude: Law Commission 
Report No. 112, para. 37. 
24. Harrison in Settling Up (ed. McDonald, 1986), 241 at 257. See 
also Page (1985) Australian Family Lawyer 11. 
25. (1985) Aust. Law News, 20, 21. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid. See also comments by Professor Lauchlan Chipman which 
were reported in (1985) Reform 121, 121 to 122. 
28. Family Law in Australia: A Report of the Joint Select 
Committee on the Family Law Act, Vol. 1 (1980), para. 5.45. 
See Harrison (1980) 5 Legal Services Bulletin 247, 248. Note 
that a minority report of the Committee opposed the 
recommendation. 
29. Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates (Senate) (13th 
October 1981), 1107. This stance was later supported by the 
then Attorney-General, Senator Gareth Evans: Parliamentary 
Debates (Senate)(8th September, 1983), 555. 
30. The words underlined show the proposed change to the wording 
of s.75(2)(o). 
31. A.L.R.C. Discussion Paper No. 22 Matrimonial Property Law, 
para. 50. 
32. The symposium was chaired by Treyvaud J. 
33. Institute of Family Studies (now "Australian Institute of 
Family Studies") Newsletter No. 11, December 1984, 19. 
34. (1985) Reform 122. It should be noted that Page has argued 
strenuously for the re-introduction of fault considerations in 
order to bring the lgal system into step with public opinion: 
(1985) Australian Family Lawyer 11. 
35. Discussion Paper No. 22, para. 50. 
275 
36. The then Attorney-General, Senator Lionel Murphy, in his 
Second Reading Speech introducing the Family Law Bill in 1974, 
stated that the philosophical basis of the new law was the 
belief that ".... an inquiry into the cause of breakdown was 
not proper": Finlay (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 120, 130. 
37. See also a report on comments of Professor Hambly, 
Commissioner for the A,L.R.C. Matrimonial Property Inquiry, 
which were made to the Second National Conference of the 
Australian Association of Marriage and Family Counsellors in 
(1985) Reform 122. In its report, A Better Way Out, the 
Family Law Sub-Committee of the Law Society (U.K.), January 
1979, makes a similar statement. 
38. Prisnall (1981) 47 Brooklyn L.R. 667,81. It should be noted 
that marital fault has been expressly excluded from 
consideration in maintenance and property awards in 18 States, 
included as a discretionary factor in 15 States and omitted 
from statutory mention in another 10 States: Freed and Foster 
(1983) 16 Fain. L.Q. 289, 322 to 323. 
39. It has already been noted that a recommendation by the Joint 
Select Committee that this be amended to take account of the 
respondent's conduct has not been implemented. See also 
Chisolm and Jessep (1981) 4 U.N.S.W.L.J. 43,66. 
40. See Lawn and Bendiak (1979) 17 Alberta L.R. 372, 393, for 
academic comment on the relevance of conduct per se. 
41. For example, see Richards (1976) F.L.C. 90-037 at 75 142 (Full 
Court); Willett (1976) F.L.C. 90-022; Petterd (1976) F.L.C. 
90-065; McLeod and Somlo (1976) F.L.C. 90-073; Zappacosta  
(1976) F.L.C. 90-089; Rainbird (1977) F.L.C. 90-256. Contrast 
Issom (1977) F.L.C. 90-238 (maintenance denied because the 
wife's behaviour was "obvious and gross"; criticised by 
Chisolm and Jessep (1981) 4 U.N.S.W.L.J. 43, 54) and note 
obiter dicta by Nygh J. in Eliades (1981) F.L.C. 91-022 (also 
a claim for maintenance; his Honour suggested that it was 
arguable that, if an applicant for maintenance deliberately 
engagess in conduct by which she deprives herself of her 
husband's financial support, it maybe necessary to take that 
conduct into account.) See also Gates v. Gates (1976) 1 Fain. 
L.R. 11,452 (husband's desertion regarded as relevant to a 
property application. The decision was held by the Full Court 
in Wells (1978-79) 4 Fam.L.R. 57 to be incorrect.) Compare 
McLeod and Somlo (1976) F.L.C. 90-073 (wife's association with 
another man of "some financial substance" whom she would soon 
marry was relevant, not bcause of her conduct per se, but 
because the association brought financial implications. Note, 
however, that conduct has been considered relevant in Married 
Women's Property -decisions; see Cracknell v. Cracknell (1971) 
3 W.L.R. 490 and comment in Leibrandt (1976) F.L.C. 90-058 at 
75 260. 
42. Gray Property Reallocation on Divorce (1976), 266. 
43. (1976) F.L.C. 90-124. 
44. See Soblusky, ibid., at 75 568 to 75 669 for a summary of the 
principles that the Rill Court felt to be relevant to a 
maintenance application, but note Chisolm and Jessep (1981) 4 
U.N.S.W.L.J. 43, 50, for a criticism of their approach. 
45. (1978) F.L.C. 90-500. See also Burdon and Nikoup-(1977) F.L.C. 
90-293, where Marshall SJ. at 76 557 said, "It is not 
difficult to envisage settlement of property applications in 
276 
which the contribution of a party in the capacity of homemaker 
and parent could be in issue and involve consideration of 
conduct of a 'fault' nature". 
46. Ferguson (1978) F.L.C. 90-500 at 77 606 per Watson and Wood 
47. The Rill Court recognised this in Wells (1978-9) Fam. 
at 61 (Watson SJ., Lusink and Gun JJ.) 
48. For a brief analysis of the English law of divorce, see 
Weitzman in The Resolution of Family Conflict (ed. Eekelaar 
and Katz, 1984), 461, 463 to 464. See also Cretney Principles 
of Family Law (4th ed., 1984) 214, 216 to 217, for the 
continued significance of fault. 
49. Gray Reallocation of Property on Divorce (1976), 266. Of 
course, he recommends the introduction of a regime of joint 
ownership of "matrimonial property" whereas no such regime of 
matrimonial property exists in Australia, nor does it exist in 
England. The New Zealand legislature has recognised that 
matrimonial misconduct should "not be taken into account to 
diminish or detract from the positive contribution .... unless 
the misconduct has been gross and palpable and has 
significantly affected the extent or value of the matrimonial 
property": s.18(3) Matrimonial Property Act  1976 (N. Z.). The 
section was interpreted by Jeffries J. in Hackett v. Hackett 
(1977) 2 N.Z.L.R. 429, 433. 
50. The Australian Law Reform Commission recommends that the 
present system of taking into account only that conduct which 
affects property or finances be continued: Summary of 
Discussion Paper No. 22 (June 1985), para. 7. 
51. This was recognised by the Scottish Law reform Commission in 
Family Law: Report on Aliment and Financial Provision (Report 
No. 67 of 1981 at para. 3.186). For details, see Beech (1982) 
98 L.Q.R. 621, 652 to 655. 
52. Ibid. The Scots would be prepared to look at the conduct of 
an application for maintenance as well: ibid. This was the 
approach taken by Fogarty J. in Issom (1977) F.L.C. 90-328. 
Compare the position under Testator's Family Maintenance 
legislation where conduct is to be taken into account: see 
Smith (1984) F.L.C. 91-525 at 79 244 (Nygh J.) 
53. It should be noted, however, that McDonald and Weston, in a 
paper, "The Data Base for Child Support Reform", presented to 
the Workshop in Child Support Issues, Social Justice Project, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1986, reported that 
figures for September 1982 show that only 36% of divorced 
women and 20% of re-married women with the care of children 
from a former marriage were receiving regular maintenance 
payments: Harrison and Tucker in Settling Up (ed. McDonald 
1986), 259 at 260. For a general survey of maintenance 
arrangements, see Harrison and Tucker, ibid., 259 to 267. 
54. (1976) F.L.C. 90-216 at 76 125. 
55. Note that Mr. Lionel Bowen, M.H.R. on 19th October 1983 
(Weekly Hansard, No. 11, 1983, page 171) stated during the 
Second Reading Debate on the Family Law Amendment Bill 1981: 
"I am satisfied that the courts are interpreting the matter 
(the extent to which conduct should be relevant) to mean 
economic circumstances." The relevance of conduct having 
economic consequences has been specifically recognised by 
legislation in other jurisdictions. See, generally, Kovacs 
(1980) 6 Uhl. Ths. L.R. 227, 253. For the Canadian position, 
277 
see McLean (1981) 31 Uhl. Toronto L.R. 363, 373 and 424. For 
the attitude of New Zealand courts to such conduct, see Atkin 
(1979) 10 V.U.W.L.R. 93, 112 to 113. For the American 
position, see Freed and Foster (1973) 7 Fam. L.Q. 275, 280 to 
343. 
56. (1981) 28 U.C.L.A.L.R. 1181, 1186. 
57. Property Division upon Divorce (1982), 120. 
58. In W. (1980) F.L.C. 90-872 at 75 526, Nygh J. held that a wife 
was not a failure for keeping the husband's legal practice out 
of the home. 
59. Professor Hambly, Commissioner for the Australian Law Reform 
Commission's Matrimonial Property Inquiry, commented on this 
in a speech he made to the Second National Conference of the 
Australian Association of Marriage and Family Counsellors: 
(1985)Beform 121, 122. 
60. Note that by s.101 of the Family Law Act, the asking of an 
"offensive" or "scandalous" question is prohibited undess the 
Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that 
the question be answered. Costs will also be awarded where 
unreasonable behaviour has led to unnecessary legal oosts on 
the part of the other: see further Part D of this chapter. 
61. Wade Property Division upon Divorce (1982), 181. See Hewitt 
(1977) 42 Sask L.R. 260, 267 for the Canadian perspective. 
62. (1986) F.L.C. 91-712. 
63. For comment, see Family Law: Report on Aliment and Financial 
Provision Scot. Law Commission No. 67, para. 3.37. 
64. The fettering, of this broad discretion has been disapproved by 
judges of high authority. For example, see Mallet v. Mallet 
(1984) F.L.C. 91-507 at 79 110. See generally Evans v. 
Bartlam (1937) A.C. 473 at 488 to 489; Gardner v. Jaz (1885) 
29 Ch.D. 50, 58. The Australian Law Reform Commission has 
suggested the enactment of guidelines to counter the uncertain 
effect of the judicial discretion extended under the present 
form of the Family Law Act: Discussion Paper No. 22 
Matrimonial Property Law (June 1985), pares. 150, 151, to 159. 
PART B: 
65. (1976) 2 N.Z.L.R. 715 (P.C.) at 728. His Lordship was 
interpreting 8.18 of the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 (N.Z.) 
which referred to contributions to the marriage partnership. 
66. (1978) F.L.C. 90-500 at 77 606. See also Burdon and Nikou  
(1977) F.L.C. 90-293 at 76 557 (Marshall SJ.). In Ferguson 
(1978) F.L.C. 90-500, Watson and Wood SJJ. were prepared to 
apply the principles set down in s.43 to such a case but 
Strauss J. at 77 612 said that, in his view, 8.43 does not 
appear to apply to "matters" in the sense of 2.75(2)(o) ".... 
but to principles to which regard must be had in the exercise 
of the Court's jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act". Therefore, justification for taking into account 
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(Murray J.). 
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90. (1981) F.L.C. 91-093. 
91. (1982) F.L.C. 91-257 at 77 438. 
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95. Compare Dow-Sainter (1980) F.L.C. 90-890 (Rill Court): no 
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280 
hold as to what is 'good' or 'proper' for the housewife and 
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219. At first instance, the wife was left with 3/14 of 
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49. But note the warning of Shone (1977) 17 Alberta L.R. 143, 174, 
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78. Since the amendments made to the -Married Women's Property Act 
1882 (Eng.) in 1964, actions between spouses for detinue and 
conversion of chattels may be taken under the summary 
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83. Acts Interpretation Act 1901-1966 (Cth.), s.13(1) and s.13(3). 
84. Under the common law concept of unity of person, the husband 
and the wife could not sue each other. 
85. The wife had not specifically pleaded her claim but she was 
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(1974) 13 R.F.L. (2d.) 352 (B.C.S.C.). 
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9. (1977) F.L.C. 90-216. 
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Wood J. took the woman's capacity to pay into account when he 
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Chisholm and Jessep (1981) 4 U.N.S.W.L.J. 43, 55. 
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15. (1980) F.L.C. 90-886. 
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17. (1977) F.L.C. 90-216. 
18. Hack (1980) F.L.C. 90-886 at 75 595. But compare Sharp v. 
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order under s.79 was consonant with the duty imposed on the 
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wife's pension entitlements* Hack (1980) F.L.C. 90-886 at 75 597. 
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Financial Consequences of Divorce, para. 39) recommended the-- retention of conduct in the list of circumstances to which the 
court should have regard where it would be inequitable to do otherwise. 
21. (1983) F.L.C. 91-316. 
22. (1976) F.L.C. 90-048. 
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Mead (1983) F.L.C. 91-354: the Court realised that the husband 
would be unlikely to repay debts even though he had incurred 
them and should therefore bear responsibility for them. 
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36. (1982) 43 A.L.R. 700, 702. The principle was denied in Re 
Berry (A bankrupt) (1978) 2 N.Z.L.R. 373 (C.A.) 
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Three, Part A, paragraph (e) of this study. 
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F.L.C. 91-252. 
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Suters (1983) . F.L.C. 91-365 (non-disclosure held to amount to 
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Lords); Briese (1986) F.L.C. 91-713; Oriolo (1985) F.L.C. 
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91-028; Rouse (1981) F.L.C. 91-073; Barro (No. 2) (1983) 
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56. Kelly (No. 2) (1981) F.L.C. 91-108; Greedy X1982) F.L.C. 91-250; Jensen (1982) F.L.C. 91-262. In Hogan (1986) F.L.C. 
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F.L.C. 91-034. 
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Martin v. Martin (1959) 110 C.L.R. 297 at 305 (High Court). 
For comment on the use of tax planning schemes to consolidate 
the• interests of the husband to the detriment of the wife, see 
Business Review Weekly, 4-11 September 1982, and Browne (1984) 
Personal Investment (Feb. issue), 55. Compare Pickard (1981) 
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frequently reported that their spouses had money hidden away 
in accounts of their own, but they had no evidence of this or 
the amounts allegedly involved. 
PART E: 
96. Ibid., 203. 
97. Note that the law in England has been radically altered as to 
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English decision, see Shinh v. Shinh (1977) 1 All E.R. 97, 
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291 
13. Although the case concerned a maintenance application, it is 
submitted that the principle remains the same. 
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17. (1980) F.L.C. 90-908. 
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Note, however, the exception with respect to the value of an 
interest in a joint tenancy described by Wood SJ. in L. (1978) 
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24. (1981) F.L.C. 91-021. 
25. (1981) F.L.C. 91-003. 
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(1979) F.L.C. 90-606 (High Court), or unless the accrued 
jurisdiction of the Family Court is applicable in the 
circumstances of the case. (See further Chapter Four, Part 
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35. Or s.85A where trust property is concerned. 
36. As in Abdullah (1981) F.L.C. 91-003. 
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38. The step-brother's claim in Antonarkis v. Delly (1976) F.L.C. 
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39. Ascot Developments Pty. Ltd. v. Harper and Harper (1981) 
F.L.C. 91-000 at 76 061 pgr Gibbs CJ. 
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41. (1981) F.L.C. 91-104. 
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heading "Section 85". 
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W. (1982) F.L.C. 91-238. 
44. (1984) F.L.C. 91-553. 
45. Prince (1984) F.L.C. 91-501 at 79 084 per Fogarty J. 
46. EilTi7(No. 2) (1983) F.L.C. 91-317. 
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48. For example, see Reynolds (1985) F.L.C. 91-632, where the 
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49. (1980) F.L.C. 90-908. 
50. Compare Anderson (1981) F.L.C. 91-104, where the wife's 
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take the case to the Supreme Court. 
51. (1981) F.L.C. 91-085. 
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53. Contrast Zdavkovic (1982) F.L.C. 91-270, where it was held 
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debt. Contrast also Wagner and Wagner; Wolfgramm (1984) 
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Prince (1984) F.L.C. 91-501 at 79 076.) It is arguable that 
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42. Such need only be "limited in duration" since the High Court's 
decision in Mullane v. Mullane (1983) F.L.C. 91-303. 
43. (1984) F.L.C. 91-555. 
44. (1981) F.L.C. 91-027. 
45. (1982) F.L.C. 91-228. 
46. (1981) F.L.C. 91-108. 
47. (1980) F.L.C. 90-898. 
48. Kovacs (1985) 59 L.I.J. 296, 301. 
49. (1981) F.L.C. 91-000 at 76 061 to 76 062 ws Gibbs CJ. 
50. (1982)F.L.C. 91-279. The wife, after separation, became aware 
that negotiations for the sale of the matrimonial home, which 
was owned by a company of which the husband was the managing 
director, were at an advanced stage. The husband had not made 
a full disclosure of them to the wife and had professed 
ignorance to the Court. See also Vodenciotis (1979) F.L.C. 
90-617, 78 196. 
51. Gibbs J. 's obiter dicta in Ascot Investments  (1981) F.L.C. 
91-000 at 76 061 to 76 062 were relied upon. His Honour 
expressed a similar view as to the matrimonial home in Re 
Dovey; ex parte Ross (1979) F.L.C. 90-616. In Ascot, supra., 
at 76 065, Murphy J. said the exception should embrace all 
property. 
52. (1982) F.L.C. 91-279. 
53. Kovacs (1985) 59 L.I.J. 296, 302. 
54. As to the Family Court's accrued jurisdiction, see Chapter 
Four, Part A, of this study. 
55. (1984) F.L.C. 91-517 (Full Court). 
56. Kovacs (1985) 59 L.I.J. 296, 302, suggests that in the light 
of the decision in Green (1984) 91-555, the High Court is 
likely to strike down s.85A because of the power it contains 
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to affect the interests of third parties. The constitutional 
validity of a similar provision (S.86(2)) in the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1959 (0th.) was never tested. 
CHAPrER SEVEN  
1. Although these boundaries have been extended by the enactment 
of the Family Law Amendment Act 1983, operative from 25th 
November 1983. 
2. S.78(3). 
3. Re Ross-Jones; ex parte Beaumont (1979) F.L.C. 90-606; Ascot 
Investments (1981) F.L.C. 91-000; Re Ross-Jones and 
Marinovich; ex parte Green (1984) F.L.C. 91-555. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission has expressed the view that 
the flexibility of the Family Law Act provides more scope for 
controlling trusts and companies than any alternative 
matrimonial property system: Discussion Paper No. 22 
Matrimonial Property Law (June 1985), para. 73. 
4. For example, see Russell: Farrelly (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 594; R. 
v. Demack; ex parte Plummer (1977) F.L.C. 90-244; Dowel v. 
Murray (1978) F.L.C. 90-516; R. v. Lambert: ex erte Plummer 
(1980) F.L.C. 90-904; Gazzo v. Comptroller of Stamps (Vic.) 
(1981) F.L.C. 90-101; Cormick v. Salmon (1984) F.L.C. 91-554. 
5. As to this, see Editorial Comment (1983) 57 A.L.J. 548, 549 to 
560; Australian Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper No. 22 
Matrimonial Property Law (June 1985), pares. 25, 73. 
6. It is submitted, then, that it is not possible for the Federal 
Parliament to broaden the basis of the matrimonial property 
jurisdiction (as advocated by Kovacs (1982) 8 Adel. L.R. 163, 
176) by resorting to such constitutional powers as that 
relating to corporations in 3.51(xx). (Compare the position 
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (0th.) by examining s.6 of 
that Act.) 
7. Family Law in Australia: Report of the Joint Select Committee 
on the Family Law Act (July 1980), Vol. 1, para. 5.513. 
8. Discussion Paper No. 22 Matrimonial Property Law (June 1985), 
para. 25. It should be noted that the proposed "interchange 
of powers" amendment to the Australian Constitution was 
defeated at the Federal elections of December, 1984, despite 
the fact that the proposal had received unanimous support at 
successive constitutional conventions for over a decade: 
(1985) Reform 18 at 21. 
9. (1985) Reform 18 at 21 to 22. 
10. Gazzo v. Comptroller of Stamps (1981) F.L.C. 91-101 at 76 731 
to 76 732. 
11. Antonarkis and Anor. v. Delly and Anor. (1976) F.L.C. 90-063; 
' Ascot Investments (1981) F.L.C. 91-000 at 76 061 per Gibbs J. 
12. Re Ross-Jones and Marinovich; ex parte Green (1984) F.L.C. 
91-555 at 79 488 per Gibbs CJ. 
13. Re Davey; ex parte Ross (1979) F.L.C. 90-616. 
14. See, for example, Fogarty J. 's judgment in Prince (1984) F.L.C. 91-501. See also Chapter Four, Part A, of this study. 
15. While taxation is assessed on a progressive scale, there is 
strong incentive for some tax payers to seek to lessen their 
personal income by recourse to company and trust structures. 
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16. The Australian Law Reform Commission has expressed the view 
that the amendment is sufficiently proximate to the rights and 
duties arising fram the marital relationship to fall within 
the limits of the "marriage power" that have been set by the 
High Court. 
17. As to the possible interpretations of paragraph (ca)(i) of the 
definition of "matrimonial cause" in s.4(1), see Chapter Four, 
Part C, of this study. 
18. Contrast the New Zealand position where the very fact of 
marriage alters the parties' property rights. See further 
Atkin (1984) 11 N.Z.L.R. 183 at 187. 
JUD. 
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